Opinion
2:23-cv-06649-RMG-MGB
07-17-2024
Glynndeavin Von Fox, Plaintiff, v. Valerie Lowndes, Esq., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Glynndeavin Von Fox, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to the United States Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and certain international agreements. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The instant action is one of eleven lawsuits brought by Plaintiff on December 8, 2023.Like Plaintiff's other pleadings, the initial Complaint in this action is at times illegible and largely incoherent. The Complaint names a single defendant, Valerie Lowndes, Esq. (“Defendant Lowndes”), and references the “U.S. Constitution; Civil Rights Act; [and the] U.N. Human Rights Treaty” as the bases for this action. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) The Complaint alleges that “[a]s the Plaintiff already has the access to current U.S. Supreme Court Writ under 18-8671 that is waiting on transcripts from the SCJD, the numerous lawsuits regarding S.C. Bar Association is [illegible] violation of the law of a [illegible] self-litigant that has already been qualified.” (Id. at 5.) For relief, the Complaint seeks $3.8 in damages. (Id.)
See Von Fox v. Sligman, No. 3:23-cv-6641-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. Lawender, No. 2:23-cv-6643-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. Kornahrens, No. 3:23-cv-6645-RMG (D.S.C. June 24, 2024); Von Fox v. Scott, No. 2:23-cv-6647-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. Biden, No. 2:23-cv-6652-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. Ex-President Donald Trump, No. 2:23-cv-6654-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. The State of Alaska, No. 2:23-cv-6656-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs, No. 2:23-cv-6658-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. Davis, No. 3:23-cv-6661-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.); Von Fox v. Hanahan Police Department, No. 2:23-cv-6665-RMG-MGB (D.S.C.).
The undersigned issued an order on June 3, 2024, notifying Plaintiff that his initial Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 6.) More specifically, the order noted that the pleading was “so confused, ambiguous, vague [and] otherwise unintelligible,” that the Court could not “discern any causes of action” from Plaintiff's Complaint. (Id. at 1-2.) Under General Order, In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Non-Prisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5015-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007), the undersigned then gave Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint that cured the identified pleading deficiencies. (Id. at 2.) The order warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the undersigned's instructions within the time permitted would result in summary dismissal. (Id.)
On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint against Defendant Lowndes. (Dkt. No. 9.) Unfortunately, the pleading is brief and limited to the following:
The legal complaint against the aforementioned, Valerie Lowndes, Esq., is regarding the use of information from a United Kingdom Political Asylee process that was not verified, nor ratified by the United States Supreme Court to enter the United States of America for legal purposes. The aforementioned then on or about December 2023, legally touched the Plaintiff, a one, Glynndeavin von Fox with use of non-confirmed information about a Political Asylee process of the Plaintiff, who is a Political Asylee in the United Kington & it's Commonwealth under UK ARC#5337788, of which the Plaintiff was under legal scrutiny of the legal process of determination of the Plaintiff within the South Carolina Berkeley County Probate Court. The Plaintiff seeks remedy of the Honorable Court because of the defendants actions toward the plaintiff.(See id. (errors in original).) This is the extent of Plaintiff's amended allegations.
Although an amended complaint typically replaces the original, see Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”), the undersigned is compelled to consider the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 9) together with the initial Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) in an abundance of caution. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting that courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case); see also Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasizing “the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities”) (internal citations omitted). Any further references to the “Amended Complaint” herein shall encompass both filings.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, a claim based on a “meritless legal theory” or “baseless” factual contentions, such as “fantastic or delusional” scenarios, may be dismissed sua sponte at any time under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25, 327-28 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 6 at 1-2), summary dismissal is appropriate when a pleading is “so incomprehensible and filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, and unsupported comments or gibberish, that it is unclear what is to be made of them.” Witherspoon v. Berry, No. 9:13-cv-2942-MGL, 2015 WL 1790222, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2015); see also Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a Pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint .... that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such is the case here.
While Plaintiff references several legal authorities in his pleading-the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the United States Constitution, and the “U.N. Human Rights Treaty” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3)-the nonsensical nature of his allegations makes it virtually impossible to discern the true facts underlying these claims.Indeed, Plaintiff alludes to a vague “political asylee process,” a “legal process of determination” before the Berkeley County Probate Court, and a case before the United States Supreme Court without any context or coherent explanation. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Dkt. No. 9.) These confused allegations simply do not demonstrate that Plaintiff suffered any sort of constitutional and/or civil rights violation, or that Defendant Lowndes committed such. See Windham v. Graham, No. 9:08-cv-1935-PMD-GCK, 2008 WL 3833789, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that “a complaint is insufficient where it simply expounds a collection of legal buzzwords but fails to make any factual allegations against the defendants”); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”).
The undersigned assumes that Plaintiff is referring to the United Nations Charter and/or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when he writes, “U.N. Human Rights Treaty.” Because there is no indication that Plaintiff has a private right of action under either of these international instruments, the Court does not entertain any such claims here. See Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that “individual plaintiffs do not have standing to raise any claims under the United Nations Charter and . . . other international obligations”); Hussell v. Jackson Cnty. Prosecuting Att'y, No. 2:19-cv-101, 2020 WL 4208942, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. July 22, 2020) (explaining that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not privately enforceable in federal court); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 907 cmt. a. (1987) (“International agreements . . . generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts....”).
Although the Court was unable to locate any Berkeley County probate proceedings involving Plaintiff, his reference to “U.S. Supreme Court Writ 18-8621” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5) likely alludes to Von Fox v. South Carolina, 139 S.Ct. 2672, 204 L.Ed.2d 1077 (2019), which can be found at Docket No. 18-8671. See Supreme Court of the United States, Docket Search, https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket.aspx (searching Docket No. “18-8671”) (last visited July 17, 2024); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites). Plaintiff apparently filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging certain state court proceedings wherein he was found guilty of several criminal charges before the Charleston County Court of General Sessions in July 2017. See Charleston County Public Index, https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/ (searching Indictment Nos. “2013GS1001945” and “2013GS1001946”) (list visited July 17, 2024); South Carolina Appellate Case Management System, https://www.sccourts.org/ACMS/ (searching Appellate Case No. “2017-001589”). The United States Supreme Court apparently denied Plaintiff's petition on July 3, 2019. It is unclear how this decision would provide the basis for any cognizable claim against Defendant Lowndes here.
To that end, it is worth noting that to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring a constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Because Defendant Lowndes appears to be a private actor, he is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and any such claims would fail in the first instance. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (“[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct....”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Marcantoni v. Bealefeld, 734 Fed.Appx. 198, 199 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “private attorneys do not act under color of state law and a § 1983 suit may not be maintained against an attorney based on his representation”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this action be summarily dismissed without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). In light of this recommendation, the Clerk of Court shall not forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).