Opinion
No. 28455
Decided May 7, 1941.
Workmen's compensation — Death from coronary occlusion not compensable, when — No traumatic injury arising from usual duties.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county.
The plaintiff, Mollie Vogt, filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas alleging in substance that she is the widow of John Vogt; that until his death she was wholly dependent upon him for support; that for some time prior to his decease he was in the employ of the Hudepohl Brewing Company as a helper on a beer truck; that it was his duty to assist in the loading and unloading of various packages and barrels of beer weighing as much as four hundred pounds; that on February 5, 1936, he was compelled to discontinue his work temporarily because he was suffering from a heart ailment known as chronic fibrous myocarditis; that he resumed his employment approximately two months later on April 8, 1936; that after he began his work that day and had assisted in loading five barrels of beer he suffered a coronary occlusion which resulted in almost immediate death; that the strain of his work in assisting with the loading of the truck aggravated the preexisting chronic fibrous myocarditis and thereby caused his death from coronary occlusion; that the plaintiff filed with the defendant, the Industrial Commission of Ohio, her claim for death benefits; that her claim was denied on the ground that the "proof of record fails to show that decedent's death was the result of an injury sustained while in the course of and arising out of employment"; that upon rehearing her claim again was denied for the reason that the "decedent did not sustain an industrial accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act nor was his death caused or accelerated by his work."
The defendant filed a demurrer to the petition on the two grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered for the defendant.
Upon an appeal on questions of law the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the Court of Common Pleas.
The case is in this court by reason of the allowance of the defendant's motion to certify the record.
Mr. B. Wm. Heidkamp and Mr. Joseph, I. Williams, for appellee.
Mr. Thomas J. Herbert, attorney general, Mr. E.P. Felker and Mr. Thomas F. Joseph, for appellant.
The single question presented by the defendant for the consideration of this court is: "Does a petition which recites merely that an employee died from a coronary occlusion suffered while engaged in the performance of his regular duties consisting of heavy work, state a cause of action against the Industrial Commission of Ohio?"
This court is not asked to announce a new rule of law but rather to reapply a frequently stated principle to the facts alleged in this plaintiff's petition as above summarized.
The defendant relies upon the pronouncement in the case of Goodman v. Industrial Commission, 135 Ohio St. 81, 19 N.E.2d 508, in which it was observed that this court has consistently defined the term "injury," as used in the Constitution and statutes of Ohio, to be physical or traumatic in origin and cause, and resulting from a sudden happening at a particular time. In that case the deceased suffered an acute dilatation of the heart while in the performance of his customary duties as a baker. Death resulted the same day. The claim was disallowed by the Industrial Commission and the courts.
In the instant case a careful study of the allegations in the plaintiff's petition discloses nothing to indicate that the deceased was not merely performing his usual duties in the usual manner without traumatic injury of any nature arising therefrom.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals clearly must be reversed and that of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., TURNER, WILLIAMS, HART, ZIMMERMAN and BETTMAN, JJ., concur.
MATTHIAS, J., not participating.