Opinion
01 Civ. 7348 (WK)
December 14, 2001
For Plaintiff: Frederick R. Dettmer, Esq., Law Office of Frederick R. Dettmer, The Lincoln Building, New York, New York.
For Defendants: Christopher A. D'Angelo, Esq., Nixon Peabody LLP, New York, New York.
MEMORANUDMORDER
Plaintiff D. Caroline Vlaskamp ("plaintiff") originally filed this wrongful discharge case in the Supreme Court of New York against her former employer Friends Seminary, a Quaker school, as well as its principal, head of the lower school, governing bodies and its trustees (collectively, "defendants"). On August 8, 2001, defendants removed this action to district court based on the basis of federal question jurisdiction alleging that since the terms of plaintiff's employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement between the Friends Seminary Teachers' Association (the "Teachers' Association") and Friends Seminary (the "Agreement"), plaintiff's state law claim was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (the "LMRA"). Currently before us is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c).
By letter dated August 22, 2001 defense counsel notified us that he inadvertently omitted defendants Joanne Dally, Elizabeth Enloe, John Fields and Edes Gilbert from the caption and body of the Notice of Removal. We consider these defendants to be part of the removed action.
On November 29, 2001 we heard oral argument from the parties. At that time we stated that we did not believe we had jurisdiction under the LMRA, and therefore could not decide the merits of defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we now hold that we do not have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA and therefore, we remand this case to state court.
DISCUSSION
Federal law preempts state actions that could have been brought pursuant to Section 301of the LMRA. Section 301 of the LMRA states in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 213 (when the evaluation of state law claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, Section 301 of the LMRA preempts such state law claims). However, when a claim originally brought in state court and removed to fedreal court pursuant to Section 301of the LMRA could not have been brought under that statute, we must remand the case to state court. Ferro v. Association of Catholic Schools (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 623 F. Supp. 1161.
In National Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop, the Supreme Court held that the National Labors Relation Act, § 1 et seq., as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (the "NLRA"), by which Congress seeks to "protect the right of American workers to bargain collectively[,]" does not authorize the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB") to exercise jurisdiction over parochial school teachers. (1979) 440 U.S. 490, 504. The Supreme Court found no "clear expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers within the jurisdiction of the [NLRB],"and therefore "decline[d] to construe the NLRA in a manner that could call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religious Clauses." Id. at 507.
The parties and our independent research have found only one case that discusses whether the LMRA extends to church-operated schools. In Ferro v. Association of Catholic Schools Judge Robert L. Carter held, in a case strikingly similar to ours, that it did not, and therefore remanded the case to state court. 623 F. Supp. 1161. Defendants urge us not to follow this case and instead to follow a line of cases applying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2-17, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621- 634 (the "ADEA") to church-operated schools, arguing that whereas Catholic Bishop dealt with intrusive government agency action which could give rise to entanglement concerns, our case and the ADEA cases deal with limited judicial interaction which does not. See e.g., Gargano v. Diocese of Rockville Centre (2d Cir. 1996) 80 F.3d 87; De Marco v. Holy Cross High School (2d Cir. 1993) 4 F.3d 166.
However, such an argument does not acknowledge the undividable connection between the LMRA and the NLRA. The LMRA amended the NLRA in 1947, which became known as the Taft-Hartley Act, and it comprises Title I of the NLRA. The purpose behind the creation of the LMRA was to provide a mechanism by which an employee may sue in federal court to enforce a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to the practices and procedures set out in the NLRA. Title V of the amended NLRA provides that the terms `employer,' `employee' and `labor organization' have the same meaning for the purposes of both the NLRA and the LMRA. 29 U.S.C.A. § 142(3).
If we do not have jurisdiction under the NLRA over church-operated schools then we cannot have jurisdiction over them under the LMRA. For this reason we follow the holding in Ferro and find that we do not have jurisdiction to hear this case.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons we find that we lack jurisdiction and therefore we remand this case to state court.
SO ORDERED.