Vlahos v. City of Chicago

13 Citing cases

  1. Greene v. City of Chicago

    209 Ill. App. 3d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 11 times
    In Greene, the court held a pedestrian walking to a friend's house was not an intended user of the street, even though he was injured in a curbside parking area.

    The question of the existence of a duty is one of law to be decided by the court, and if, based upon the pleadings and accompanying affidavits, it appears that no duty is owed plaintiff, summary judgment for defendant is proper. Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660. β€’ 2 Defendant owes no duty to warn pedestrians not using the crosswalk of any hazards outside of the crosswalk.

  2. Curatola v. Village of Niles

    154 Ill. 2d 201 (Ill. 1993)   Cited 83 times
    Discussing factors to consider in determining the existence of a duty for a negligence claim

    Curatola subsequently moved the court to reconsider, presenting evidence that his vehicle did not block or interfere with the use of the driveway, nor did its parking violate municipal ordinances. The trial court, however, denied Curatola's motion to reconsider, citing a recent decision, Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, which rejected the reasoning of Di Domenico and held that a municipality owes no duty to a pedestrian who steps off a curb into the street where no crosswalk exists. Plaintiff subsequently appealed.

  3. Gabriel v. City of Edwardsville

    237 Ill. App. 3d 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 8 times
    In Gabriel, we found that a plaintiff who "walked into the street about five to six steps and tripped over a water main cover" could not recover against the City for her injuries.

    Several other cases have held likewise. ( Curatola v. Village of Niles (1992), 230 Ill. App.3d 743, 746, 598 N.E.2d 945, 946; Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 913, 556 N.E.2d 660, 661; Mason v. City of Chicago (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 330, 331, 527 N.E.2d 572, 573; Risner v. City of Chicago (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 827, 831, 502 N.E.2d 357, 360.) When pedestrians use the public streets as walkways, the law imposes no general duty upon a municipality to safeguard pedestrians.

  4. Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge

    209 Ill. App. 3d 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 12 times
    In Wojdyla the decedent was crossing a six-lane highway, while walking to his parked car when he was struck by an automobile.

    Di Domenico, 171 Ill. App.3d at 296-97. Recently, in Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660, plaintiff also stepped into a hole while getting into his illegally double parked vehicle in an area that was not a crosswalk. The court chose to follow the reasoning of Mason in affirming defendant-city's motion for summary judgment.

  5. Curatola v. Village of Niles

    230 Ill. App. 3d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    Such a duty would overextend a municipal function. ( Greene v. City of Chicago (1991), 209 Ill. App.3d 311, 313, citing Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911.) Plaintiff's underlying contention is that the fact situation of the instant case sets it apart from this doctrine.

  6. Torres v. City of Chicago

    218 Ill. App. 3d 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Finding plaintiff an intended user of the roadway when he stepped back from the trunk of a legally parked vehicle: "use of the parking space logically entails pedestrian use of the adjacent areas in order to enter and exit the parked vehicle and such use of the street is therefore also intended and permitted and reasonably foreseeable"

    We also find distinguishable the five appellate court cases which have been released since the instant case was briefed, addressing the issue of whether a municipality owes a duty of care to a pedestrian injured while walking on the street outside of the crosswalk. In Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660, the plaintiff was injured after stepping into a hole in the street, outside of a crosswalk, while walking to his illegally double-parked car. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff in Vlahos was not a permitted and intended user of the street since he parked in a spot where parking was not lawfully permitted and the city obviously did not intend for cars to be parked illegally.

  7. Vaughn v. City of West Frankfort

    166 Ill. 2d 155 (Ill. 1995)   Cited 70 times
    Recognizing that a pedestrian who crosses the street midblock, outside of a crosswalk, is not an intended user

    Under this rationale, pedestrians such as plaintiff, who cross a street or roadway midblock, outside of a crosswalk, are not intended users of the street as contemplated in section 3-102 of the Act. Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge (1992), 148 Ill.2d 417; see Gabriel v. City of Edwardsville (1992), 237 Ill. App.3d 649; Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911; Mason v. City of Chicago (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 330; Swett v. Village of Algonquin (1988), 169 Ill. App.3d 78; Risner v. City of Chicago (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 827; Deren v. City of Carbondale (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 473. Plaintiff further argues that because the sidewalk on the east side of Jefferson Street ended midblock, and section 11-1007 of the Vehicle Code requires pedestrians to walk on the sidewalk where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, it was necessary for her to cross the street midblock to reach the sidewalk provided on the west side of the street.

  8. Ramirez v. City of Chicago

    212 Ill. App. 3d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 17 times
    Identifying Greene as an exception to the general rule that streets are for use by vehicles and not pedestrians because the "plaintiff was standing near or attending a disabled vehicle"

    The Illinois appellate courts have addressed the issue of whether a municipality owes a pedestrian a duty of care in the maintenance of roadways in an increasing number of cases. (See Deren v. City of Carbondale (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 473, 300 N.E.2d 590; Risner, 150 Ill. App.3d 827, 502 N.E.2d 357; Di Domenico v. Village of Romeoville (1988), 171 Ill. App.3d 293, 525 N.E.2d 242; Mason, 173 Ill. App.3d 330, 527 N.E.2d 572; Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660; Vance v. City of Chicago (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 652, 557 N.E.2d 494; Princivalli v. City of Chicago (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 525, 559 N.E.2d 1190.) In fact, two more decisions involving the issue before this court have been released since the parties briefed the case at bar.

  9. Sisk v. Williamson County

    167 Ill. 2d 343 (Ill. 1995)   Cited 43 times
    Holding that even where "it may have been impossible for the pedestrian to walk on a sidewalk or in a crosswalk," a pedestrian's use of a street will not be deemed an intended use absent some "manifestations of intent with regard to use of the property by pedestrians."

    Illinois courts have concluded that although pedestrians may be permitted users, they are not intended users of streets outside of marked cross-walks or other areas designated and intended for the protection of pedestrians. See Poindexter v. City of Chicago (1993), 247 Ill. App.3d 47 (plaintiff fell in open manhole while crossing street midblock); Gabriel v. City of Edwardsville (1992), 237 Ill. App.3d 649 (plaintiff tripped on a water main cover while crossing street outside the crosswalks); Greene v. City of Chicago (1991), 209 Ill. App.3d 311 (plaintiff stepped into a pothole while crossing street outside the crosswalks); Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911 (plaintiff stepped in hole while walking to his vehicle which was double-parked); Mason v. City of Chicago (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 330 (plaintiff stepped into a hole while crossing street midblock, outside the crosswalk); Householder v. City of Bunker Hill (1988), 172 Ill. App.3d 1037 (plaintiff stepped into a manhole while pushing a vehicle in the street); cf. Evans v. City of Chicago (1994), 268 Ill. App.3d 924 (plaintiff fell into open manhole 15 inches outside an unmarked crosswalk). In Deren, the plaintiff alleged that the road on which he was injured was "regularly used by a large number of pedestrians * * * and that by use, the edge of the roadway had become a pedestrian walkway which the city knew or should have known."

  10. Ramirez v. City of Chicago

    2019 IL App (1st) 180841 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    cerns only the permitted and intended use of the street immediately around a legally parked vehicle"); DeMambro , 2013 IL App (4th) 120957, ΒΆ 25, 371 Ill.Dec. 877, 990 N.E.2d 1255 ("plaintiff was clearly intended to be in the area around her vehicle, which, as the City concedes, was lawfully parked near the curb"); Grove v. City of Park Ridge , 240 Ill. App. 3d 659, 661-62, 181 Ill.Dec. 348, 608 N.E.2d 421 (1992) (municipality's duty extends "only to those pedestrians walking to or from the curb area, going to or from a legally parked vehicle"); Di Domenico v. Village of Romeoville , 171 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296, 121 Ill.Dec. 436, 525 N.E.2d 242 (1988) (in finding that municipality owed duty to a plaintiff who was injured while walking to his car, noting that the plaintiff "legally parked in a location used for such purpose"). Further underscoring that a plaintiff must park legally, in Curatola , 154 Ill. 2d at 212, 181 Ill.Dec. 631, 608 N.E.2d 882, the court criticized another decision, Vlahos v. City of Chicago , 198 Ill. App. 3d 911, 145 Ill.Dec. 42, 556 N.E.2d 660 (1990), because it did not recognize that the plaintiff there was illegally parked, which should have been a salient fact in determining that the plaintiff was not an intended and permitted user of the street. Though none of these cases expressly considered the scenario of an illegally parked vehicle, the cases instruct that a plaintiff must be legally parked to be an intended and permitted user of the street area around her vehicle.