The question of the existence of a duty is one of law to be decided by the court, and if, based upon the pleadings and accompanying affidavits, it appears that no duty is owed plaintiff, summary judgment for defendant is proper. Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660. β’ 2 Defendant owes no duty to warn pedestrians not using the crosswalk of any hazards outside of the crosswalk.
Curatola subsequently moved the court to reconsider, presenting evidence that his vehicle did not block or interfere with the use of the driveway, nor did its parking violate municipal ordinances. The trial court, however, denied Curatola's motion to reconsider, citing a recent decision, Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, which rejected the reasoning of Di Domenico and held that a municipality owes no duty to a pedestrian who steps off a curb into the street where no crosswalk exists. Plaintiff subsequently appealed.
Several other cases have held likewise. ( Curatola v. Village of Niles (1992), 230 Ill. App.3d 743, 746, 598 N.E.2d 945, 946; Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 913, 556 N.E.2d 660, 661; Mason v. City of Chicago (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 330, 331, 527 N.E.2d 572, 573; Risner v. City of Chicago (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 827, 831, 502 N.E.2d 357, 360.) When pedestrians use the public streets as walkways, the law imposes no general duty upon a municipality to safeguard pedestrians.
Di Domenico, 171 Ill. App.3d at 296-97. Recently, in Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660, plaintiff also stepped into a hole while getting into his illegally double parked vehicle in an area that was not a crosswalk. The court chose to follow the reasoning of Mason in affirming defendant-city's motion for summary judgment.
Such a duty would overextend a municipal function. ( Greene v. City of Chicago (1991), 209 Ill. App.3d 311, 313, citing Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911.) Plaintiff's underlying contention is that the fact situation of the instant case sets it apart from this doctrine.
We also find distinguishable the five appellate court cases which have been released since the instant case was briefed, addressing the issue of whether a municipality owes a duty of care to a pedestrian injured while walking on the street outside of the crosswalk. In Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660, the plaintiff was injured after stepping into a hole in the street, outside of a crosswalk, while walking to his illegally double-parked car. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff in Vlahos was not a permitted and intended user of the street since he parked in a spot where parking was not lawfully permitted and the city obviously did not intend for cars to be parked illegally.
Under this rationale, pedestrians such as plaintiff, who cross a street or roadway midblock, outside of a crosswalk, are not intended users of the street as contemplated in section 3-102 of the Act. Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge (1992), 148 Ill.2d 417; see Gabriel v. City of Edwardsville (1992), 237 Ill. App.3d 649; Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911; Mason v. City of Chicago (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 330; Swett v. Village of Algonquin (1988), 169 Ill. App.3d 78; Risner v. City of Chicago (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 827; Deren v. City of Carbondale (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 473. Plaintiff further argues that because the sidewalk on the east side of Jefferson Street ended midblock, and section 11-1007 of the Vehicle Code requires pedestrians to walk on the sidewalk where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, it was necessary for her to cross the street midblock to reach the sidewalk provided on the west side of the street.
The Illinois appellate courts have addressed the issue of whether a municipality owes a pedestrian a duty of care in the maintenance of roadways in an increasing number of cases. (See Deren v. City of Carbondale (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 473, 300 N.E.2d 590; Risner, 150 Ill. App.3d 827, 502 N.E.2d 357; Di Domenico v. Village of Romeoville (1988), 171 Ill. App.3d 293, 525 N.E.2d 242; Mason, 173 Ill. App.3d 330, 527 N.E.2d 572; Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911, 556 N.E.2d 660; Vance v. City of Chicago (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 652, 557 N.E.2d 494; Princivalli v. City of Chicago (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 525, 559 N.E.2d 1190.) In fact, two more decisions involving the issue before this court have been released since the parties briefed the case at bar.
Illinois courts have concluded that although pedestrians may be permitted users, they are not intended users of streets outside of marked cross-walks or other areas designated and intended for the protection of pedestrians. See Poindexter v. City of Chicago (1993), 247 Ill. App.3d 47 (plaintiff fell in open manhole while crossing street midblock); Gabriel v. City of Edwardsville (1992), 237 Ill. App.3d 649 (plaintiff tripped on a water main cover while crossing street outside the crosswalks); Greene v. City of Chicago (1991), 209 Ill. App.3d 311 (plaintiff stepped into a pothole while crossing street outside the crosswalks); Vlahos v. City of Chicago (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 911 (plaintiff stepped in hole while walking to his vehicle which was double-parked); Mason v. City of Chicago (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 330 (plaintiff stepped into a hole while crossing street midblock, outside the crosswalk); Householder v. City of Bunker Hill (1988), 172 Ill. App.3d 1037 (plaintiff stepped into a manhole while pushing a vehicle in the street); cf. Evans v. City of Chicago (1994), 268 Ill. App.3d 924 (plaintiff fell into open manhole 15 inches outside an unmarked crosswalk). In Deren, the plaintiff alleged that the road on which he was injured was "regularly used by a large number of pedestrians * * * and that by use, the edge of the roadway had become a pedestrian walkway which the city knew or should have known."
cerns only the permitted and intended use of the street immediately around a legally parked vehicle"); DeMambro , 2013 IL App (4th) 120957, ΒΆ 25, 371 Ill.Dec. 877, 990 N.E.2d 1255 ("plaintiff was clearly intended to be in the area around her vehicle, which, as the City concedes, was lawfully parked near the curb"); Grove v. City of Park Ridge , 240 Ill. App. 3d 659, 661-62, 181 Ill.Dec. 348, 608 N.E.2d 421 (1992) (municipality's duty extends "only to those pedestrians walking to or from the curb area, going to or from a legally parked vehicle"); Di Domenico v. Village of Romeoville , 171 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296, 121 Ill.Dec. 436, 525 N.E.2d 242 (1988) (in finding that municipality owed duty to a plaintiff who was injured while walking to his car, noting that the plaintiff "legally parked in a location used for such purpose"). Further underscoring that a plaintiff must park legally, in Curatola , 154 Ill. 2d at 212, 181 Ill.Dec. 631, 608 N.E.2d 882, the court criticized another decision, Vlahos v. City of Chicago , 198 Ill. App. 3d 911, 145 Ill.Dec. 42, 556 N.E.2d 660 (1990), because it did not recognize that the plaintiff there was illegally parked, which should have been a salient fact in determining that the plaintiff was not an intended and permitted user of the street. Though none of these cases expressly considered the scenario of an illegally parked vehicle, the cases instruct that a plaintiff must be legally parked to be an intended and permitted user of the street area around her vehicle.