Opinion
April 20, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (William P. McCooe, J.).
Although the parties involved and the relief sought in the present foreclosure actions are virtually identical to those involved in the five foreclosure actions commenced in 1984 and subsequently stayed in 1985, the present actions differ from the 1984 actions in that the facts underlying the actions are different. In 1984, plaintiffs sought foreclosure because of defendants' failure to make interest payments totaling approximately $267,000 which were due on July 1, 1984, while the present actions seek foreclosure due to defendants' default in the payment of principal amounts due January 1, 1987. Thus, since it appears settled that a mortgagee may maintain separate causes of action for interest and principal (Gregory v. Jacobs, 56 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576, affd 269 App. Div. 921) and separate actions for foreclosure based upon defaults involving interest and principal payments due (Golden v. Ramapo Improvement Corp., 78 A.D.2d 648, 650-651), defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground of prior actions pending should have been denied. (See, Kent Dev. Co. v. Liccione, 37 N.Y.2d 899, 901; Bofinger v. Bofinger, 107 Misc.2d 573, 574-575.) Since we are reinstating the actions and there was no objection by plaintiffs to that portion of defendants' motion seeking consolidation, such relief is granted and the matter remanded to the Supreme Court for determination of plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment.
Concur — Kupferman, J.P., Ross, Carro, Rosenberger and Smith, JJ.