Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-3929.
May 17, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On March 10, 2006, after a three day trial, the jury returned a verdict of $25,000 for the Plaintiff in this reverse discrimination case. The jury awarded Plaintiff $13,560 in backpay and $11,440 in compensatory damages. On April 12, 2006, this court remitted the jury's award of backpay by the amount Ms. Vitullo was receiving from her employment at Home Health Specialists, $22,800 per annum. The testimony at trial established that Ms. Vitullo left her position at Home Health Specialists for reasons unrelated to Yeadon. Thus, we concluded that Yeadon could not be responsible for damages that were not caused by its discriminatory employment. Upon reconsideration, we realize that this issue is not one of causation, but rather of mitigation. Because we conclude that we made a clear error of law, we will grant the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and vacate our prior Order, remitting the jury's award of backpay.
Legal Standard
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). A motion for reconsideration may be granted if the moving party shows: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, the Plaintiff argues that the court made a clear error of law in reducing the backpay award. Thus, the claim is properly presented in a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Defendant argues that the reconsideration motion is untimely filed. We disagree. A motion for reconsideration must be filed within ten days of the date of the entry of the judgment or Order. Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(g). Here, our remittitur Order was entered on April 13, 2006. Excluding weekends and holidays, as required by Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, brings us to April 27, 2006, the date on which Plaintiff filed the reconsideration motion. Therefore, we conclude that it was timely filed.
Causation vs. Mitigation
During the trial, Ms. Vitullo testified that she had been employed by Home Health Specialists at the time she applied for the full time secretarial position with Yeadon. This was full time employment with full benefits. (N.T. 3/8/06, 46-47). At the time she applied for the full-time secretarial position with Yeadon, she was making $22,880. (Exhibit D-18). Ms. Vitullo left her employment with Home Health Specialists because her employer would not permit her sick leave to tend to a medical problem. According to her own testimony, Ms. Vitullo was aware at the time she resigned the position with Home Health Specialists that she was not going to get the full-time secretarial position because the Chief of Police had so advised her mother. (N.T. 3/8/06, 48-49).
When we considered the Defendant's argument for remittitur, we were persuaded by the argument that Yeadon should not be responsible for the damages caused by Plaintiff's decision to leave her employment at Home Health Services. Characterizing the issue as one of causation rather than mitigation eliminates the reasonability element of mitigation. See Long Island Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 616 (2005). See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) ("a victim has a duty to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages"). However, this is not a question of causation. It is an issue of mitigation.
The nuances of causation and mitigation are discussed primarily in the context of breach of contract cases, specifically cases arising out of the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1970's and 1980's. See First Heights Bank F.S.B. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Temple-Inland Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 561 (Fed.Cl. 2005); National Australia Bank v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 352 (Fed.Cl. 2004); First Nationwide Bank v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 438 (Fed.Cl. 2003). As an inducement for healthy institutions to purchase ailing savings and loan associations, ("SL's"), the government offered certain tax incentives. After these institutions purchased the ailing SL's, Congress passed the Guarini Amendment, which eliminated certain of these tax incentives. The new owners of the SL's brought suit alleging breach of contract. The government argued, under the guise of causation, that the Guarini Amendment had not caused the damages claimed by the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs could have avoided certain of the damages by taking tax "charge-offs" prior to the enactment of the Guarini Amendment. The Federal Circuit rejected the government's attempt to characterize this mitigation issue as one of causation, noting that the government's characterization would obliterate the reasonability element of mitigation, as previously noted
The clear import of the government characterizing its argument as one of causation is to avoid the reasonability element of the mitigation doctrine. We disagree, however, with the causation label that the government assigns to its argument. The sole allegation underlying the government's argument is that plaintiffs failed to take actions that would have eliminated some of the damages from the breach. Such an allegation is covered by the mitigation doctrine and its reasonability element. We thus conclude that the government's so-called causation argument is identical to the government's mitigation argument and reject it.First Heights, at 1517.
We face a similar situation in our case. The Defendant claims that the Plaintiff's continued employment with Home Health Services would have eliminated some of the damages she suffered as a result of Yeadon's discriminatory employment decision. Casting it as a question of causation, the reasonableness of Plaintiff's decision to quit that job would not enter into the analysis. However, properly considered as an issue of mitigation, we must look to the factors that influenced Ms. Vitullo's decision because "a victim [of discrimination] has a duty to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages." Faragher, supra (emphasis added).
The undisputed testimony at trial was that Ms. Vitullo left her job at Home Health Services when her employer would not allow her time off to tend to a serious medical problem. (N.T. 3/8/06, 71-72). The jury could easily have concluded that Ms. Vitullo's decision to leave that employment was entirely reasonable under the circumstances, and that Defendant therefore did not prove that Plaintiff "unreasonably" failed to mitigate her damages. Thus, her decision to quit that job does not result in a conclusion that she failed to mitigate her damages. We erred in remitting the backpay award by the amount Ms. Vitullo had been receiving at Home Health Services.
Plaintiff had to have pre-cancerous cells removed from her cervix. According to the Plaintiff, her boss was not supportive and told her that she could not have time off for the medical procedure. (N.T. 3/8/06, 71-72).
Unlike the burden for causation, which is on the Plaintiff, the burden to prove a failure to mitigate damages is on the Defendant.
We will, therefore, reinstate the total verdict of $25,000, including $13,560 in backpay. This conclusion requires us to revisit the calculation of prejudgment interest. In the Memorandum addressing the Motion for Prejudgment Interest, the Defendant conceded that, in the event the verdict was not remitted, the Plaintiff was entitled to an award of prejudgment interest consistent with the Plaintiff's calculations. The Plaintiff calculated the total prejudgment interest as $894.See Exhibit A, attached to Motion for Prejudgment Interest. Therefore, we will mold the verdict to include $894 in prejudgment interest, and enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $25,894. We will address Plaintiff's Motions for Attorneys' Fees and Costs in a separate opinion.
An appropriate Order follows.
Both sides spend much time arguing about this Court's authority to award a new trial had the Plaintiff not accepted the remitted verdict. Because we have found that we erred in remitting the verdict, we have no reason to address these arguments.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of May, 2006, upon consideration of the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, the response, thereto, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. To the extent this Court's Order of April 12, 2006 (entered April 13, 2006), granted the Defendant's Motion for Remittitur, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the prior Order is VACATED. The Defendant's Motion for Remittitur is DENIED. Similarly, this Court's prior Order granting Plaintiff prejudgment interest in the amount of $334.45 is MODIFIED. The Plaintiff's Motion for Prejudgment Interest is GRANTED and the Plaintiff is awarded $894 in prejudgment interest.JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $25,894 (including $13,560 in backpay; $11,440 in compensatory damages; and $894 in prejudgment interest). The court will address the Motions for Attorneys' Fees in a separate opinion.