Opinion
2000-09199
Argued November 13, 2001.
December 24, 2001.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (R.E. Rivera, J.), dated September 6, 2000, as granted those branches of the respective motions of the defendants third-party plaintiffs and second third-party plaintiffs, the third-party defendant, and the second third-party defendant which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Allen L. Rothenberg (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac DeCicco, New York, N Y [Brian J. Isaac] of counsel), for appellants.
Cartafalsa, Slattery Kelly, New York, N.Y. (David R. Beyda of counsel), for defendants third-party plaintiffs and second third-party plaintiffs-respondents.
London Doherty, LLP (Tracy Stilwell, P.C., Staten Island, N Y [John J. Tracy] of counsel), for third-party defendant-respondent.
Motola Klar Dinowitz Carfora, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Courtney M. Robbins and David H. Motola of counsel), for second third-party defendant-respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, SONDRA MILLER, JJ.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants third-party plaintiffs and second third-party plaintiffs met their burden of establishing that they did not create or have notice of the allegedly dangerous condition that allegedly caused the injured plaintiff's injuries. The mere fact that the lobby floor appeared to be highly polished in some areas does not support a cause of action to recover damages for negligence, nor does it give rise to an inference of negligence (see, Guarino v. La Shellda Maintenance Corp., 252 A.D.2d 514; Guzman v. Initial Contract Services, 256 A.D.2d 308). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact warranting a trial. As such, the Supreme Court correctly granted those branches of the respondents' respective motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.
RITTER, J.P., KRAUSMAN, GOLDSTEIN and S. MILLER, JJ., concur.