Opinion
HHDCV156061846S
04-27-2017
Maureen Vita v. Varin Kumar et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ELGO, J.
Presently before the court is a motion to strike filed by the defendant, Amica Mutual Insurance Company, which seeks to strike the second count of the plaintiff's amended complaint. In the second count of her two-count complaint, the plaintiff, Maureen Vita, seeks uninsured motorist benefits from the defendant, with whom she possessed a contract for automobile liability insurance at the time of the alleged motor vehicle accident. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, among other reasons, the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient legal causation. For the reasons discussed herein, the court grants the defendant's motion to strike.
As noted by the summons and the plaintiff's amended complaint, Varun Kumar is a co-defendant in this action. For purposes of this memorandum, however, Amica Mutual Insurance Company will be referred to as the defendant, because the claim directed against Kumar is not presently at issue.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
For purposes of the present motion, the following facts alleged by the plaintiff in her amended complaint are accepted as true. On or about February 18, 2015, the plaintiff was a pedestrian traveling in a westerly direction across Whitney Avenue, at or near its intersection with Hawthorne Avenue, in Hamden. As alleged, Whitney Avenue consists of four travel lanes, two in a northbound direction and two in a southbound direction. While attempting to cross from the east side to the west side of Whitney Avenue, she was struck by a vehicle operated by Varun Kumar. At the time that she was struck by Kumar, the plaintiff had crossed the two northbound lanes of Whitney Avenue and was proceeding from the center portion of the road to cross the two southbound travel lanes. Notably, at the time of the accident, Kumar was traveling in the right lane of the two southbound lanes.
On May 23, 2016, the court, Robaina, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to cite in the defendant (#113.86). On May 26, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, now the operative complaint, which asserted a claim against the defendant (#114).
Additionally, at the time of the accident, an unidentified motorist was operating a motor vehicle at a high rate of speed in the left lane of the two southbound lanes of Whitney Avenue, at or near the intersection with Hawthorne Avenue. The plaintiff alleges that the personal injuries and losses she sustained from Kumar's vehicle striking her were caused by the negligence and carelessness of the unidentified motorist in that the unidentified motorist: (i) failed to grant the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk, in violation of General Statutes § 14-300(c); (ii) operated his/her vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable under the circumstances, in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a; (iii) was inattentive in the operation of his/her vehicle; (iv) failed to have and/or keep his/her vehicle under proper and reasonable control; (v) failed to keep a reasonable lookout for pedestrians and other vehicles; (vi) failed to slow his/her vehicle and allow the pedestrian to cross the street; (vii) knew or should have known that his/her vehicle's position on the roadway obstructed Kumar's view; and (viii) failed to turn his/her vehicle so as to avoid obstructing the view of Kumar.
The plaintiff also alleges that, when Kumar struck her, she held a contract for automobile liability insurance with the defendant, which included coverage for uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits. As alleged by the plaintiff, the unidentified motorist traveling in the left lane of the two southbound lanes of Whitney Avenue was an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by the plaintiff's insurance policy with the defendant. Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff, in count two of her amended complaint, seeks uninsured motorist benefits in accordance with the terms of her contract with the defendant.
II
DISCUSSION
The standards governing this court's review of the defendant's motion to strike are well settled. " The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003); see also Practice Book § 10-39(a)(1). " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). " A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
The defendant attacks the legal sufficiency of the second count of the plaintiff's amended complaint based on the ground that the plaintiff's allegations fail to sufficiently allege legal causation. More specifically, the defendant argues that a trier of fact would need to resort to conjecture or surmise to find that the unidentified motorist's conduct, as alleged by the plaintiff, proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. In response, the plaintiff argues that count two of her amended complaint sufficiently alleges legal causation because her injuries and losses were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the unidentified motorist's conduct. Moreover, the plaintiff argues that proximate cause is a question of fact.
The defendant also claims that the subparagraph in the second count alleging that the unidentified motorist was negligent and/or careless by failing to grant the right-of-way to a pedestrian within a crosswalk, in violation of General Statutes § 14-300(c), is legally insufficient because the plaintiff has not alleged that she was at, within, or near a crosswalk. Because the court agrees with the defendant's argument regarding proximate cause, it does not reach this additional argument.
" [The] [e]ssential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50, 56, 913 A.2d 407 (2007). Moreover, " [t]o prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries . . . The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct . . . The second component of legal cause is proximate cause . . . [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries . . . Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that tied his injuries to the [defendant's conduct] . . . The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection . . . This causal connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise . . . An actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm is a proximate cause of that harm . . . The finding of actual cause is thus a requisite for any finding of proximate cause." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 110 Conn.App. 736, 740, 955 A.2d 1241, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955, 961 A.2d 421 (2008); see, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kulla, 216 Conn. 390, 399, 579 A.2d 525 (1990) (claim for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits requires that " uninsured or underinsured vehicle . . . be causally connected to the occurrence that results in the claimant's loss"); see also Kumah v. Brown, 130 Conn.App. 343, 348-49, 23 A.3d 758 (2011) (although courts occasionally engage in scope of foreseeable risk analysis when assessing legal cause, " foreseeability is more appropriately resolved as a question of duty, " and relevant analysis for proximate cause determination is whether " a reasonable fact finder could find [that the negligent acts were] a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff's] injuries"), aff'd, 307 Conn. 620, 58 A.3d 247 (2013).
" Proximate cause does not require the plaintiff to remove from the realm of possibility all other potential causes of the accident . . . Instead, the plaintiff must establish that it is more likely than not that the cause on which the plaintiff relics was in fact a proximate cause of the accident." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 310 Conn. 768, 777, 83 A.3d 576 (2014). Moreover, " [t]he issue of proximate causation is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier . . . Conclusions of proximate cause are to be drawn by the jury and not by the court . . . It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable man could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Trzcinski v. Richey, 190 Conn. 285, 295, 460 A.2d 1269 (1983); accord Stewart v. Federated Dep't Stores, 234 Conn. 597, 611, 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Baruno v. Slane, 151 Conn.App. 386, 400, 94 A.3d 1230, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 920, 100 A.3d 851 (2014). Moreover, a court may strike a claim sounding in negligence for failing to sufficiently allege proximate cause. See, e.g., Coste v. Riverside Motors, Inc., 24 Conn.App. 109, 115, 585 A.2d 1263 (1991) (affirming decision to strike negligence claim based on failure to allege proximate cause because conjecture existed and defendant's conduct was " too inconsequential to the ultimate harm to the plaintiff considering the many other variables").
As previously noted, the focus of the defendant's attack on the legal sufficiency of the second count of the plaintiff's amended complaint is that the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege proximate cause. Thus, the court's analysis will be limited to that component of legal causation. Before turning to the specific allegations contained in count two of the plaintiff's amended complaint, however, this court notes its appreciation that decisional law has, at times, discussed foreseeability when addressing causation. See, e.g., Coste v. Riverside Motors, Inc., supra, 24 Conn.App. 114 (" [t]he fundamental inquiry in the substantial factor test is whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Nonetheless, our appellate courts have also indicated that the test and focus of a proximate cause inquiry is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., supra, 310 Conn. 776-77 (" [p]roximate cause requires that the defendant's conduct [was] a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries" [internal quotation marks omitted]); DeCastro v. Odetah Camping Resort, Inc., 170 Conn.App. 581, 591, 155 A.3d 305 (2017) (" [i]n Connecticut, the test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Kumah v. Brown, supra, 130 Conn.App. 348-49 (eschewing application of foreseeability test, instead focusing proximate cause examination on whether reasonable fact finder could find negligent conduct to have been substantial factor in causing injuries). Considering this appellate authority, this court concludes that, in order to satisfy her burden of sufficiently alleging proximate cause in her amended complaint, the plaintiff must allege facts establishing that the unidentified motorist's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about her losses and injuries that flowed from Kumar striking her with a motor vehicle. The plaintiff's alleged causal connection between her injuries and the unidentified motorist's conduct must be based on more than conjecture and surmise. See, e.g., Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 110 Conn.App. 740.
As courts have noted, " [t]he meaning of the term 'substantial factor' is so clear as to need no expository definition . . . Indeed, it is doubtful if the expression is susceptible of definition more understandable than the simple and familiar words it employs." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phelps v. Lankes, 74 Conn.App. 597, 606, 813 A.2d 100 (2003); see also 2 Restatement (Second) Torts, What Constitutes Legal Cause, § 431, comment (a), p. 429 (1965) (noting that " [t]he word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause").
As previously noted, the plaintiff alleges that the unidentified motorist: (i) failed to grant the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk, in violation of § 14-300(c); (ii) operated his/her vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable under the circumstances, in violation of § 14-218a; (iii) was inattentive in the operation of his/her vehicle; (iv) failed to have and/or keep his/her vehicle under proper and reasonable control; (v) failed to keep a reasonable lookout for pedestrians and other vehicles; (vi) failed to slow his/her vehicle and allow the pedestrian to cross the street; (vii) knew or should have known that his/her vehicle's position on the roadway obstructed Kumar's view; and (viii) failed to turn his/her vehicle so as to avoid obstructing the view of Kumar. This court concludes that these allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the unidentified motorist proximately caused the plaintiff's losses and injuries that flowed from the accident with Kumar's vehicle.
This court agrees with the defendant that, as alleged, a trier would need to resort to conjecture or surmise in finding that the unidentified motorist proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. For example, conjecture exists as to whether Kumar would have avoided a collision with the plaintiff had the unidentified motorist: properly granted the right-of-way to a pedestrian; been attentive or otherwise operated his/her vehicle under proper and reasonable control under the circumstances; or operated his/her vehicle at an appropriate speed under the circumstances. Similarly, conjecture exists as to whether the plaintiff would not have been struck by Kumar's vehicle had Kumar possessed an unobstructed line of sight of the plaintiff. Simply put, as alleged, the trier of fact would necessarily need to resort to conjecture in concluding that the unidentified motorist was a substantial factor in causing the accident, because the second count lacks any facts to suggest that Kumar would not have struck the plaintiff had the unidentified motorist not operated his/her vehicle in the ways alleged.
As presently framed by the amended complaint, a trier of fact would need to resort to conjecture or surmise to draw an unbroken line of causation between the unidentified motorist's operation of his/her motor vehicle and Kumar's collision with the plaintiff. See Kumah v. Brown, supra, 130 Conn.App. 353. Thus, the uninsured vehicle lacks a sufficient causal connection to the plaintiff's claimed injuries and, therefore, her claim against the defendant is insufficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kulla, supra, 216 Conn. 399 (claim for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits requires that " uninsured or underinsured vehicle . . . be causally connected to the occurrence that results in the claimant's loss"); Schweiger v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 110 Conn.App. 740 (" causal connection must be based on more than conjecture or surmise"). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike the second count of the plaintiff's amended complaint is granted.
By the court,