"Generally, 'when a state agency acting in a judicial capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts must give the agency's fact finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.'" Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 426, 432-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Univ. of Tennesseev. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 92 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). According to the defendants, in his NYSDHR complaint, Kim alleged the following:
“The Court may extend the time to serve a defendant upon a showing of good cause.” Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F.Supp.2d 426, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
” Jones, 846 Fed.Appx. at 24; see also Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F.Supp.2d 426, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In making [a] determination [about whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies], a district court must consider whether the person seeking application of the equitable tolling doctrine (1) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled, and (2) has proved that the circumstances are
While the court "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the court "has the discretion to deny leave to amend where there is no indication from a liberal reading of the complaint that a valid claim might be stated." Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 426, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations omitted). To the extent DiCarlo's seeks to amend its complaint, DiCarlo's must submit a letter not to exceed two pages in length by March 17, 2020, addressing whether amendment would be futile in light of this decision.
Courts in this Circuit determining good cause look to (1) the diligence and reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts to serve, and (2) prejudice to the defendants from the delay. See Walters v. Suffolk Cnty., No. 09-cv-556, 2014 WL 940734, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014); Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F.Supp.2d 426, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
Courts in the Second Circuit determining good cause look to (1) the diligence and reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts to serve, and (2) prejudice to the defendants from the delay. See Walters v. Suffolk Cty., No. 09-CV-556, 2014 WL 940734, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014); Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 426, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
Courts in this Circuit determining good cause look to (1) the diligence and reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts to serve, and (2) prejudice to the defendants from the delay. SeeWalters v. Suffolk Cnty., No. 09-CV-556, 2014 WL 940734, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014) ; Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F.Supp.2d 426, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). In the absence of good cause, an extension may still be granted at the court's discretion.
In determining whether there was good cause, the court considers (1) whether plaintiff reasonably and diligently attempted to effect service, and (2) whether defendants are prejudiced by the delay. See Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 426, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
As to the third prima facie factor, "[i]n the context of a claim for discrimination under the ADEA, 'a plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.'" Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 2d 426, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (alteration and some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007)). "The Second Circuit has applied this definition broadly to include discharge, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand."
"Thus, in New York, a plaintiff typically has 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act to file a charge with either the EEOC or the NYSDHR." Visco v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist. , 991 F.Supp.2d 426, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from her job on May 30, 2014. Plaintiff filed her complaint with the NYSDHR 319–days later, on April 14, 2015.