Summary
remanding to the commission to make a factual finding whether George's carpal tunnel syndrome was a disease
Summary of this case from Shoppers Food Ware. v. CumminsOpinion
49464 No. 1715-93-2
Decided May 31, 1994
(1) Workers' Compensation — Benefits — Occupational Disease. — Code Sec. 65.2-46 requires that the condition for which compensation is sought as an occupational disease must first qualify as a disease.
Glenn S. Phelps (R. Ferrell Newman; Thompson, Smithers, Newman Wade, on brief), for appellants.
(Roger G. Hopper, on brief), for appellee.
SUMMARY
Employer appealed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission awarding benefits for an occupational disease, carpal tunnel syndrome. Employer argued that carpal tunnel syndrome is not a disease.
The Court of Appeals remanded, holding that the commission failed to make a finding that carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease.
Reversed and remanded.
OPINION
The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Elizabeth Storm George compensation based upon a determination that she contracted an occupational disease, carpal tunnel syndrome. The sole issue on appeal is whether George's carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease within the meaning of Code Sec. 65.2-400 and the holding of Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d 600 (1993).
(1) In Merillat, the claimant suffered from a torn rotator cuff which resulted from repetitive overhead lifting and manipulation with his left arm. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that a plain reading of Code Sec. 65.1-46, the occupational disease statute, requires that the condition for which compensation is sought as an occupational disease must first qualify as a disease. It concluded that the claimant's condition was not a disease.
Title 65.1, the Workers' Compensation Act, was recodified effective 1991 as Title 65.2. Code Sec. 65.1-46 was redesignated Sec. 65.2-400. There were no substantive changes.t
It appears from the record that the commission assumed but failed to find that George's carpal tunnel syndrome, which also resulted from repetitive activity, was a disease. That assumption was justified in light of this Court's holding that carpal tunnel syndrome is compensable as an occupational disease upon proof of the six requirements of Code Sec. 65.2-400. Knott v. Blue Bell, Inc., 7 Va. App. 335, 337 n.2, 373 S.E.2d 481, 482 n.2 (1988). However, we interpret Merillat to require a separate finding, based upon credible evidence, that the condition is a disease. Merillat, 246 Va. at 433, 436 S.E.2d at 602.
Therefore, we remand this case for the commission to make a factual finding whether George's carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease within the meaning of that term in Code Sec. 65.2-400. See Piedmont Manufacturing Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 501, 438 S.E.2d 765 (1993); Department of State Police v. Haga, 18 Va. App. 162, 442 S.E.2d 424 (1994). In view of the developments in the law since this case was decided before the commission, we direct the commission to allow both parties the opportunity to present additional evidence concerning whether the condition is a disease.
Reversed and Remanded.
Elder, J., and Cole, S.J., concurred.