Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-cv-1056-AT
2023-08-11
VIRAL DRM, LLC, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN COUNTER NOTIFICANTS, Defendants.
Joel Benjamin Rothman, Evan A. Andersen, Faith Beckworth, Sriplaw, P.A., Boca Raton, FL, for Plaintiff.
Joel Benjamin Rothman, Evan A. Andersen, Faith Beckworth, Sriplaw, P.A., Boca Raton, FL, for Plaintiff.
ORDER
Amy Totenberg, United States District Judge
Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Viral DRM, LLC's Motion for Expedited Consideration, [Doc. 6], Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, [Doc. 9], Motion for Service by Alternative Means, [Doc. 10], Motions for Leave to File Matters under Seal, [Docs. 11, 18], and Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, [Doc. 16]. After careful consideration of the filings, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Expedited Consideration, [Doc. 6], and Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, [Doc. 16]. And as explained below, the Court DENIES the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, [Doc. 9], and Motion for Service by Alternative Means, [Doc. 10], but GRANTS the Motions for Leave to File Certain Matters under Seal, [Docs. 11, 18].
I. Background
This case concerns allegations that a number of foreign nationals uploaded unauthorized copies of copyrighted videos to YouTube, in violation of the United States Copyright Act.
Viral DRM is a Mississippi-based syndicator of extreme weather videos. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), Doc. 16-1 at ¶¶ 2-3). It is affiliated with WXchasing LLC (a Mississippi-based video-production company that creates videos that Viral DRM licenses and syndicates) and Live Storms Media LLC (an Alabama-based licensing broker of video content that is owned or exclusively licensed to Viral DRM and WXchasing). (Id. at ¶ 4). WXchasing and Live Storms Media have YouTube channels on which they post many of their videos, and Viral DRM licenses video content to large media outlets like CNN, The Weather Channel, and Weather.com. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8).
Defendants are individuals residing outside the United States who operate various YouTube channels. See (id. at ¶¶ 16-17, Doc. 17-1). Viral DRM alleges that Defendants downloaded its copyrighted videos from YouTube or Facebook, edited them, and uploaded unauthorized versions to their own YouTube channels. See (SAC, Doc. 16-1 at ¶ 22-24, 32-33). When Viral DRM discovered the unauthorized videos, they submitted take-down notices to YouTube, which identified the videos as copyright-infringing content that need to be removed. See (id. at ¶¶ 54-55, 67). When YouTube removed the videos from Defendants' channels, Defendants allegedly submitted counternotices to YouTube—bearing false names and contact information—in which they misrepresented that they were permitted to post the videos. See (id. at ¶¶ 56-57, 68-71, 91).
In response, Viral DRM initiated this lawsuit on March 11, 2023. (Doc. 1). On June 26, it moved for expedited consideration of its forthcoming filings, [Doc. 6], and the following day, it filed its First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 7), a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, [Doc. 9], a Motion for Service by Alternative Means, [Doc. 10], and a Motion for Leave to File Certain Matters under Seal, [Doc. 11]. In Schedule A to the Amended Complaint, Viral DRM identified for the first time Defendants' names, nations of residence, and YouTube channels, which Viral DRM was able to obtain by subpoena from Google LLC (YouTube's parent company). See (Doc. 7 at ¶ 22, Doc 8-1).
After reviewing the filings, the Court issued a June 28 Order directing Viral DRM to provide supplemental briefing outlining the specific legal bases for the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over each Defendant. (Doc. 14). Several days later, Viral DRM moved to submit a Second Amended Complaint, which contained additional allegations concerning the Court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. [Doc. 16]. It also filed another Motion for Leave to File Certain Matters under Seal, [Doc. 18], and supplemental briefing regarding the legal grounds for the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, (Doc. 19). Most recently, on July 18, Viral DRM submitted a letter in response to the Court's query as to whether counsel has previously litigated other cases, involving similar facts, where a TRO was issued against similarly situated defendants. See (Doc. 21). Counsel indicated that they have not. See (Doc. 21-1 at 1). II. EX PARTE TRO REQUEST
At this juncture, the Court must deny Viral DRM's TRO request because it has not established that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants.
A. Legal Standard
A temporary restraining order is an "extraordinary and drastic remedy." Cooper v. Raffensperger, 472 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (citing Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)). Before a court will grant a TRO, the requesting party must demonstrate "(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest." Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Where, as here, an ex parte TRO is requested, the plaintiff must also establish compliance with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
Still, the most basic prerequisite for a TRO is adequately establishing that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. "A court ordinarily does not have power to issue an order against a person . . . over whom it has not acquired in personam jurisdiction." 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2956 (3d ed. 2023); see also Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) ("[A]n in personam judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant is void as to that defendant."); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.6 (11th Cir. 1999) ("A court without personal jurisdiction is powerless to take further action."). Thus, a court lacking personal jurisdiction also lacks the authority to issue a TRO against the defendants. See Neenah, Inc. v. Mohawk Fine Papers, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-04870-ELR, 2019 WL 2080267, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2019); AimPoint Re SA v. GCD & Assocs., LLC, No. 1:17-CV-1817-WSD, 2017 WL 7519193, at *4 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2017). And further, if a requesting party has not established personal jurisdiction, he also cannot make the requisite showing of a substantial likelihood of success before the court. See Jones v. Shaw Grp., No. 1:08-CV-2826-CAP, Doc. 119 at 4, 2009 WL 10668737 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 4, 2009).
See also Viahart, LLC v. Does 1-73, No. 6:18-CV-604-RWS-KNM, 2018 WL 6929341, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Viahart, LLC v. Does 1-54, No. 6:18-CV-00604-RWS, 2019 WL 2127307 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2019); Am. Girl, LLC v. Nameview, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880-81 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
B. Discussion
Viral DRM requests that the Court exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants. The Court has questioned its authority to do so based on the pleadings and given Viral DRM multiple opportunities submit supplemental materials supporting the Court's exercise of jurisdiction in this case. See (Docs. 14, 16, 19, 21). Because the Court remains doubtful that it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, Viral DRM's TRO request must be denied.
"A plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction." United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, Viral DRM argues that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the nonresident Defendants because they consented to the Court's jurisdiction when they submitted the YouTube counternotices. See (Docs. 19 at 10-11, 21-1 at 2). The Court disagrees.
To be sure, the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be waived, and "[a] variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court." Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); see also Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 143 S. Ct. 2028, 2039, 216 L.Ed.2d 815 (2023) ("Our precedents have recognized, too, that 'express or implied consent' can continue to ground personal jurisdiction—and consent may be manifested in various ways by word or deed."). Where such agreements are "freely negotiated" and are not "unreasonable and unjust," their enforcement does not offend due process. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citation omitted); Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 921 (11th Cir. 1989). But waiver provisions should not be enforced when they are "invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972).
Here, the YouTube counternotifications are insufficient to establish that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. First, the counternotifications Viral DRM attached to the Second Amended Complaint only relate to accounts operated by three of the eight Defendants. Compare (Doc. 16-4) to (Doc. 17-1). So even if the counternotices constitute valid jurisdictional waivers, they cannot provide the Court personal jurisdiction over five of the Defendants.
Second, as Viral DRM alleges, the counternotifications were fraudulent. (SAC, Doc. 16-1 at ¶¶ 68-71). They contain fake names and address, making it uncertain that they can be treated as valid, enforceable waivers of personal jurisdiction against the Defendants that submitted them. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907; cf. Liles v. Ginn-La W. End, Ltd., 631 F.3d 1242, 1256 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ("[A] forum-selection clause cannot ordinarily be invoked by or against a party who did not sign the contract in which the provision appears.") (cleaned up).
Third, even if the fraudulent counternotifications constitute valid jurisdictional waivers, they do not appear to give this Court personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. The operation of the counternotices' jurisdiction-consent provision turns on whether the party submitting the counternotice has a U.S. or foreign address. Where the party has an American address, they "consent to the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court for the district in which [the] address is located." (Doc. 16-4). But if they have a foreign address, they consent to the jurisdiction of "the judicial district in which YouTube is located." Id. The federal district "in which YouTube is located" is most reasonably understood to be the Northern District of California, the district containing YouTube's San Bruno, California headquarters, which is the address listed on the counternotices. See id.; Epic Games, Inc. v. Mendes, No. 17-CV-06223-LB, 2018 WL 2926086, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2018) (holding that a by submitting a YouTube counternotice, in which a foreign defendant consented to the jurisdiction of "the judicial district in which YouTube is located," he consented to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California); Crunchyroll, Inc. v. Pledge, No. C 11-2334 SBA, 2014 WL 1347492, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (same).
See (Doc. 16-4) ("I consent to the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court for the district in which my address is located, or if my address is outside of the United States, the judicial district in which YouTube is located, and will accept service of process from the claimant.").
Here, Viral DRM attached 23 YouTube counternotices to its Second Amended Complaint—21 list a Birmingham, Alabama address and two list an address in Vietnam. See (Doc. 16-4). Ordinarily, the Alabama counternotices would confer personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Alabama, and the Vietnam counternotices would confer personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of California. But since Viral DRM alleges that the counternotices are fraudulent, it argues that Defendants' actual foreign addresses control, and Defendants should be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of "the judicial district in which YouTube is located." See (Doc. 21-1 at 2).
Viral DRM argues that this jurisdiction-consent provision should be read far more broadly than it is written, to serve as consent to suit in any judicial district where Google, YouTube's parent company, has an office or facility. See (Docs. 19 at 10-11, 21-1 at 2-3). The Court declines this invitation, as it is inconsistent with the text of the provision. Cf. DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302, 1315 (11th Cir. 2020) ("In interpreting a forum-selection clause's language, we turn to general contract principles to apply the plain meaning of the contract's language.").
Regardless, the counternotices do not confer specific personal jurisdiction to this Court. Under the terms of the jurisdiction-consent provision, Defendants could reasonably foresee being subject to litigation in the Northern District of Alabama or the Northern District of California, but not the Northern District of Georgia. Thus, the counternotices do not permit the Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over any of the Defendants.
Because Defendants did not consent to the Court's jurisdiction, the next question is whether the Court may nonetheless exercise specific personal jurisdiction over them. Determining whether a court has specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires a two-part analysis: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be appropriate under the state long-arm statute; and (2) the defendant must have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so that "maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " See Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).
Even if jurisdiction were appropriate under Georgia's long-arm statute—which is unlikely—due process concerns prohibit the Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. The exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that has not consented to suit in the forum complies with Due Process when the defendant "has 'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted); see also McCall v. Zotos, No. 22-11725, 2023 WL 3946827, at *4 (11th Cir. June 12, 2023) (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013)) (stating Due Process requires plaintiff to establish that (1) his claims "arise out of or relate to" defendant's contacts with the forum and (2) "the nonresident defendant 'purposefully availed' himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state").
Here, the allegations do not indicate that Defendants directed any activity towards Georgia, much less that they did so purposefully. Instead, Viral DRM alleges that Defendants—foreign nationals, residing abroad—downloaded copyrighted videos from YouTube or Facebook, edited them, and uploaded unauthorized versions to their own globally accessible YouTube pages. This is not enough.
Notably, Viral DRM's jurisdiction-related allegations and briefing appear to largely describe Viral DRM's and Google/YouTube's contacts with Georgia, rather than Defendants' contacts with the state. This is unavailing, as the Supreme Court has "consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused 'minimum contacts' inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State." Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014). "Put simply, however significant the plaintiff's contacts with the forum may be, those contacts cannot be 'decisive in determining whether the defendant's due process rights are violated.' " Id. at 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115 (citation omitted).
Courts have generally found that a nonresident defendant's Internet-based activities are "purposefully directed" at a given forum "(1) where the defendant's website functioned 'as the defendant's storefront in the forum'; and (2) where the defendant's conduct met the Calder 'effects test.' " See Smarter Every Day, LLC v. Nunez, No. 2:15-CV-01358-RDP, 2017 WL 1247500, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2017) (citing Triple Up Ltd. v. Youku Tudou Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 15, 24 (D.D.C. 2017)). Plaintiff's allegations fall into neither category.
The ability of forum residents to access a defendant's website or Internet posts, standing alone, is insufficient to confer specific personal jurisdiction. See Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2022); McCall, 2023 WL 3946827, at *4-5 & n.2; Smarter Every Day, 2017 WL 1247500, at *3 (collecting cases); see also Esslinger v. Endlink, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-153-TCB, 2023 WL 3931505, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2023) (slip opinion) (finding that the mere accessibility of defendant's "website, app, and LinkedIn profile" to Georgia residents did not confer specific personal jurisdiction where there was no evidence that defendant "directed sales or advertising through these internet contacts" to Georgia). To the extent Viral DRM attempts to argue otherwise, it is simply incorrect.
First, Defendants are not alleged to have used their YouTube pages to contact, enter electronic transactions with, or send anything to Georgians. See Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1271, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2022); Smarter Every Day, 2017 WL 1247500, at *4. Second, Defendants' alleged tortious actions were not "expressly aimed at the plaintiff in the forum state." See Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)) (emphasis added); Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1276; Smarter Every Day, 2017 WL 1247500, at *5.
This is a notable distinction between this case and those where the Court has frequently exercised personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants using websites to advertise, sell, and send infringing products to Georgians. See, e.g., Glock, Inc. v. Wuster, 122 F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (collecting cases where Georgia federal courts "held that specific jurisdiction was proper over an online retailer that sold allegedly patent-infringing and/or trademark-violating products into Georgia").
Instead, Defendants allegedly harmed Viral DRM (a Mississippi-based LLC) by posting unauthorized copies of its videos to a globally accessible media-hosting website. In similar cases, courts have routinely declined to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants that upload copyright-infringing photos or videos to websites that are not specifically directed at the relevant forum. See, e.g., Crunchyroll, Inc., 2014 WL 1347492, at *10-11 (declining to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident, foreign defendant who uploaded infringing videos to YouTube); Strober v. Harris, No. 8:20-CV-2663-T-35JSS, 2020 WL 13120131, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:20-CV-2663-MSS-JSS, 2020 WL 13120139 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2020) (declining to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who incorporated copyrighted material into a YouTube video); Smarter Every Day, 2017 WL 1247500, at *4-5 (declining to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who uploaded infringing photos and video to its Facebook page); AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1210-12 (9th Cir. 2020) (declining to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, foreign defendant who uploaded infringing videos on an internationally available video-hosting website). Viral DRM fares no better, as the Court cannot conclude that its claims "arise out of or relate to" Defendants' contacts with Georgia, or that Defendants "purposefully directed" their allegedly tortious activities at the state. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted).
Because, at this juncture, Viral DRM has not shown that the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, Viral DRM's TRO request [Doc. 9] is DENIED.
III. Motions for Leave to File Matters under Seal
Viral DRM moved for the Court to temporarily maintain under seal Schedule A to the Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint, as well as Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Declaration of Brandon Clement in support of their TRO request. See [Docs. 11, 18]. These documents identify the Defendants, their places of residence, their YouTube channels, and the details of the allegedly infringing videos that they uploaded. See (Docs. 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 17-1). Viral DRM requests that the documents remain under seal until the Court rules on its TRO request "and, if granted, the relief ordered therein has been effectuated." (Docs. 11 at 6, 18 at 6-7).
Because Viral DRM predicated this temporary seal on the Court granting its TRO request, the Court's denial of the TRO request would seem to render its Motions to Seal largely moot. However, the Court recognizes Viral DRM's legitimate concern that when Defendants learn of its claims and requested relief, they may hide or transfer any ill-gotten proceeds and relevant records, hindering the prospects of a future remedy.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Viral DRM's requests for a temporary seal with the following conductions:
1) The documents will remain under seal until 5:00 PM EST on August 25, 2023, 14 days after the issuance of this Order, to allow Viral DRM to determine whether it will proceed with this case before the Court;
2) If Viral DRM timely notifies the Court of its intent to proceed, the documents will remain under seal until October 10, 2023, to allow Viral DRM to serve Defendants as discussed in Section IV, infra;
3) But if Viral DRM moves to voluntarily dismiss this case before the August 25 deadline, the Court will permanently seal the documents;
4) If Viral DRM does not notify the Court of its intent to either proceed or to dismiss this case by August 25, the documents will be unsealed on that date.
IV. Motion for Alternative Service
Viral DRM requests authorization to serve process on the foreign, nonresident Defendants by email and a website posting under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). [Doc. 10].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) governs service of process in foreign countries. Under Rule 4(f)(1), an individual or corporation may be served in a foreign country "by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1). Rule 4(f)(3) permits alternative methods of service so long as those methods are not prohibited by international agreement and are approved by the Court.
The Supreme Court has stated that compliance with the Hague Convention "is mandatory in all cases to which it applies." Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988); 5th Method Consulting, LLC v. Barrick Lumwana Mining Co., No. 1:20-CV-2256-CAP, 2020 WL 13588240, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 21, 2020); Lighting Sci. Grp. Corp. v. Nichia Corp., No. 1:19-CV-1948-LMM, 2019 WL 9633377, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2019); see Tillotson Corp. v. Supermax Corp. Bhd., No. 4:07-CV-0193-RLV, 2008 WL 11336243, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 21, 2008) ("[T]his court does have the discretion to tailor or modify the appropriate method of service when the Convention applies."). But a plaintiff is not required to serve a person outside of the United States in accordance with the Convention "where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known." Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, Art. 1, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
Here, Defendants reside in Albania, Egypt, Slovenia, Vietnam, and Ukraine, which are all signatories to the Hague Service Convention. See (Docs. 10-1 at 3; 17-1 at 1); HCCH Members, https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members. And in Schedule A to the Second Amended Complaint, Viral DRM provided addresses for each of the Defendants. See (Doc. 17-1). Because Defendants' addresses are known, Viral DRM is required to serve process in accordance with the Hague Service Convention, and the Court may not, at this juncture, exercise its discretion to permit alternative methods of service.
The Court therefore DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Viral DRM's Motion for Alternative Service, [Doc. 10], and grants it an additional 60 days from the entry of this Order to serve Defendants in accordance with the Hague Convention. In the event that the Viral DRM is unsuccessful in its attempts to serve Defendants using the methods required under the Convention, it may refile its request to serve by an alternative method by October 10, 2023. Any renewed motion should detail Viral DRM's efforts at service as well as its attempts to understand and comport with the law governing service of process in the relevant countries.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Expedited Consideration, [Doc. 6], Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, [Doc. 16], and the Motions for Leave to File Certain Matters under Seal, [Docs. 11, 18]. But the Court DENIES the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, [Doc. 9], and Motion for Service by Alternative Means, [Doc. 10].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th Day of August, 2023.