Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:99CV144-P-D.
March 21, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause comes before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. The Court has duly considered the motions and the parties' memoranda and is ready to rule.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This is a suit by plaintiffs Harry Vinson and Patty Young alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The facts giving rise to the litigation are as follows:
On or about Sunday, April 18, 1999, plaintiffs were visiting at the home of Woodrow and Kernith Vinson, where Ms. Rita Vinson lived with her parents. Rita Vinson contacted Scotty Reedy, a deputy sheriff with the Lee County Sheriff's Department, and told him that Harry Vinson and Patty Young were at her home and asked that he respond to enforce a restraining order in effect against Harry Vinson. Reedy did so; the Complaint alleges that he "burst into the elderly Mr. Vinson's home brandishing a gun . . . and . . . ordered these plaintiffs from the residence of elderly Mr. Vinson."
Rita Vinson is the sister of Harry Vinson.
The restraining order was issued by Lee County Chancellor Timothy Ervin in a matter styled Woodrow W. Vinson and Kernith B. Vinson v. Harry W. Vinson et al., Chancery Court of Lee County, Mississippi, Cause No. 96-0078. The order provided:
Defendants are hereby enjoined from entering into or on the homestead of Mr. and Mrs. Woodrow Vinson, from calling the residence, or doing anything to in any way disturb, frighten or harass either Mr. and Mrs. Vinson or any member of the household, including their daughter, Rita Vinson, who resides in the same residence. Defendants are not to approach or attempt to communicate with or contact them in any setting or circumstances or by any means. This order shall remain in effect until a subsequent order of this Court cancels or modifies this injunction.
The injunction was never modified. The Court's final decree dated October 13, 1998 specifically references the earlier orders and provides: "The Court hereby declines to set aside the agreement previously entered into by Defendants and finds that there is no factual basis for rescinding the previous Orders and Decrees entered by this Court in these causes."
As a result of the foregoing incident, the plaintiffs filed the instant action, seeking several million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages from Rita Vinson, Scotty Reedy and insurance companies and sureties for the Sheriff's Department. The defendants responded by filing motions to dismiss based on F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), as well as Mr. Reedy's affirmative defense of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The motions have been fully briefed and the Court is ready to rule.
Although defendant Reedy styled his motion as one to dismiss, the Court notes his submission of matters extraneous to the pleadings in support of his motion. As a result, the Court construes the motion as one for summary judgment in accordance with the provisions of F.R.C.P. 12(c) .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if a party fails to state a claim under which relief can be granted. The allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true when the Court considers whether the Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action. See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1991); cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3057, 112 S.Ct. 298, 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991). Only the complaint and allegations contained therein are to be considered in reaching a decision on a defendant Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims which would entitle him or her to relief.
LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Vinson's Claims Against Deputy Reedy
Reedy asserts a right to the protection afforded by quasi-judicial immunity. Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107 (5 th Cir. 1996). Attached as exhibits in support of his motion were the affidavit of Sheriff Presley and a copy of Chancellor Ervin's order in Vinson v. Vinson, Cause No. 96-0078. As a result, the Court construes his motion as one for summary judgment and is cognizant of its duty to construe the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. F.R.C.P. 56(c); McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 178 (5 th Cir. 1984).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that "an official acting within the scope of his authority is absolutely immune from a suit for damages to the extent that the cause of action arises from his compliance with a facially valid judicial order issued by a court acting within its jurisdiction." Mays at 113. Defendant Reedy presented evidence that he was acting within the scope of his authority as a deputy sheriff with the Lee County Sheriff's Department when he reported to the Vinson's resident on April 18, 1999. Presley's affidavit likewise reveals that the Reedy's purpose was the enforcement of a judicial decree. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to defeat the evidence presented; nor has he in any wise brought forth evidence tending to establish that the order to be enforced was not facially valid or that Chancellor Ervin was acting without jurisdiction at the time of the order's entry.
In the case at hand, Deputy Reedy was acting in his official capacity when he responded to Rita Vinson's call. Furthermore, the cause of action arose from his enforcement of a facially valid court order in a case undisputedly within the jurisdiction of the chancery court. That being said, plaintiff Vinson is not entitled to pursue a claim for damages against Reedy in his individual capacity. Id.
Any claim Vinson may have attempted to plead against Reedy in his official capacity is likewise insufficient. Official capacity claim is equivalent to alleging an action against the Sheriff's Department, only cognizable where the Complaint alleges that the officer was acting pursuant to an official policy or custom established by the government entity for which he is employed. Vinson's Complaint does not include any such allegations.
B. Vinson's Claims Against Rita Vinson
Mr. Vinson's claims against his sister, Rita Vinson, are also not cognizable under § 1983. Mrs. Vinson herself cannot be considered as having engaged in "state action" or action "under color of" state law by her mere request for the enforcement of the restraining order. And, to the extent that the Complaint alleges a conspiracy to violate § 1983, "plaintiffs must allege that defendant conspired with others who not only acted under color of state law but also may be held liable for their complicity. This, plaintiffs obviously cannot do." International Molders and Allied Workers, ALF-CIO v. Buchanan Lumber Birmingham, 459 F. Supp. 950, 952 (N.D.Ala. 1978), aff'd. 618 F.2d 782 (5 th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
C. Young's Claims Against Reedy and Vinson
Plaintiff Vinson's claims are equally subject to dismissal under this analysis, infra.
Young's claims against defendants Reedy and Vinson likewise fail. The Complaint asserts no violation of Young's First Amendment right to religious freedom at all. The only factual allegation in the pleadings which might include a claim for violation of religious rights is mentioned only in the context of Harry Vinson's asserted "[r]eligious [r]ight and [d]uty to visit and administer help of all natures under the laws of the HOLY BIBLE and the teaching of JESUS THE CHRIST." Complaint at 6. Finally, review of the allegations of the Complaint reveals a dearth of factual information to support the requisite elements of a claim under the First Amendment. "The court is not required to `conjure up unpled allegations or construe elaborately arcane scripts to' save a complaint." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5 th Cir. 1995).
Lemon v. Kurtzman established a three-prong test against which claims for infringement of religious freedom are to be measured:
1) whether the conduct had a secular purpose;
2) whether the primary effect of the conduct advance or inhibited religion; and
3) whether the conduct fostered excessive government entanglement with religious activities.403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Young's Fourth Amendment claim must fail for much the same reason. The Complaint does not allege that Reedy effected an arrest; he merely "ordered these Plaintiffs from the residence." Complaint at 5. Any other allegations in the Complaint constitute mere surplusage. "[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5 th Cir. 1993).
Lastly, the claims presented for violation of plaintiff Young's rights under the Sixth and Eighth Amendment are also subject to dismissal. The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment are only implicated in the context of criminal proceedings. See Bradley v. Extradition Corporation of America, 758 F. Supp. 1153 (W.D.La. 1991); Palermo v. Rorex, 806 F.2d 1266 (5 th Cir. 1987). Ms. Young does not allege that she was subjected to prosecution for the incident alleged in the Complaint. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
D. Claims Against Western Surety and Coregis
In addition to suing the individual defendants, plaintiffs also joined as defendants Western Surety Company ("Western Surety")and Coregis Insurance Company ("Coregis"). Western Surety is the bondholder for Lee County Sheriff, Harold Ray Presley. Coregis is the insurer for Scotty Reedy in his capacity as deputy sheriff with Lee County. Plaintiffs' Complaint does not seek declaratory relief, but attempts to pursue a direct action for damages against these defendants. Mississippi law does not permit direct actions against insurers. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co., 756 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.Miss. 1990). As a further matter, the plaintiffs' claims against Western Surety and Coregis arise solely from the actions of defendant Reedy, i.e., their alleged liability is merely derivative. Because the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief as to Reedy, logic dictates that the insurers are also entitled to a dismissal of the claims against them.
Attorneys' Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Some of the above-named defendants have petitioned the Court for an award of attorneys fees. In light of the fact that they have prevailed on the merits, the Court is willing to entertain a properly supported motion for an award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if presented to the Court within 10 days from the entry of this Memorandum Opinion.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, defendant Reedy in entitled to summary judgment on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. The other defendants are entitled to dismissal pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58.
This, the 21st, day of March, 2000.