The contract was in the nature of a family settlement, free of purpose to withhold evidence and without other inherent tendency to interfere with full and impartial justice in this proceeding. The trial court so concluded and we share that view. For clear reasons of public policy, the law looks with favor upon the voluntary adjustment of conflicting claims by family settlement, courts encourage agreements of that kind, and ordinarily they will be upheld when entered into with a full understanding of the facts and without fraud, undue influence, or other imposition. Burnes v. Burnes, 8 Cir., 137 F. 781, certiorari denied, 199 U.S. 605, 26 S.Ct. 746, 50 L.Ed. 330; Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97; Riffe v. Walton, 105 Kan. 227, 182 P. 640, 6 A.L.R. 549; In re Schofield's Estate, 101 Colo. 443, 73 P.2d 1381; Hill v. Breeden, 53 Wyo. 125, 79 P.2d 482; In re Smith's Estate, 103 Colo. 91, 83 P.2d 333; Richards v. Tiernan, 150 Kan. 116, 91 P.2d 22; In re Edelman's Estate, 336 Pa. 4, 6 A.2d 511; Martin v. Martin, 98 Ark. 93, 135 S.W. 348; Davis v. Davis, 171 Ark. 168, 283 S.W. 360; Hollowoa v. Buck, 174 Ark. 497, 296 S.W. 74; Edwards v. Swilley, 196 Ark. 633, 118 S.W.2d 584; Barnett v. Barnett, 199 Ark. 754, 135 S.W.2d 828; Stark v. Stark, 201 Ark. 133, 143 S.W.2d 875; Harris v. Citizens Bank Trust Co., 172 Va. 111, 200 S.E. 652; First National Bank Trust Co. in Macon v. Roberts, 187 Ga. 472, 1 S.E.2d 12; Childs v. Julian, Ala. Sup., 2 So.2d 453. An effort was made to disqualify the presiding judge.

The effect of this statute has frequently been before the Supreme Court of that state, and it has uniformly held that the county courts are courts of record, and have original, general jurisdiction in probate matters; that the orders and judgments of said courts are entitled to the same favorable presumption and the same immunity from collateral attack as are accorded those of other courts of general jurisdiction. Welch v. Focht, 67 Okla. 275, 171 P. 730, L.R.A. 1918D, 1163; Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97; Moffer v. Jones, 67 Okla. 171, 169 P. 652. V. It is the statutory law of the state of Oklahoma that the county court has authority to require a guardian to account for all funds of the ward's estate.

Already having determined the cause of action asserted in the last amended petition was not barred by limitations, we consider only whether the agreement relied upon was violative of the statutory provisions above mentioned. This Court consistently has applied the rule, based upon public policy, that voluntary compromise of conflicting claims to a decedent's estate by family settlement contract entered into with full understanding of the facts is favored in law and such agreements are encouraged and ordinarily are upheld. Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97; Dowell, Adm. v. Dowell, Okla., 316 P.2d 850. Generally, as to consideration for such family compromises see annotation 6 A.L.R. 555. 38 A.L.R. 734; 81 A.L.R. 1187. In urging that plaintiffs' action sought to enforce a claim violative of the Statute of Frauds defendant cites Abraham v. McSoud, 188 Okla. 409, 109 P.2d 822; Oliphant v. Rogers, 186 Okla. 70, 95 P.2d 887, and Chambers v. Savage, 185 Okla. 251 91 P.2d 88, and earlier decisions cited in these cases.

See also Nelson v. Schoonover, 89 Kan. 388, 131 P. 147. Courts look with favor upon family settlement agreements, as a matter of public policy, and they will ordinarily be upheld when made with full understanding of the facts and without fraud, undue influence, or imposition, and this is true even though it might afterward appear that one or more of the parties to such contract actually had no enforceable right. Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97; Scott v. Beams, 10 Cir., 122 F.2d 777. No fraud, undue influence, or imposition is asserted or proved in this case.

"Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered or agreed to be suffered by such person, other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration for a promise." In the case of Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97, this court, in the third paragraph of the syllabus, used this language: "Compromises of doubtful rights are upheld by general policy as tending to prevent litigation in all enlightened systems of jurisprudence.

The county court, in probate matters, is a court of general jurisdiction, and every possible presumption is indulged in support of its judgments in such matters. Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97; Abraham v. Homer, 102 Okla. 12, 226 P. 45; Dawkins v. Peoples Bank Trust Co., 117 Okla. 181, 245 P. 594. Every fact not negatived by the record is presumed in support of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction. First Nat. Bank of Kingfisher v. Darrough, 162 Okla. 243, 19 P.2d 551; Bowling v. Merry, 91 Okla. 176, 217 P. 404. It follows that where the record is silent as to the existence of any fact necessary to the validity of the judgment of such a court, it must be presumed on collateral attack that the court inquired into and found the existence of such fact.

We think it sufficient to say that the plaintiff company did not sustain a loss under the administrator's bond at the time Vinson made the payments to which defendants refer in the third paragraph of their answer. In the case of Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97, the opinion shows a judgment in favor of Cook and against Vinson on account of payments made by Vinson while administrator of the estate of Enos Nichols, deceased. The statute of limitations would begin to run from date of payment of the judgment by the plaintiff, that being the date upon which plaintiff sustained a loss, and the statute did not run against the plaintiff from the date of payments made by Vinson.

It seems that these defendants could not be bound to perform their part of the escrow agreement until the probate sale proceedings should be completed, and they then had five days within which they could act. It seems to be well settled that they could not be affected by the nunc pro tunc order confirming the guardianship sale, except from the date it was filed in the probate case. Farnham et al. v. Hildreth, 32 Barb. (N.Y.) 277; Ferrell et al. v. Hales, 119 N.C. 199, 25 S.E. 821; Davidson v. Richardson, 50 Or. 323, 91 P. 1080; Acklen v. Acklen et al., 45 Ala. 609; Wells v. Geiseke et al., 27 Minn. 478, 8 N.W. 380; McCormick v. Wheeler, Mellick Co., 36 Ill. 114, 85 Am. Dec. 388; Jones v. Gallagher, 64 Okla. 41, 166 P. 204; Marker v. Gilliam, 80 Okla. 250, 196 P. 126; Perkins v. Haywood, 132 Ind. 95, 31 N.E. 670; Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97. The probate proceeding was completed when the probate sale was finally confirmed on April 7, 1922. Five days were given thereafter by the terms of the escrow agreement to pay the balance of the bonus on the lease, or forfeit the escrow money.

Nor could such an issue have been presented in an original action in the district court, because the allowance to the widow is a matter of probate procedure, of which the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction. Const., art. 7, secs. 12, 13, 16; Scott v. McGirth, 41 Okla. 520, 139 P. 519; Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97. On the trial of that case plaintiffs dismissed their second cause of action.

he mortgage was executed. It is not insisted here that the county court of Murray county was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition, issue the letters of administration, and through an administrator properly administer and settle up the estate of Edmundson Brown. But, notwithstanding the administration in Murray county, it is insisted that the county court of Murray county had no power, jurisdiction, or authority to approve the mortgage for the reason that proof was offered tending to show that the allottee, Edmundson Brown, was a resident of and died in territory now included in what is known as Pontotoc county. The record in the administration case has not been incorporated into and brought up with the case-made submitted in this appeal. But every presumption will be indulged in favor of the correctness of the judgment of the county court of Murray county in taking jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased allottee, Edmundson Brown. Welch v. Focht, 67 Okla. 275, 171 P. 730; Vinson v. Cook, 76 Okla. 46, 184 P. 97; In re Green's Estate, 80 Okla. 256, 196 P. 128. The federal act referred to does not require that the approval of a conveyance be had in the county including the territory where the allottee resided or died; but the approval is to be had "by the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of said deceased allottee"; and necessarily this must be the court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the decedent's estate at the time the instrument is presented for approval.