Opinion
No. CV01 0074876S
July 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Sarah McLaughlin Vinci, commenced this action in 2001 against the defendants, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) and Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company (Middlesex), seeking benefits under uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance policies issued by the defendants. The plaintiff alleges in her complaint that on or about June 27, 1998, while operating a motor vehicle, she was seriously injured by an underinsured motorist. She claims that she has exhausted the tortfeasor's liability insurance policy and now seeks underinsured motorist benefits from Allstate and Middlesex.
The parties stipulated to the following relevant facts. On June 27, 1998, the plaintiff was operating a 1992 Geo Metro (Geo) on Sawmill Road in West Haven when she was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Nunziata Maiorino (Maiorino). The accident was caused by Maiorino's negligence. The plaintiff subsequently commenced a suit against Maiorino in the Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford at Milford with Docket No. CV 00 0069758 S. The parties settled the case for $25,000. Maiorino, at the time of the accident, was insured through Allstate and the payment of $25,000 in settlement of the claim exhausted the available bodily injury insurance available to her. The plaintiff sustained $125,000 in damages for bodily injuries arising out of this automobile accident. At the time of the accident, the Geo was insured by a policy issued by Allstate for which the plaintiff is the only named insured. Said policy was issued in 1996, and was in full force and effect through the date of the accident. The Allstate policy provided for underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person/$100,000 per accident. Allstate agrees that this policy covers the plaintiff's bodily injury claims, but disputes the allocation, entitlement and prioritization of setoffs and credits with reference to coverage provided, to the extent that Middlesex also claims entitlement to these credits or setoffs.
During the relevant time period including June 27, 1998, the plaintiff and her mother resided together at 44 Ridge Hollow Road in West Haven, Connecticut. The Geo was registered to the plaintiff's father, William H. McLaughlin. Middlesex had in effect, at a minimum, an automobile insurance policy covering a 1993 Pontiac issued to the plaintiff's mother, Bonnie McLaughlin. Under the applicable policies, Middlesex and Allstate are entitled collectively to a credit or setoff of $25,000 for the amount received by the plaintiff in settlement of her claim against Maiorino.
The parties further stipulated to the following disputed issues: (1) whether the Geo was "an owned vehicle" of the plaintiff, as that term is used in General Statutes § 38a-336(d), and "not owned" by the plaintiff's father; (2) whether the Middlesex policy issued to the plaintiff's mother for the 1993 Pontiac provides underinsured motorist protection to the plaintiff; and (3) if Middlesex must provide coverage for the plaintiff's damages, how should the credit of $25,000 be allocated between Allstate and Middlesex.
This case involves an antistacking provision contained in Connecticut's uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage statute, General Statutes § 38a-336. Section 38a-336(d) provides that, "If any person insured for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is an occupant of an owned vehicle, the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage afforded by the policy covering the vehicle occupied at the time of the accident shall be the only uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage available." (Emphasis added.) The operative insurance policy issued by Middlesex contains a similar limitation, entitled "Other Insurance": "While `occupying' a vehicle owned by that `insured,' only the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage applicable to that vehicle will apply, and no other policies or provisions of coverage will apply." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 12, Endorsement, p. 3).
The main dispute between the plaintiff and Middlesex is whether the plaintiff or her father was the "owner" of the Geo at the time of the accident. The plaintiff relies, inter alia, on the definition of "owner" as found in General Statutes § 14-1(56) and other sections in title 14 to support its argument that because the plaintiff's father, William McLaughlin, was the registered owner of the Geo, he is the owner for purposes of General Statutes § 38a-336(d). The plaintiff further argues that her father is the owner because he made the down payment on the car, procured a loan for it, and maintained and repaired the car. Additionally, the plaintiff contends that her father was liable for the payment of property taxes and registration fees.
General Statutes § 14-1(56) defines "owner" as "any person holding title to a motor vehicle, or having the legal right to register the same, including purchasers under conditional bills of sale."
Middlesex counters that the plaintiff was the "de facto" owner of the Geo because: (1) she purchased insurance coverage directly from Allstate; (2) she arranged with Allstate to have a written estimate for damages; (3) the car was a graduation gift from her father; and (4) she was the principal driver of the car. Middlesex further contends that while the Geo was registered to the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff treated the car as "her own," and therefore, is limited to the insurance coverage provided by Allstate.
In interpreting the term "owned," this court notes that neither the insurance policy issued by Middlesex nor General Statutes § 38a-336(d) defines "owned" as used therein. "Under our law, the terms of an insurance policy are to be construed according to the general rules of contract construction. Policy language must be interpreted reasonably; words are to be given their ordinary meaning in order to deduce the intent of the parties." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sylvestre v. United Services Automobile Assn. Casualty Ins. Co., 42 Conn. App. 219, 223-24, 678 A.2d 1005, aff'd, 240 Conn. 544, 692 A.2d 1254 (1997).
This court examines Connecticut case law and dictionary definitions to ascertain the meaning of the term "owner." Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) defines "owner," in relevant part, as "[t]he person in whom is vested the ownership, dominion, or title to property; proprietor. He who has dominion of a thing, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a right to enjoy and do with as he pleases . . . unless he be prevented by some agreement or covenant which restrains his right."
Connecticut courts construing the term "owner" in the context of motor vehicle claims have defined "owner as any person holding title to a motor vehicle . . . In the case of a privately owned car, this definition has been applied through the certificate of registration. The certificate, in a particular person's name and identifying a particular vehicle, warrants [although it does not compel] a finding of ownership of that vehicle by the person in whose name the car is registered." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 226, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). Registration of a car constitutes "a public declaration of ownership . . . [however . . . this declaration is [not] conclusive as to title. It is merely evidence of ownership, to be considered in connection with other evidence in the case upon that issue. (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.). Burakowski v. Grustas, 134 Conn. 205, 208-09, 56 A.2d 461 (1947); Cleeland v. Carter, 126 Conn. 704, 706, 14 A.2d 36 (1940); Kaplenski v. Horwitz, 114 Conn. 523, 526, 159 A. 351 (1932).
In Hope v. Cavallo, 163 Conn. 576, 580-81, 585, 316 A.2d 407 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he term owner is one of general application and includes one having an interest other than the full legal and beneficial title . . . The word owner is one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right . . . It is not a technical term and thus, is not confined to a person who has the absolute right in a chattel, but also applies to a person who has possession and control thereof . . . [Therefore,] the word owner . . . has no commonly approved usage or fixed meaning, but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used . . . In addition, it should also be noted that, generally, the individual who must sustain the loss of property in case of destruction is considered the owner and both in common parlance and legal acceptation, [the] property is his." (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Middlesex relies on Hope v. Cavallo, supra, 163 Conn. 576, in support of its argument that registration in the name of the plaintiff's father is not dispositive of the issue of "ownership." Middlesex considers other indicia of ownership in concluding that the plaintiff was the owner of the Geo. For example, Middlesex argues that because the plaintiff insured the Geo, she "bore the risk of loss or damage to the car."
Based on the testimony and evidence admitted at trial, the court concludes that despite the fact that the plaintiff was not the registered owner of the car, she was nonetheless the owner for purposes of General Statutes § 38a-336(d). The plaintiff exercised possession and control of the car at the time of the accident. Following her mother's suggestion, she obtained insurance from Allstate to cover the car and was the sole named insured on the policy. As judicially admitted, from October 1996 until the date of the accident, the plaintiff paid all the insurance policies for the car. After the accident, she arranged to have a written estimate for damages to the car, and made the necessary repairs. Allstate issued two checks for these damages made payable to the plaintiff. Thus, while the car was registered in the father's name, the evidence demonstrates that the plaintiff had possession and control of the car, obtained and paid for the insurance and made repairs to the car after the accident. Additionally, because the plaintiff insured the car, she bore the responsibility for the risk of loss or damage to the vehicle. As such, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the plaintiff was the owner of the car.
The plaintiff next argues that the Middlesex policy issued to the plaintiff's mother for the 1993 Pontiac provides underinsured motorist protection to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that the two exclusions for coverage found in the Middlesex policy, and on which Middlesex relies to preclude coverage, are not applicable to the plaintiff. This argument, however, is premised on a finding that the plaintiff's father was the owner of the Geo. A review of the pertinent exclusions, therefore, is instrumental in demonstrating this conclusion.
The Middlesex policy has an underinsured endorsement that provides the following two pertinent exclusions: "A. We do not provide Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage for `bodily injury' sustained: 1. By an `insured' while `occupying,' or when struck by any motor vehicle owned by that `insured' which is not insured for this coverage under this policy . . . 2. By any `family member' while `occupying,' or when struck by, any motor vehicle you own which is insured for this coverage or a primary basis under any other policy." (Exhibit 12, Endorsement, p. 2.) Assuming the plaintiff qualifies as an insured, the plain language of the exclusions preclude coverage by the plaintiff here. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was operating the Geo at the time of the accident from which this claim arises, and that the Geo was covered by an underinsured motorist policy issued by Allstate. The evidence also establishes that the plaintiff owned the Geo at the time of the accident.
"Insured" is defined, in pertinent part, as "[y]ou or any `family member' . . ." (Exhibit 12, Endorsement, p. 1). "Family member" is defined as "a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household . . ." (Exhibit 12, Definitions, p. 1). "You" refers to "1. The `named insured' shown in the declarations: and 2. The spouse of a resident of the same household."
Moreover, General Statutes § 38a-336(d) and the unambiguous provision of the Middlesex policy, entitled "Other Insurance," support this holding. See infra. The plain language of both the statute and the insurance policy provide that an insured person who is injured while occupying a vehicle that he owns, which is covered by an uninsured and underinsured motorist policy cannot claim benefits under a second uninsured and underinsured policy. The court's finding that the plaintiff, and not her father, was the owner of the Geo at the time of the accident precludes recovery by the plaintiff under the Middlesex policy. Thus, the plaintiff is limited to the amount of her own uninsured and underinsured coverage under Allstate. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to $50,000 less Allstate's credit of $25,000 for what the tortfeasor already paid her.
Because of the court's holding, the court need not address the issues of misrepresentation and priority of credits briefed by the parties.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff against Allstate in the amount of $25,000.
The Court
By Curran, JTR