Vincent v. State

5 Citing cases

  1. Forrester v. State

    297 P.2d 418 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956)   Cited 1 times

    We conclude from the meagre details before us (1) that the arrest was legal; (2) that without doubt the 17 pints of intoxicating liquor found in defendant's car belonged to him; and (3) while it is not clear that the defendant volunteered the information to the officers that he had other whiskey in his car that he had just used in transportation of the one pint that he apparently showed the officers after a telephone appointment to make delivery, we must assume that he did so and must assume that the officers after telephoning the number listed on the card in question, watched and waited for the delivery and saw the car approach and stop and after a lawful arrest on seeing the pint inquired of defendant if he had other liquor and that defendant instead of standing on his constitutional rights not to answer, volunteered the information that he had other liquor in the turtle back of his automobile and voluntarily unlocked it for the officers to search. See Vincent v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 128, 129 P.2d 214, where a defendant was without the curtilage of his place of business when he made a sale of a pint of whiskey to officers. They saw him go on his premises to get the pint; they arrested him and searched his premises and obtained 9 more pints.

  2. Darks v. State

    273 P.2d 880 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954)   Cited 14 times

    "An offense is committed or attempted in the `presence of an officer' where officer is apprised by any of his senses prior to the arrest that an offense is being committed by the person arrested." Other cases illustrating the principle are: Golden v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 121, 129 P.2d 202; Newton v. State, 61 Okla. Cr. 237, 71 P.2d 122; Vincent v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 128, 129 P.2d 214; Goodwin v. State, 68 Okla. Cr. 381, 99 P.2d 181; Tacker v. State, 72 Okla. Cr. 72, 113 P.2d 394. It is next contended that the case should be reversed on account of the misconduct of the county attorney. It is said that he commented on the fact that the defendant did not testify.

  3. Monahan v. State

    243 P.2d 744 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952)   Cited 6 times

    This court is committed to the view of placing a liberal interpretation on informations and sustaining them where it alleges the essential elements of the offense sufficiently to apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. Hulsey v. State, 86 Okla. Cr. 273, 192 P.2d 301; Vincent v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 128, 129 P.2d 214. Under the provisions of Title 47, § 93 [ 47-93], O.S.A. 1941 and O.S. 1951, it is unlawful for any person while (a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (b) to operate or drive a motor vehicle, (c) on any highway within this state. The information in this case clearly alleged the essential elements of the crime and further identified the defendant with the commission of the crime and alleged that it was committed "unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly".

  4. Hulsey v. State

    86 Okla. Crim. 273 (Okla. Crim. App. 1948)   Cited 8 times

    We think that the information should have been made more specific by alleging the specific act or acts committed by the defendant, but this court is committed to the view of placing a liberal interpretation on informations and sustaining them where it alleged the elements of the offense sufficiently to apprise the defendant of he must be prepared to meet. Vincent v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 128, 129 P.2d 214. In accordance with this view this information and conviction would probably be sustained if it were not for the fact that the court in construing the information failed to sufficiently define the essentials of the offense in his instructions.

  5. Roberts v. State

    145 P.2d 435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1944)

    Or the sale and possession of the same liquor. Kimbrell v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 354, 123 P. 1027. We have also held that where intoxicating liquor was found by one set of officers at certain premises at a certain time of day, and other officers at a different time found other liquor on the same premises, yet at a time when the owner could have had time and an opportunity to place the same there after the first search of the premises, the owner could be charged and convicted of each offense. Vincent v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 128, 129 P.2d 214; Vincent v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 116, 129 P.2d 196. But as above stated, the charging of two different parties in two separate informations, with the possession of the same liquor, seems to be of first import in this case.