Opinion
No. 22419. Department Two.
August 22, 1930.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES (76-1) — PUBLIC SUPPLY — DISTRICTS — ORGANIZATION — ESTOPPEL. A landowner in a water district organized under Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 11579 to 11602, providing an assessment for benefits without any provision for a hearing, is not estopped to enjoin the collection of the tax by the fact that, when he paid his general taxes, there was a notation "W D 20" to indicate the water tax, where he had no notice or knowledge that a district had been organized and no knowledge or notice of the purpose of the notation or of the payment included or made.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (131) — MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (131, 230) — DUE PROCESS — NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS AND ASSESSMENTS. The water district act, Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 11579 to 11602, providing for the organization of municipal corporations for the sole purpose of supplying residents of the district with water for domestic purposes, violates the due process clause of the constitution in that it provides for fixing the boundaries of the district and the assessment of benefits without any provision for a hearing on the questions of the property to be included or the benefits.
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Frater, J., entered November 12, 1929, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for equitable relief. Affirmed.
Shorett, Shorett Taylor, Ewing D. Colvin, and Arthur M. Hare, for appellants.
Charles E. Congleton, for respondent.
This action was brought by the respondent to cancel and enjoin the collection of taxes and assessments levied by appellant Water District No. 20. The appellant water district pleaded, as a defense to the action, not only a general denial, but also pleaded acts and conduct tending to show estoppel. From a judgment awarding the relief prayed for, this appeal follows.
It is stipulated that the facts as found in the case of Desimone v. Shields, 152 Wn. 353, 277 P. 829, may be considered as the facts in this case in so far as they relate to the organization of Water District No. 20. All of the facts relating thereto are set forth in that opinion.
[1, 2] The facts in the instant case, however, distinguish it from the Desimone case, supra. This respondent never lived in the water district, had no notice of the proceedings leading up to its organization, had no knowledge that such district had been organized or existed, knew of no facts in connection with the water district, and used no water. The only thing that respondent did in this case on which the doctrine of estoppel might be rested is that, when he paid his general taxes, there was a notation on the tax receipt indicating that a portion of the tax was for the benefit of the water district, this notation being, "W.D. 20."
It will be noticed, however, that this assessment was included in the general tax statement for the year 1926. It was not paid as a special assessment, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that respondent had any knowledge whatsoever of the purpose for which the payment was included or made. This is far different from the facts set forth in the Desimone case, supra, and contains none of the elements necessary to constitute estoppel. Appellant's principal argument, however, is devoted to a criticism of the case of Drum v. University Place Water District, 144 Wn. 585, 258 P. 505. It is conceded that, unless the Drum case is overruled, this judgment must be affirmed. That was an En Banc hearing, and we see no reason at this time to overrule that decision.
Judgment affirmed.
MITCHELL, C.J., FULLERTON, MAIN, and HOLCOMB, JJ., concur.