* * * In this state it is well recognized, and properly so, that a wife may waive her widow's allowance by contract with her husband. Brimble v. Sickler, supra; Vincent v. Martin, 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.2d 1089. However, the waiver cannot arise by presumption, assumption or construction. It must be in terms that do not admit of a doubt and clearly and definitely indicate a purpose to waive this specific statutory right.

We do not find in the Williams case — or in any other of long line of decisions — a requirement that reference to a "widow's allowance" must be modified by the word "statutory" if intended to apply to the allowance provided by the statute referred to. In Vincent v. Martin, 91 Colo. 1-06, 11 P.2d 1089, it was said that the term "statutory allowances" includes "widow's allowance" because "There is no statutory allowance to a widow other than a widow's allowance." "* * * If the words `statutory allowances' were not intended to and do not actually include a widow's allowance they are meaningless because there is no statutory allowance to a widow except a widow's allowance."

The only way she can be protected against her creditors is by allowing her a continuing right of occupancy. Counsel for the adult child cite Vincent v. Martin, Executor, 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.2d 1089, as authority in support of the proposition that no allowances are permitted in an estate except those granted by statute, and that there is no statutory allowance to a widow except a widow's allowance. [4, 5] This argument is true so far as it goes, but it is true only in the matter of administration of estates.

[1, 2] We approach a consideration of the controversy here in the spirit of liberality disclosed by our previous holdings in cases of this character, which favor the granting of a widow's allowance, even though an agreement such as is here involved might be so construed as to justify a denial of the application. See: Wilson v. Wilson, 55 Colo. 70, 132 Pac. 67; Deeble v. Alerton, 58 Colo. 166, 143 Pac. 1096; Remington v. Remington, 72 Colo. 132, 209 Pac. 802; Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494, 266 Pac. 497; Vincent v. Martin, 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.2d 1089; Williams v. Pollard, 101 Colo. 262, 72 P.2d 476. Counsel for both parties agree that the following language in Williams v. Pollard, supra, at page 266, correctly states the law applicable to the problem before us as settled in this jurisdiction: "The waiver cannot arise by presumption, assumption or construction. It must be in terms that do not admit of a doubt and clearly and definitely indicate a purpose to waive this specific statutory right." The language of the agreement upon which plaintiff in error relies to sustain his contention of waiver appears in the second and fifth paragraphs thereof, as follows:

In this state it is well recognized, and properly so, that a wife may waive her widow's allowance by contract with her husband. Brimble v. Sickler, supra; Vincent v. Martin, 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.2d 1089. However, the waiver cannot arise by presumption, assumption or construction. It must be in terms that do not admit of a doubt and clearly and definitely indicate a purpose to waive this specific statutory right.

The great weight of authority, however, holds the other way. See In re Cutting's Estate, 174 Cal. 104, 161 P. 1137; Buffington v. Buffington, 151 Ind. 200, 51 N.E. 328; Kroell v. Kroell, 219 Ill. 105, 76 N.E. 63, 4 Ann. Cas. 801; In re Oppenheimer's Estate, 73 Mont. 560, 238 P. 599; Vincent v. Martin, 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.2d 1089; and for further discussion on this point see 24 C.J. 251. [1, 2] No fraud is alleged in this case.

'           It is settled that a wife may waive a widow's allowance by contract with her husband. Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494, 266 P. 497; Vincent v. Martin, 91 Colo. 106, 11 P.2d 1089. Such a waiver, however, must be in terms that do not admit of a doubt and clearly and definitely indicate a purpose to waive a specific statutory right. McLaughlin v. Craig, 117 Colo. 67, 184 P.2d 130. Williams v. Pollard, 101 Colo. 262, 72 P.2d 476; Remington v. Remington, 72 Colo. 132, 209 P. 802.