Opinion
Civ. No. 99-74 SECTION "L" (1).
March 23, 2000.
Before the Court is the motion of plaintiff Maleaca Vincent for reconsideration of the Court's Order of July 14, 1999, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
On January 11, 1999, plaintiff filed the above captioned suit in this Court, stating causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state law defamation and false imprisonment claims. In her pleadings, plaintiff alleged that her cause of action arose on January 8, 1998, while she was shopping at the Dillard Department Store in Metairie, Louisiana. On June 30, 1999, both parties to this action submitted to the Court a joint pre-trial order. The pre-trial order raised the issue of prescription of plaintiff's claims and both parties briefly set forth their positions on the issue. At the pretrial conference on July 2, 1999, the parties discussed the issue with the Court. The Court ordered the parties to brief the issue prior to the July 19, conference. On July 7, 1999, the defendant Dillard Department Store ("Dillard") filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 9, 1999, plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. On July 12, 1999, defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. On July 14, 1999, this Court issued an Order and Reasons granting defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 56. On July 23, 1999, plaintiff filed the present motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 14, 1999 Order and Reasons pursuant to Rule 59, asserting that summary judgment for defendant was inappropriate because (1) plaintiff was denied due process when the Court granted summary judgment for the defendant less than ten days after the filing of defendant's motion to dismiss, and (2) an issue of fact exists regarding the date and time of plaintiff's release from custody.
The Court notes at the outset that the decision to grant a motion under Rule 59 lies within the discretion of the district court. See Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. The Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). However, this Court has held that Rule 59 relief is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. See Avondale Industries, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, No. 94-2786, 1996 WL 413645, at *2 (E.D. La. Jul. 24, 1996). Rule 59 motions have been granted when the movant shows that a judgment is based upon a manifest error of fact or law, that newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence exists, that manifest injustice would otherwise result or that serious misconduct of counsel justifies relief. See id. Rule 59 should not be used to relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or submit evidence that could have been presented before. See Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, No. 98-2605, 1999 WL 777720, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 1999). In this case, plaintiff argues that judgment was entered in error because the time of plaintiff's release from jail remains in dispute.
As to plaintiff's argument that dismissal of her case did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds that plaintiff had ample notice that her case was at risk. Prior to a ruling on a summary judgment motion, Rule 56(c) requires the court to give the non-movant an adequate opportunity to respond. See Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996). A district court may even enter summary judgment sua sponte as long as the adversely-affected party has ten days notice to come forward with the necessary evidence. See Washington v. Resolution Trust Corp., 68 F.3d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1995). The purpose of the notice requirement is to place "a party on notice that he is in jeopardy of having his case dismissed and affords him the opportunity to put forth evidence." Millar v. Houghton, 115 F.3d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1997).
In this case, plaintiff was on notice that her case was in jeopardy of being dismissed no later than June 30, 1999, when she submitted a joint pretrial order which raised and discussed the prescription issue arguments of plaintiff and defendant. At the pretrial conference held on July 2, 1999, counsel and the Court discussed the prescription issue. In a minute entry dated July 2, 1999, the Court instructed both sides to submit briefs on the issue prior to the trial date. The Court granted defendant's motion on July 14, 1999, fifteen days after plaintiff submitted the pretrial order and twelve days after the conference at which prescription was discussed. Rule 56 does not require a hearing date or a "date certain" on which a motion is to be decided. See Jackson, 99 F.3d at 713. Plaintiff had adequate notice and opportunity to respond in this case.
Even if this Court had considered plaintiff's affidavit recounting her recollection of the events of January 8 and 9, 1998, dismissal of this case would have been appropriate. In her affidavit, plaintiff states that she remembers being released after 1:00 a.m. on the morning of January 9, 1998. Plaintiff does not explain why she did not produce this affidavit before the Court ruled on the prescription issue, but the self-serving and conclusory statements are inadequate to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Lechuga v. South Pacific Transportation Company, 949 F.2d 790, 798 (5th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff's argument that prescription did not begin to run until January 9, 1998, is inconsistent with other pleadings filed in this case. Plaintiff's complaint and pretrial order maintain that plaintiff's cause of action arose on January 8, 1998, when she was allegedly accused of shoplifting, handcuffed and subjected to a racially derogatory comment by agents of Dillard's Department Store. Vincent's federal cause of action against Dillard's, which is based on those allegations, prescribed before her complaint was filed on January 11, 1999.
Mere disagreement with the Court's July 14, 1999, Order and Reasons does not justify relief under Rule 59. Because plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court should grant plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the motion must be DENIED.