Opinion
No. 153093/2014.
05-18-2016
Edgar VILLONGCO, Plaintiff, v. TOMPKINS SQUARE BAGELS, Sage the Cat, LLC, and Nathan Bershadsky, Defendants.
Yevgeny Rabinovich, Khavinson & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff Edgar Villongco. William Cody Lawlor, Hannum Feretic Prendergast & Merlino, LLC, for defendants Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC. Kevin G. Faley, Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, NY, for defendant Nathan Bershadsky.
Yevgeny Rabinovich, Khavinson & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff Edgar Villongco.
William Cody Lawlor, Hannum Feretic Prendergast & Merlino, LLC, for defendants Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC.
Kevin G. Faley, Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, NY, for defendant Nathan Bershadsky.
CAROL R. EDMEAD, J.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
In this personal injury action, defendant Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC (collectively, “Tompkins Bagels” or the “restaurant”) moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff Edgar Villongco (“plaintiff”).
Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges that on July 25, 2013, defendant Nathan Bershadsky (“defendant”) struck and injured him as a result of an incident at Tompkins Bagels, and that Tompkins Bagels is liable to plaintiff for negligence (first and second causes of action) and battery (fourth and fifth causes of action) pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior and for negligent supervision/hiring (seventh and eighth causes of action).
The second, fifth, and eighth causes of action were brought against “XYZ” d/b/a Tompkins Square Bagels, which was amended and substituted with Sage the Cat, LLC.
Specifically, plaintiff testified that he and his colleagues went to Tompkins Bagels and were seated at a table, when a female waitress (Luz Segarra) told them that laptops were not allowed at the table (EBT, pp. 22). They began clearing their items, and the employee began clearing the table (EBT, pp. 24–25). He arose from the table, and as he turned to walk away, he mumbled “what a c-nt” (EBT, pp. 22, 27). The employee then “yelled ... did you hear what he called me and it was directed towards” the kitchen, to a “gentleman in the back in the food preparation area” (EBT, p. 28), to which the gentleman responded, “what did he call you” (EBT, p. 29). Plaintiff next observed the defendant “put down whatever he was holding” and “walk from behind the counter towards” plaintiff and exit the restaurant (EBT, p. 30).
Plaintiff exited the restaurant, and defendant yelled from the doorway of the restaurant “why don't you say that to me you little faot,” and then quickly crossed the street (EBT, pp. 31, 33, 36). Defendant then stated that plaintiff called the female employee a “c-nt,” and when plaintiff denied it and turned to leave, defendant struck plaintiff once in his jaw (EBT, pp. 36–37). The incident occurred “50, 60 feet” from Tompkins Bagels' entrance (EBT, p. 14). Defendant then told plaintiff, “you know where to find me” and returned to the doorway of the restaurant where he and other employees including the waitress were standing (EBT, pp. 39–40).
Defendant testified that he worked as a “consultant” for Tompkins Bagels (EBT, pp. 13, 15). He first met one of the restaurant's owners, Christopher Pugliese (“Pugliese”), at the restaurant as a customer, and he told Pugliese he “had a lot of experience in the bagel business” and offered to provide “constructive criticism”; plaintiff had “approximately eight, nine years in two different bagel stores that were considered very, very busy and very established bagel stores” (EBT pp. 19–20). Thereafter, Pugliese called defendant, stating that he “called a couple of places where you had said you worked and everyone had very nice things to say about you. They knew I was impressed with the way you—your knowledge of the business that you knew the cost and labor costs, and food costs and stuff like that.” (EBT, p. 30). Plaintiff also told Pugliese he was a “retired firefighter” (EBT, p. 50). Pugliese contacted defendant to discuss “possibly working something out where I could help his employees become better” (EBT, p. 55). Due to limits on defendant's ability to work, Pugliese hired defendant in a “consulting aspect” for “two or three hours a day during lunch a couple of times a week.” (EBT, pp. 56–57). Defendant was “just there to help train people to be better at their job”; to “show them my way of doing [platters] ... how to make [them] more decorative” (EBT, pp. 170, 198). Segarra “had no jurisdiction over me, that's why I told her I was leaving”; Segarra was in charge of employees and defendant “wasn't an employee. (EBT, p. 171). Defendant did not disclose any orders of protection against him and was unaware of whether Pugliese performed any background check of him (EBT, pp. 165–166).
On the date of the incident, defendant was teaching a new employee in the kitchen (EBT, pp 63–64). Defendant told Sergurra that he was “leaving now” and began exiting the kitchen intending to go home; defendant threw his gloves in the garbage and took off his apron, and intended to go downstairs to change his shirt (EBT, pp. 94, 157, 158). He told Segarra “it's dead, there's nothing else to show Christian, I'm out of here” (EBT, p. 94). He saw defendant approach Segarra, whisper something to her, and then Segarra “fell back into me” (EBT, pp. 74–75, 101–102). Segarra told defendant that plaintiff “called her a fuing c-nt it was my understanding that she had fallen back because he shoved her or shouldered into her” (EBT, p. 112). Defendant saw plaintiff “step [ ] into Luz' with his shoulder” and she “practically fell into my arms jumping away from him” (EBT, p. 74). Defendant then exited the restaurant (EBT, p. 105).
Defendant explained that he left the restaurant, and when he saw plaintiff, called out to him, who then started walking back towards defendant (EBT, pp. 119–123). Defendant and plaintiff exchanged words, and as one of plaintiff's two colleagues was pulling plaintiff's arm to attempt to get defendant to leave, plaintiff “kept getting closer and closer and nastier and nastier” with “hand gestures a half an inch of my face.” When defendant “felt jeopardized by his infringing on my space, [he] hit him” (EBT, p. 27) According to defendant, plaintiff “put his hand in my face a multitude of times, and cursed me, right in my face.... He called me a bch. He called—he told me to get my f—-ing aback into the kitchen before I got hurt. And then he called me an old bitch. And all the time motioning was his hand into my face inches away. Sixty years old, carpal tunnel, disabled, the guy just hit a woman. I felt what was he going to do to me” (EBT, p. 73). Afterwards, defendant returned to the restaurant to retrieve his bag and personal items (EBT, p. 137). When asked if defendant considered his confrontation with the plaintiff as part of his job, defendant replied, “No, sir.” (EBT, p. 189).
Luz Segarra testified, when asked to describe defendant, that “he walked like—you know, he had this chip on his shoulder, that he was like a bad ass” (EBT, p. 37). Before the incident, she sent defendant on his break but defendant was still in the restaurant (EBT, p. 28–29). Segarra testified that plaintiff “said, you're a fuing c-nt. What did you say? You heard me; you're a fu—ing c -nt” (EBT, p. 25). Defendant, who was “close” “behind the counter” and “on his break,” “walks out....” Segarra went outside to see if the area needed to be swept and saw defendant “a block away from the store”; she called to defendant but defendant “kept on” (EBT, pp. 31–33). As it was lunchtime, she returned to the restaurant; it was “Business as usual, nothing happened in the store, nobody noticed anything, nothing (EBT, pp. 25–26, 33). Thereafter, defendant returned to the restaurant saying, “I broke his ... jaw;” Segarra then called “Chris” her “boss” and sent defendant home (EBT, pp. 25–26).
Pugliese testified on behalf of Tompkins Bagels, defendant was a consultant, hired to help him train chefs, “run my kitchen in a more organized way, giv[e] me advice on, you know, how I could do things better, you know, and that's really it. He was a retired fireman, I think he had some extra time on his hands and just helping me” (EBT, pp. 46–47) Pugliese “liked the idea of hiring him because he was a retired fireman. He told me he knew CPR, I thought that would be valuable. I liked the idea that he was older, you know, I made an attempt to hire older people, they have things they can contribute.” (EBT, p. 66). Pugliese “thought he had been through things as a fighter so I thought he'd be calm and levelheaded, you know, be able to sort of—yeah, I mean, you know, maybe help my staff, you know. I have a lot of kids there and he's a good fellow to pass on some—you know, I mean, I definitely liked right away when I found out he was a retired fireman. I thought that was good” (EBT, pp. 66–67). Defendant “wasn't an hourly employee so—and he was more, like I said, he was just more kind of helping me, consulting me....” (EBT, pp. 69–70) Further, defendant was entitled, like employees, to a free meal during break (EBT, p. 78). When asked if it within Segarra's supervisory capacity to stop defendant from taking a break, Pugliese responded, “Yes.” (EBT, p. 101). In the course of hiring an employee, Pugliese “would sit down with each employee and explain to them the history of the place, how I expected them to act, what the rules were. Simple rule, like one meal per shift, half hour break, be on time, call if you're going to be out, how to interact with staff members. The only policy we have is verbal, do whatever it takes to make the guest happy and, you know, that's really it. Just hospitality, we hammered that point, we are in hospitality and we are here to make people happy. That's what was said to every employee I hire. (EBT, pp. 109–111). There was no specific procedure on how to handle an issue with a customer (EBT, p. 110). If you have an issue with anything, people would always come to me or the manager. (EBT, p. 111).
According to Pugliese, he went to the restaurant after receiving a call about the incident and interviewed the employees (EBT, pp. 42–46). When asked if he saw anything out of the ordinary about defendant's demeanor or physical appearance when he returned to the restaurant, he responded “No, I mean, no he is a pretty calm, you know, guy” (EBT, p. 46). Defendant and “every person” told Pugliese what happened, and Pugliese “was shocked, this is not what we do, you know. I don't you know, I never raised my hand at another human being in my life and I wouldn't expect any of my workers to do that. (EBT, p. 46). From the time that defendant said he saw or heard plaintiff speaking disrespectfully to Segarra to the time of the punch, defendant was on his break, meaning “Once you take your break, that's your time” (EBT, pp. 76–77). Pugliese suspended defendant because he did not want his employees to think that defendant's acts were “okay” (EBT, p. 81).
In support of summary judgment, Tompkins Bagels argues that it cannot be held liable for defendant's actions as they were not perofrmed in furtherance of the business of Tompkins Bagels. Further, plaintiff's claim for negligent hiring and supervision against Tompkins Bagels is unsupported by the record.
In opposition, plaintiff argues a jury may conclude that defendant was “doing his master's work” and thus, acting within the scope of his employment, attempting to maintain peace and order in the restaurant, when the altercation and assault occurred. Caselaw applies respondeat superior even when the employee, through lack of judgment or temper, goes beyond his duty or authority and inflicts injury upon another. Segarra's testimony of defendant's description raises the question of whether defendant's actions and general conduct were reasonably foreseeable to Segarra. Segarra intentionally aroused defendant who was under her control, and never directed defendant to refrain from confronting plaintiff while watching defendant confront plaintiff. That the assault occurred across the street from the restaurant does not absolve Tomkins Bagels from liability, as the confrontation that escalated to the assault began inside the restaurant.
Alternatively, Tomkins Bagels is liable under the theory of negligent supervision and training for acts of defendant outside the scope of employment. Segarra knew that defendant was an angry person with a chip on his shoulder and involved him in a dispute with plaintiff. Further, Tomkins Bagels' training of employees to simply make customers happy, in the absence of any policy on how to handle issues between customers and employees, and failure to properly train Segarra, constitute negligence on its part.
Defendant also argues that Tomkins Bagels lacked adequate hiring procedures or supervision of the premises. Tomkins Bagels did not perform background checks, and did not have a formal application process or formal handbook or behavior policy, formal training, or hiring procedures.
In reply, Tomkins Bagels argues that defendant's actions were in furtherance of a personal interest, rather than one of the restaurant, and the caselaw cited by plaintiff is distinguishable. Further, there is no evidence regarding defendant's propensity for violence, or Tomkins Bagels' knowledge of same, especially given that defendant's position did not require that he have any interaction with customers. Tomkins Bagels was under no duty to inquire of past convictions.
Discussion
It is well settled that where a defendant is the proponent of a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must establish that the “cause of action ... has no merit” (CPLR § 3212[b] ) sufficient to warrant the court as a matter of law to direct judgment in its favor (Friedman v. BHL Realty Corp., 83 A.D.3d 510, 922 N.Y.S.2d 293 [1st Dept 2011] ; Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316 [1985] ). Thus, the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, by advancing sufficient “evidentiary proof in admissible form” to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (Madeline D'Anthony Enterprises, Inc. v. Sokolowsky, 101 A.D.3d 606, 957 N.Y.S.2d 88 [1st Dept 2012]citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 501 N.E.2d 572 [1986]and Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 [1980] ).
Where the proponent of the motion makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue requiring a trial of the action (CPLR § 3212[b] ; Madeline D'Anthony Enterprises, Inc. v. Sokolowsky, 101 A.D.3d 606, 957 N.Y.S.2d 88 [1st Dept 2012] ). Mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient (Alvord and Swift v. Steward M. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 281–82, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309 [1978] ; Carroll v. Radoniqi, 105 A.D.3d 493, 963 N.Y.S.2d 97 [1st Dept 2013] ).
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an intentional tort “committed by an employee can result in liability for his or her employer” if the employee was acting “within the scope of the employment” at the time of the commission of the tort (Ramos v. Jake Realty Co., 21AD3d 744, 21 A.D.3d 744, 801 N.Y.S.2d 566 [1st Dept 2005] ).”[T]he employer need not have foreseen the precise act or manner of the injury as long as the general type of conduct may have been reasonably expected” (Ramos v. Jake Realty Co., 21AD3d at 745). However, “an employee's actions are not within the scope of employment unless the purpose in performing such actions is to further the employer's interest, or to carry out duties incumbent upon the employee in furthering the employer's business” (Schilt v. New York City Tr. Auth., 304A.D.2d 189, 304 A.D.2d 189, 759 N.Y.S.2d 10 [1st Dept 2003] ). The determination of whether the doctrine applies depends upon,
“The connection between the time, place and occasion for the act; the history of the relationship between employer and employee as spelled out in actual practice; whether the act is one commonly done by such an employee; the extent of departure from normal methods of performance; and whether the specific act was one the employer could reasonably have anticipated.”
(Id. At 745).
Yet, “An employer cannot be held vicariously liable for an alleged assault where the assault was not within the scope of the employee's duties, and there is no evidence that the assault was condoned, instigated or authorized by the employer (Yeboah v. Snapple, Inc., 286A.D.2d 204, 286 A.D.2d 204, 729 N.Y.S.2d 32 [1st Dept 2001] ).
Here, defendant's duties were limited to training employees in the kitchen in the back of the restaurant. Defendant's contact with plaintiff did not occur at any time during which defendant was performing any of his duties for Tompkins Bagels. Indeed, defendant had already told Segarra that he was leaving for the day, and Segarra testified that defendant was on break. Furthermore, at the time of the physical confrontation, both plaintiff and defendant were across the street from the restaurant, again, at a time when defendant was “off the clock,” which according to Tompkins Bagels, means during a period when defendant was not working. By the time plaintiff made his initial contact with defendant by calling plaintiff across the street, both plaintiff and defendant were off the restaurant premises. Although the plaintiff's insult of Segarra occurred inside the restaurant, no verbal or physical interaction between plaintiff and defendant occurred inside the restaurant.
Further, there was no indication that defendant's interaction with any customer was foreseeable, or could have been anticipated, especially given that defendant's duties did not include any contact with the restaurant's customers (see Conde v. Yeshiva University, 16AD3d 185, 16 A.D.3d 185, 792 N.Y.S.2d 387 [1st Dept 2005] (dismissing the assault and battery claims brought under the doctrine of respondeat superior where employee acted beyond the scope of his employment, “motivated by private concerns that were not even remotely related to any conduct [employer] could have foreseen in the performance of his duties”)). The testimony noted above indicates that defendant was assigned to solely to train employees in the kitchen or deli to better perform their respective duties, and that he was “in charge of the kitchen ... the deli, whatever went on in the kitchen, he took care of that” and that Segarra would remain in the front” (Segarra EBT, pp. 12–13, 54). Defendant's position was to “organize” and help “run” the kitchen (Pugliese EBT, pp. 46–47, 53, 108). And, “kitchen staff does not have much interaction with customers” (Pugliese EBT, p. 75). Segarra “ran the front” and defendant's training of the employees in the kitchen “had nothing to do with the front end that she ran” (Bershadsky EBT, p. 170). Further, student employees also worked in “the front” (Pugliese EBT, p. 34), but they “had nothing to do with [defendant] in the back” (Bershadsky EBT, p. 183).
Segarra's outcry of what plaintiff did to her, apparently aimed at defendant in an apparent surprise, does not rise to any level of any inference that Segarra was directing or negligently suggested for defendant to take any action, or, gives rise to an inference that defendant's response was in furtherance of Tompkins Bagel's business. Defendant explained his personal motives for confronting plaintiff, and expressly denied that his pursuit of plaintiff was related in any way to his duties as consultant (Kwak v. Wolfenson, 258 A.D.2d 418, 686 N.Y.S.2d 381 [1st Dept 1999] (dismissing complaint where there were “no facts tending to show that alleged assault was within scope of assailant's alleged duties as secretary”)).
The cases cited by plaintiff are factually distinguishable from the circumstances herein. (Ramos v. Jake Realty Co., 21AD3d 744 supra (defendant's building superintendent assaulted plaintiff during workday at work site specifically to prevent him from collecting evidence of rent strike; there was no evidence that the superintendent had any personal motivation for the assault; superintendent's animus, “shared by management, was about the rent strike”); De Wald v. Seidenberg, 297 N.Y. 335, 79 N.E.2d 430 [1948] (fight ensued between building superintendent and plaintiff when superintendent was carrying out a duty to enforce his employers' rules against throwing items out of the window); Sims v. Bergamo, 3 N.Y.2d 531, 147 N.E.2d 1, 169 N.Y.S.2d 449 [1957] (where defendant's bartender assaulted plaintiff after having accused her of breaking window of defendant's bar, it may reasonably be inferred that the bartender believed that it was necessary to take steps to prevent plaintiff's further destruction of bar property); Fofana v. Chevrolet Saturn of Harlem, Inc., 2008 WL 4961586, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 33061(U) [Supreme Court, New York County 2008] (issue of fact existed where employee's manager expressly approved of employee's attack of plaintiff after soliciting plaintiff's customer on plaintiff's car lot); Stewartson v. Gristede's Supermarket, 271A.D.2d 324, 271 A.D.2d 324, 705 N.Y.S.2d 583 [1st Dept 2000] (reversing dismissal of complaint where assault against store customer unloading groceries on conveyor belt ensued while defendant's store manager was in the process of filling a phone-in order); Bilias v. Gaslight, Inc., 100AD3d 533, 100 A.D.3d 533, 954 N.Y.S.2d 88 [1st Dept 2012] (issue of fact existed where defendant bar's employee attacked plaintiff after forcibly escorting plaintiff out of the bar)).
Further, liability cannot be charged to Tomkins Bagels on the ground of negligent hiring and supervision. To establish a cause of action based on negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision, it must be shown that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury (see Detone v. Bullit Courier Serv., Inc., 140 A.D.2d 278, 279 [1988], lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 702 [1988], citing Vanderhule v. Berinstein, 285 A.D.2d 290 [3d Dept 1954], amended on other grounds 284 A.D.2d 1089 [3d Dept 1954][emphasis added]; see also, 37 N.Y. Jur, Master and Servant, § 164).
In negligent hiring and negligent retention actions, “[t]he negligence of the employer in such a case is direct, not vicarious, and arises from its having placed the employee in a position to cause foreseeable harm, harm which the injured party most probably would have been spared had the employer taken reasonable care in making its decision concerning the hiring and retention of the employee” (White v. Hampton Management Co. L.L.C., 35 A.D.3d 243, 827 N.Y.S.2d 120 [1st Dept 2006], citing Gomez v. City of New York, 304 A.D.2d 374, 758 N.Y.S.2d 298 [1st Dept 2003] ; Sheila C. v. Povich, 11 A.D.3d 120, 781 N.Y.S.2d 342 [1st Dept 2004], citing Detone v. Bullit Courier Serv., Inc., 140 A.D.2d 278, 279, 528 N.Y.S.2d 575 [1st Dept1988], lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 702 [1988] ; see also Rodriguez v. United Transp. Co., 246 A.D.2d 178, 180 [1998] ).
Here, there is no evidence that Tomkins Bagels had any notice of defendant's propensity to commit an assault and/or battery of a customer, and Segarra's testimony that defendant had a “chip on his shoulder” is insufficient to constitute notice in this regard. Similarly, defendant's admission to stealing $20 from the register of a prior job is insufficient to give rise to notice of any criminal propensity to commit violence. Further, there is no indication that a criminal background check would have revealed any proclivity to act violently. “An employer is under no duty to inquire as to whether an employee has been convicted of crimes in the past” (Yeboah v. Snapple, Inc., 286A.D.2d 204, 205, 286 A.D.2d 204, 729 N.Y.S.2d 32 [1st Dept 2001] ). In any event, the record indicates that Tompkins Bagels checked defendant's references, and obtained positive feedback from defendant's former business dealings.
Further, as to the claim that Tomkins Bagels did not have any policies concerning issues between customers and employees, such a vague claim, in the absence of any prior notice of defendant's propensity to commit an assault and/or battery of a customer, is insufficient to raise an issue of fact.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion by defendant Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint is granted, and the first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth causes of action are hereby severed and dismissed as asserted against Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC; and it is further
ORDERED that said defendant shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon all parties within 20 days of entry; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Based on the accompanying Memorandum Decision, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion by defendant Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint is granted, and the first, second, fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth causes of action are hereby severed and dismissed as asserted against Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC; and it is further
ORDERED that said defendant shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon all parties within 20 days of entry; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.