Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TC015917, Rose Hom, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Stolpman, Krissman, Elber & Silver and Dennis M. Elber for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, Thomas N. Charchut and Maureen Haight Gee; Lynberg & Watkins and Michael J. Larin; and Chernay Peterson and Todd L. Peterson for Defendant and Respondent.
TURNER, P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Saul Villegas, appeals from a portion of a December 4, 2008 judgment wherein the trial court refused to award him prejudgment interest against defendant, Harsco Corporation. Plaintiff contends that he was entitled to prejudgment interest from the time of a January 13, 2006 verdict until entry of the judgment on December 4, 2008. We conclude that prejudgment interest should have been awarded pursuant to Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) upon the date that the verdict was entered; January 13, 2006. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying plaintiff’s prejudgment interest request.
II. BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from a complex personal injury action involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants. The personal injury action resulted in a jury verdict on January 13, 2006. On December 22, 2005, prior to the jury verdict, the trial court issued an order precluding plaintiff from recovering damages from defendant. This was because plaintiff had neither named defendant in his complaint nor served it with summons and complaint. On May 27, 2008, in a consolidated appeal, we issued an opinion reversing the December 22, 2005 order, which had precluded plaintiff from recovering damages against defendant. (Harsco Corporation v. Kiewit Pacific Company (May 27, 2008, B190127) [nonpub. opn.].) As modified, we affirmed the noneconomic damages verdicts. But we reversed the July 17, 2006 judgment as to economic damages. (Id., typed opn. at pp. 26-27.) The trial court was instructed to conduct an evidentiary hearing and calculate the Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (a) offsets. (Id., typed opn. at p. 28.) We further ordered the trial court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant. (Ibid.)
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
After the remittitur issued, plaintiff sought prejudgment interest from the date of the January 13, 2006. In support of the request, plaintiff cited among other authorities California Rules of Court, rule 3.1802 and Civil Code section 3287. Defendant opposed the prejudgment interest claim on the ground that section 685.020 limited interest to the date of entry of the judgment. Defendant relied upon Pellegrini v. Weiss (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 515, 532-533, and argued that rule 3.1802 instructing the clerk to enter interest from the date of a jury verdict was invalid as a matter of law because it conflicted with section 685.020. Defendant argued Civil Code section 3287 did not apply to the facts of this case because plaintiff’s damages were incapable of being made certain until the date the judgment was entered.
Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
On December 4, 2008, after conducting an evidentiary hearing on the section 877.6 offset, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. In entering the judgment, the trial court rejected plaintiff’s claim he was entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of the January 13, 2006 jury verdict until actual entry of judgment on December 4, 2008. This timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
The parties agree that to the extent that the prejudgment interest issue concerns application of statutes and rules, the trial court ruling denying prejudgment interest is subject to de novo review. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 800.) Plaintiff contends interest began to accrue on January 13, 2006, the date the verdict was returned. Plaintiff relies upon Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) which provides in part: “Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except during such time as the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt....” Plaintiff also relies on rule 3.1802 which provides, “The clerk must include in the judgment any interest awarded by the court and the interest accrued since the entry of the verdict.” Former Rule 875 was renumbered as rule 3.1802 effective January 1, 2007. Former rule 875 provided: “The clerk shall include in the judgment any interest awarded by the court and the interest accrued since the entry of the verdict.” Defendant argues the trial court properly ruled the date for computing interest was December 4, 2008, the first date a judgment was entered against it. Defendant relies on section 685.020, subdivision (a) which provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (b), interest commences to accrue on a money judgment on the date of entry of the judgment.” We conclude section 685.020 has nothing to do with this case.
Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) mandates prejudgment interest be imposed if the statutory requirements are met. (See Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp. (2008)160 Cal.App.4th 907, 935; see also North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 828 [prejudgment interest is mandatory when statutory requirements are met under Civil Code section 3287]; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 366, 378 [same].) In a case where Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) is applicable, prejudgment interest is mandatory. (North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 828; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 378; Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 762, 798; Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 371, 376.) That is, prejudgment interest is mandatory on the date when the damages are certain or ascertainable by calculation. (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a); Sagadin v. Ripper (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1141, 1174-1175; Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 798.) The test for recovery of prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) is whether the defendant actually knows the amount owed or from reasonably available information could have computed the amount. (Roodenberg v. Pavestone Co., L.P. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 185, 190-191; Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1789.) Damages are deemed certain when the parties do not essentially dispute the computation of damages. (Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 340, 354-355; Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 948, 958.) However, while discussing section 3287, subdivision (a), our colleagues in Division Two of this appellate district have held: “The statute does not authorize prejudgment interest where the amount of damage, as opposed to the determination of liability, ‘depends upon a judicial determination based upon conflicting evidence and is not ascertainable from truthful data supplied by the claimant to his debtor.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] (Employers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 354-355; accord Great Western Drywall, Inc. v. Roel Const. Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 761, 767; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1173.) The question here is whether as a matter of law, damages were certain or capable of being made so by calculation as of January 13, 2006, the date of the jury verdict. We independently review when and whether the damages were certain or capable of being made so within the meaning of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a). (KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 376, 390-391; see also Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 916.)
Defendant argues the damage amount was uncertain until December 4, 2008, the date judgment was finally entered in plaintiff’s favor. Defendant points out that no verdict was entered against it on January 13, 2006. Defendant reasons no judgment against it was entered until after we reversed the judgment and the post-appeal evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriate amount of economic damages was held.
We disagree with defendant that collectively the aforementioned factors made the damages uncertain. The fact that there was no judgment entered against defendant until after we reversed the judgment does not mean there was any uncertainty in the amount of damages when the verdict was returned. The jury found the amount of plaintiff’s damages as of January 13, 2006. Plaintiff’s damages were fixed on January 13, 2006. The damage amount has not changed since January 13, 2006. Although the judgment was appealed and set aside for offset reasons, the jury’s verdict determining a certain amount of damages was not overturned. In other words, the July 17, 2006 judgment was reversed and remanded for determination of any offsets but there was no reduction in the amount of damages determined by the jury on January 13, 2006. The Court of Appeal has held, “The possibility of that reduction, or even an actual reduction, does not render... damages any less certain.” (E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 378; see also Coleman Engineering Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 396, 409.) More specifically, it is well-established that the “offset” did not preclude prejudgment interest on the balance of plaintiff’s claim after the adjustment. (Coleman Engineering Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 409; Hansen v. Covell (1933) 218 Cal. 622, 629-631; Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 960; General Insurance Co. v. Commerce Hyatt House (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 460, 474-475.) Under these standards, plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) because his damages were certain on the date of the jury returned its verdict. (Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp., supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 935; Sagadin v. Ripper, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1174-1175; Dixon Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Walters (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 964, 974-975, disapproved on a different point in Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat. Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 801, 815, fn. 18.)
Defendant argues that this case is controlled by Pellegrini v. Weiss, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pages 532-533 which held rule 3.1802 could not be construed to require the imposition of interest between the verdict and judgment without conflicting with section 685.020, subdivision (a). However, the Pellegrini decision has nothing to do with Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b), the statute before us. So there is no question, we quote at length from the pertinent portions of the Pellegrini decision which relate to the interest computation issue: “[Defendant] asserts the trial court erred in setting the date for the running of interest on the damages award of July 29, 2005, the date the trial court considered and ruled on the equitable claims and confirmed the jury verdict. [Defendant] submits the date for the running of interest should instead be January 13, 2006, the date judgment was finally entered. [¶] In support of this argument, [defendant] relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 685.020, subdivision (a), which provides: ‘[I]nterest commences to accrue on a money judgment on the date of entry of the judgment.’ [¶] Rule 3.1802 of the California Rules of Court dealing with interest on judgments, provides that ‘[t]he clerk shall include in the judgment any interest awarded by the court and the interest accrued since the entry of the verdict.” (Emphasis added.) [¶] We read rule 3.1802 of the California Rules of Court as directing the clerk to calculate the continuation of any prejudgment interest that may have been awarded from the date of the verdict through the date of the judgment. Were we to construe California Rules of Court, rule 3.1802 as providing that postjudgment interest accrues between verdict and judgment, it would conflict with Code of Civil Procedure section 685.020. A rule of court cannot take precedence over a statute, however, so we decline to construe California Rules of Court, rule 875 in that fashion.” (Pellegrini v. Weiss, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 532-533.) The Pellegrini opinion then analyzed prior decisional and statutory authority some of which had been in essence legislatively abrogated. (Id. at p. 533.)
As can be noted, nothing in Pellegrini construes Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), the prejudgment interest statute. Thus, Pellegrini is not authority for the proposition before us. (Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 127; In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388.) More to the point, section 685.020, which is part of the Enforcement of Judgments Law has nothing to do with prejudgment interest. (§ 685.110 [“Nothing in this chapter affects the law relating to prejudgment interest.”]; see Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 795, fn. 2.) Defendant’s reliance on Pellegrini is without merit.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order denying prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3287 is reversed. Upon remittitur issuance, the trial court is to forthwith issue an order granting the motion for prejudgment interest effective January 13, 2006. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Plaintiff, Saul Villegas, is awarded his costs on appeal from defendant, Harsco Corporation.
We concur: MOSK, J., KRIEGLER, J.