Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-2477 SECTION "T" (4)
July 2, 2001
July 3, 2001
Before this Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendants pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This cause came for hearing on June 20, 2001, without oral argument. The Defendants seek the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' false arrest claims, the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' conspiracy claims, and the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, as evidenced in this Court's Minute Entry of June 28, 2001, the parties have agreed to the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and conspiracy claims, with prejudice. Accordingly, this Order will address only the Plaintiffs' false arrest claims. Having studied the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court is fully advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND:
The above-captioned action arises out of events that allegedly transpired on August 15, 1998, in the City of Kenner. The Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that on that evening, the Villasenors were going to a dance that was taking place at the Knights of Columbus Hall in Kenner, Louisiana. Rosalio Villasenors claims that when he and his wife arrived at the Knights of Columbus Hall, he attempted to park in a handicapped parking space in the parking lot. However, the Plaintiffs claim that as they were attempting to pull into the parking space, the Defendant, Officer Anthony Roach, approached their vehicle and began screaming at them. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that Officer Roach yelled at them for attempting to park in the handicapped parking space because they were not displaying a handicapped placard. The parties dispute whether or not Roach screamed at the Plaintiffs and whether or not Rosalio Villasenors actually produced a handicapped placard; however, the parties are in agreement that Officer Roach did not touch either Plaintiff at this time. Additionally, Officer Roach did not arrest either Plaintiff at this time.
After exchanging words with Officer Roach, the Plaintiffs left the Knights of Columbus parking lot and drove to Florida Avenue, the street adjacent to the parking lot. The Plaintiffs decided to take a photograph of Officer Roach's police unit because they allege that it was partially blocking the handicapped parking space in question. As the Plaintiffs snapped the photos, another officer on detail with Officer Roach, Officer John Louis, noticed several flashes of light coming from the Villasenors automobile. Officer Louis also claims to have witnessed the Plaintiffs' vehicle pull away at a high rate of speed, although the Plaintiffs deny speeding away. At this time, Officer Louis ran back to his police unit and began following the Villasenors' automobile. Officer Roach followed behind Officer Louis and the Villasenors in his own police vehicle. Additionally, the Plaintiffs' daughters observed the aforementioned incident transpire and proceeded to follow behind the three vehicles in their own automobile.
As he followed the Villasenors' vehicle, Officer Louis claims to have seen the Plaintiffs run a stop sign on Florida Avenue and turn the wrong way down 32nd Street. Additionally, Officer Louis claims that the Villasenors turned left at the intersection of Williams Boulevard and 32nd Street while the traffic signal was red. The Villasenors deny going against traffic on 32nd Street or running the stop sign on Florida Avenue, but they do not recall the color of the light at the intersection of Williams and 32nd Street. However, the Villasenors' daughter, who was also following behind the three previously mentioned vehicles, testified in her deposition that the light at Williams and 32nd street was green when her parents' vehicle crossed the intersection. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs eventually pulled into the parking lot of Fisherman's Cove, a seafood restaurant and store located on Williams Boulevard. Officers Roach and Louis charged Rosalio Villasenor with disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, and careless operation of a motor vehicle, in violation of City of Kenner Ordinance 1427, Section 7-127 and LSA-R.S. 32:58, respectively. Silvia Villasenor was charged with Obstruction of a Police Officer in violation of City of Kenner Ordinance 7-153 for allegedly interfering with the arrest of her husband and refusing to step back from the arresting officers after being instructed to do so.
The trial on these charges was scheduled for November 19, 1998, at which time Rosalio Villasenor pled guilty to the charge of careless operation of a motor vehicle pursuant to City of Kenner Ordinance 5474. Ordinance 5474 allows for the suspension of a sentence on a plea of guilty provided that the Defendant is not convicted of any other offenses during the period of suspension. Pursuant to that Ordinance, a Defendant can petition the Court to dismiss the prosecution and set aside the conviction following the period of suspended sentence. On December 18, 1998, after completing his period of suspended sentence, Rosalio Villasenor's prosecution was dismissed. Additionally, the charge of disturbing the peace against Rosalio Villasenor was nolle prosquied, and the charges against Silvia Villasenor were dismissed.
The Plaintiffs filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes civil actions to redress deprivations of constitutional rights. Additionally, the Plaintiffs assert a variety of state law causes of action. Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that on August 15, 1998, Officers Roach and Louis falsely arrested Rosalio Villasenor and charged him with disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct and careless operation of a motor vehicle. They additionally claim that Officer Roach falsely arrested and battered Silvia Villasenor. The Defendants now seek summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' false arrest claims. However, the Defendants have not presented this Court with any law or arguments in support of the dismissal of Silvia Villasenor's false arrest claims. Accordingly, this Order will address only Rosalio Villasenor's false arrest claims.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. The Law on Motions for Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco. Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323(1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832(1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587(1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovmg party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986).
B. The Law with Respect to Claims for False Arrest:
The Plaintiffs have brought claims against the Defendants for false arrest under both federal and state law. In order to bring a claim for false arrest under both federal and state law, the Plaintiff must show that the police officers in question did not have probable cause to make the arrest. See Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1995); Hunt v. Chapman, 458 So.2d 206 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1984). Under federal law, probable cause is said to have existed if "'at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing'" that the suspect violated a law. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534(1996) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225. 13 L.Ed.2d 142(1964)). Under Louisiana law, an officer is said to have had probable cause for making an arrest when the facts and circumstances that are within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. See Hunt v. Chapman, 458 So.2d 206, 209 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1984) (citing State v. Haynie, 395 So.2d 669 (La. 1981)); see also LSA-C.C.P. art. 213. Under both state and federal law, if the officer is found to have had probable cause to make the arrest, then that officer will not be subject to liability for making the arrest.
In the present case, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' false arrest claims should be dismissed because the officers clearly had probable cause to arrest Rosalio Villasenor for at least careless operation of a motor vehicle. They assert that there does not exist a genuine factual dispute regarding Rosalio Villasenor's arrest because the evidence shows that he in fact was driving in a careless manner on the night in question. Furthermore, the Defendants assert that Rosalio Villasenor cannot maintain a claim for false arrest because he pled guilty to the charge of careless operation. This guilty plea, the Defendants argue, forecloses Rosalio Villasenor's false arrest claim as a matter of law.
With respect to the Defendants' assertion that Villasenor's false arrest claims should be dismissed, the Plaintiffs argue that there does exist a genuine factual dispute concerning whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest. This Court agrees with the Plaintiffs. While Officer Roach and Officer Louis contend that Rosalio Villasenor ran a red light at the intersection of Williams Boulevard and 32nd Street, Rosalie Villasenor, the Plaintiffs' daughter, testified at her deposition that her father had a green light when he crossed the intersection of Williams and 32nd Street. Furthermore, Rosalie Villasenor testified that her father did not "peel out" from the Knights of Columbus Hall, that he stopped for stop signs, that he did not drive the wrong way down a one-way street, and that he did not appear to be speeding. This characterization of events is clearly contrary to the testimony of Officers Roach and Louis. Therefore, this Court finds that there does exist genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Rosalio Villasenor for careless operation of a motor vehicle on the night of August 15, 1998.
See Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3, Deposition of Rosalie Villasenor, page 24, lines 15-20.
See id. at pages 20-24.
Nevertheless, the Defendants argue that Rosalio Villasenor is precluded from raising claims for false arrest because he plead guilty to the charge of careless operation of a motor vehicle. They assert that this guilty plea precludes any claims for false arrest because such claims would necessarily imply that the conviction for the underlying crime was invalid. They cite Wells v. Bonner, supra, for the proposition that a claim for false arrest is not cognizable in the absence of the invalidation of the Plaintiff's conviction for careless operation. See Wells, 45 F.3d at 95. The Defendants contend that Rosalio Villasenor must prove that the charges against him were resolved in his favor in order to maintain a false arrest claim under both federal and state law.
The tort of false arrest consists of two elements: 1) the detention of a person; and 2) the unlawfulness of the detention. See Touchton v. Kroger, 512 So.2d 520 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1987). However, if a person is ultimately convicted of a crime for which he was arrested and that conviction is affirmed, then the person's detention is not unlawful. See Restrepo v. Fortunato, 556 So.2d 1362 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, if the charges against the person are not resolved in the person's favor, then he is precluded from bringing a false arrest claim as a matter of law. See Wells, 45 F.3d at 95.
In Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit established a high standard for what constitutes termination in an accused's favor. See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994). In Taylor the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of whether entering a pretrial diversion program constitutes the termination of a criminal action in favor of the accused for purposes of bringing a malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 455-556. The accused parties inTaylor were arrested for interference with a flight crew on an American Airlines Flight. See id. at 455. However, instead of going to trial on the charge, the accused parties entered into a pre-trial diversion program whereby they acknowledged responsibility for their actions, but were not required to admit guilt. See id. Participants who successfully completed their terms of diversion were not charged, or if charged, had those charges against them dismissed. See id. After successfully completing the pre-trial diversion program in question, the accused parties in Taylor filed suit against several defendants claiming violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.See id. The district court granted summary judgment in the Defendants' favor, ruling that the accused parties failed to show that the criminal action was terminated in their favor. See id. The district court reasoned that "a favorable termination must answer the question of guilt or innocence, and a pre-trial diversion order leaves open the question of [the accused parties'] guilt." Id. The accused parties subsequently appealed.
In addressing the issue of whether a pre-trial diversion agreement terminates a criminal action in the accused's favor, the Fifth Circuit adopted the holding and reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See id. at 456. The Fifth Circuit, thus, concluded that "proceedings are terminated in favor of the accused only when their final disposition indicates that the accused is not guilty." Id. (citingSingleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 193 (2d Cir. 1980)). The Fifth Circuit further cited the Second Circuit in reasoning that:
[a]n adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is "[a] procedure not unlike probation designed as a special break, given usually to first time offenders." Id. at 194 (internal quotations omitted). During the "probationary" period the offender is supervised, usually to determine whether he has complied with the requirements established by the court. If the requirements are met, the charges are dismissed. Under this arrangement "an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is far from being in all respects favorable to the defendant." Id.Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456 (quoting Singleton, 632 F.2d at 194)).
In Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit again visited the question of what constitutes termination in an accused's favor for purposes of establishing a claim of malicious prosecution. See Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 858-59 (5th Cir. 1999). In Evans, the government brought charges against Evans, a Forest Service employee, for knowingly making and using a false document. See id. at 858. Those charges were eventually dropped by the government in exchange for Evans' promise to retire from the Forest Service. See id. Evans subsequently brought a claim for malicious prosecution against the government in relation to the aforementioned charges. See id. The government filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Evans was precluded from bringing a malicious prosecution claim because the "deal" entered into by Evans and the government did not constitute a termination in Evans' favor. See id. The district court agreed, reasoning that because the "deal" did not indicate that Evans was not guilty of the charges, Evans' prosecution had not terminated in his favor. See Id. Evans appealed.
In addressing the issue of whether or not an agreement between the accused and the government constituted a termination in the accused's favor, the Fifth Circuit stated that the evidence clearly indicated that "Evans agreed to do something in exchange for the government's dropping the charges." Id. at 859. Such a situation "does not support a finding of favorable termination." Id. The Fifth Circuit reiterated that it has "set a high standard for what constitutes termination in the accused's favor."Id. Pursuant to that high standard, "the disposition must affirmatively indicate a lack of guilt." Id. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that under such a standard, Evans could not demonstrate that the prosecution terminated in his favor." Id. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Evans "has admitted that he entered an agreement with prosecutors under which they would dismiss the charges in exchange for something. Regardless of which version of the agreement is correct, the disposition of the case does not affirmatively indicate that Evans was not guilty."Id. at 859-60.
C. Application of the Law to the Facts:
In looking at the facts of the present case under the guise of Taylor and Evans this Court is of the opinion that Rosalio Villasenor cannot establish that the charge of careless operation of a motor vehicle was terminated in his favor. Rosalio Villasenor plead guilty to careless operation of a motor vehicle on November 19, 1998. That guilty plea was accepted by the Kenner City Court. Pursuant to said guilty plea, the court suspended the imposition of Villasenor's sentence in accordance with City of Kenner Ordinance 5474. Ordinance 5474 allows the Kenner City Court to, without entering a judgment of guilt, defer further proceedings against the defendant and to place the defendant on probation pursuant to reasonable terms and conditions established by the court. Upon the completion of the probationary term, the court may set aside and dismiss the prosecution.
See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 4
See id.
See id.
See id., Exhibit 5.
See id.
On December 18, 1998, Rosalio Villasenor's guilty plea was set aside and the prosecution against him was dismissed pursuant to Ordinance 5474. Nevertheless, such a dismissal is not a termination in Villasenor's favor for purposes of maintaining a claim for false arrest. Just as with the accused parties in both Taylor and Evans, Villasenor agreed to do something (plead guilty to the charge against him) in exchange for the government suspending his sentence and placing him in a diversionary program. Such a situation does not support a finding of favorable termination. Pursuant to the high standard established by the Fifth Circuit, the disposition must affirmatively indicate a lack of guilt. In the present case, the dismissal of the charges against Villasenor pursuant to Ordinance 5474 does not affirmatively indicate that Villasenor was in fact not guilty of the crime with which he was charged and to which he pled guilty. His conviction was not set aside because of a finding of innocence, but rather because he successfully completed a pre-trial diversionary program. Consequently, this Court finds that as a matter of law, Rosalio Villasenor cannot maintain any claims for false arrest because he cannot establish that the prosecution for careless operation of a motor vehicle was terminated in his favor.
See Id., Exhibit 4.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same is hereby GRANTED with respect to the false arrest claims of Rosalio Villasenor.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rosalio Villasenor's claims of false arrest, under both federal and state law be, and the same are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.