sence of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (2) absence of subject-matter jurisdiction; (3) prosecution under an ex post facto law; (4) denial of the right to counsel; (5) denial of the right to a jury trial; (6) denial of 10 days' preparation before trial for appointed counsel; (7) holding trials at a location other than the county seat; (8) comments by a trial judge which taint the presumption of innocence; and (9) jury charge errors resulting in egregious harm. See Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 887-89. Clayton's complaint does not fall within any of these categories. Moreover, Texas courts have held that a defendant must object to the State's use of allegedly false evidence to preserve the complaint for appeal. See Haliburton v. State, 80 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); see also De Los Santos v. State, No. 04-05-00459-CR2006, Tex. App. Lexis 7185, at *16-17 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Aug. 16, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Villarreal v. State, No. 04-02-00886-CR, 2005 Tex. App. Lexis 9781, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Nov. 23, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (failure to object to allegedly false testimony did not preserve due process complaint); Rodriguez v. State, No. 01-05-00032-CR, 2006 Tex. App. Lexis 2007, at *19-24 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 16, 2006, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (failure to object to State's questions "that implied the existence of a factual predicate that the prosecutor either knew or should have known was false" did not preserve due process complaint). Accordingly, Clayton has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review. We overrule his first issue. IMPROPER JURY ARGUMENT