No. 4-05-00287-CR
Delivered and Filed: November 9, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 79th Judicial District Court, Brooks County, Texas, Trial Court No. 04-04-08643-CR, Honorable Richard C. Terrell, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
Opinion by: PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
Juan Alberto Villarreal appeals his murder conviction. The court assessed a sentence of 80 years imprisonment, as recommended by the jury. Villarreal argues on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting both his oral and written confessions into evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
On August 17, 2003, Falfurrias Police Chief, Eden Noel Garcia, was dispatched to the home of Hilma Villarreal late in the evening and discovered her body on her bed. She had been stabbed in the chest with a knife. Early the next morning, Hilma's son — Villarreal — arrived at her home; at about 2:30 a.m., he gave a statement denying involvement. At approximately noon on August 18, 2003, Villarreal was taken to the police station. He was given his Miranda warnings and interviewed by Chief Garcia and Texas Ranger Ray Ramon. Villarreal again denied any involvement. Within an hour of that interview, Villarreal was served with an arrest warrant and transported to jail. At Villarreal's request, Chief Garcia went to the jail and spoke to Villarreal at approximately 11:50 p.m., almost eleven hours after his arrest. Chief Garcia testified that he did not know if any other officers had questioned Villarreal between the time he was transported to jail and their 11:50 p.m. conversation. Sometime prior to 11:50 p.m., Chief Garcia was notified that Villarreal had requested an attorney. Prior to speaking to Villarreal, Chief Garcia again gave him the Miranda warnings and verbally confirmed that Villarreal wanted to waive his rights. On the way to an interview room, Chief Garcia stopped at the booking desk to obtain a Miranda waiver form for Villarreal to sign. At that time, before signing the Miranda warning form and without being questioned, Villarreal stated that he killed his mother. He subsequently signed the written waiver of his Miranda rights, and provided a written statement confessing to the killing. At trial, both the oral and written statements were admitted into evidence over objections, and are the subject of this appeal. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of an oral or written statement under a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that the record supports, especially when the fact findings are based on an evaluation of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Perez v. State, 103 S.W.3d 466, 468 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). We review de novo the court's application of the law to the facts. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; Perez, 103 S.W.3d at 468. Where, as here, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's ruling and we sustain the decision if it is correct on any applicable theory of law. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28. Admission of Oral Statement
In his first issue, Villarreal contends that the trial court erred in admitting his oral confession into evidence because it was not taken in compliance with Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 (Vernon 2005). The State replies that Villarreal's oral confession was not the result of custodial interrogation, but rather was a spontaneous admission of guilt. In admitting the oral statement into evidence, the trial court ruled it was not given as a result of a custodial interrogation. Article 38.22 only applies to statements made as a result of a custodial interrogation. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 5 (Vernon 2005) (nothing in article precludes admission of statement made by accused if statement does not stem from custodial interrogation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). The Miranda court defined custodial interrogation as questioning that is "initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664, 671 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). A person is interrogated either through express questioning or its functional equivalent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980); Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Wiley v. State, 699 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, pet. ref'd). Interrogation includes "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Thus, oral statements of guilt are admissible if they are not the result of custodial interrogation and are given freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or persuasion. Shiflet v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985); Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 824-25 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). This court applied these principles in Wiley. There, the defendant was given his Miranda warnings and questioned by police about a sexual assault in which he denied involvement. Wiley, 699 S.W.2d at 638. The defendant then invited police officers to search his room, where they found incriminating evidence. Id. When the officers showed the defendant the evidence, he immediately confessed to the crime without further questioning. Id. We held that the spontaneous confession was not the product of custodial interrogation, and was admissible. Id. at 639; see also Cooks v. State, 5 S.W.3d 292, 298 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (spontaneous admission not result of custodial interrogation). Here, the record shows Villarreal clearly was in custody, but he was not being interrogated at the time of his oral admission of guilt. His statement was neither elicited by express questioning, nor by other words or actions the police should have known would elicit an incriminating statement. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Chief Garcia was merely escorting Villarreal to an interview room, and had stopped on the way at the front booking desk to get a Miranda warning form for him to sign before beginning the interview. It is at this point that Villarreal spontaneously "blurted out" that he killed his mother. When viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and deferring to the trial court's determination of credibility and demeanor, we hold the record supports the court's ruling that the oral confession did not stem from custodial interrogation and was admissible. Villarreal's first issue is overruled. Admission of Written Statement In his second issue, Villarreal contends that the trial court erred by admitting his written confession into evidence because the statement was a product of police coercion, and thus involuntary. Villarreal also asserts his statement was involuntary because he was impaired by medication at the time he gave the statement. Whether a statement was voluntarily made is determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). If a statement of the accused is freely given and voluntarily made without any use of persuasion or compulsion, then it is admissible. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (Vernon 2005); see also Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23. A statement is not voluntary if there was "official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice." Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). If voluntariness is raised by the defendant, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was given voluntarily. Id. The trial court is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and the court's finding on voluntariness will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. At the hearing outside the jury's presence, Villarreal testified that he was interrogated by multiple officers "off and on" for an 11-hour period at the jail and that he finally told the officers "what they wanted to hear." Villarreal also testified that he had ingested several narcotics and sleeping pills before being arrested, and was "in a state where [he] couldn't make a conscious decision." The jailer testified that two officers spoke to Villarreal prior to Chief Garcia's arrival, but he did not hear what was said. Chief Garcia testified that he did not know of any other officers questioning Villarreal while he was at the jail and that it was only at Villarreal's request that Chief Garcia came to the jail to speak to him. The chief stated that Villarreal was not subjected to any police coercion to induce a confession. Chief Garcia also testified that Villarreal did not appear to be under the influence of any narcotic, drug or alcohol at the time of his oral and written confessions. Giving deference to the trial court's determinations of credibility and demeanor, we hold that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Villarreal's written statement was not the product of police coercion and was voluntary. See Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 23; see also Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 781 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) ("The mere passage of time . . . between the arrest and the confession does not necessarily increase the likelihood that a subsequent confession is involuntary."), overruled on other grounds, Boyle v. State, 820 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the written statement into evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.