Opinion
INDEX NO. 652136/2020
03-04-2021
GRETA VILLAROSA, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT AGRICOLE CIB, Defendant.
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 19 PRESENT: HON. LOUIS L. NOCK Justice MOTION DATE 09/14/2020 MOTION SEQ. NO. 001
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
LOUIS L. NOCK, J. The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 were read on this motion to/for DISMISS. Upon the foregoing documents, and after oral argument held this day, it is ordered that defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted for the reasons that follow.
Plaintiff commenced this action by summons and complaint filed June 1, 2020, alleging entitlement to certain payments from defendant after she left its employ on December 16, 2019. Defendant moves to dismiss, making the following independent documentary showings.
The initial hiring agreement between the parties (NYSCEF Doc. No. 10) contains the following express and unambiguous provisions:
Notice of Termination: I agree that if I wish to terminate my employment with the Company, I will give the Company 30 days' advance written notice (the "Notice Period"). I agree that during the Notice Period, the Company may require me to cease all or some of my duties, and/or to remain away from the Company's premises and not work for, or for the benefit of, any other entity or individual, during all or part of the Notice Period. During the Notice Period, I understand and agree that I will remain an employee of the Company. I understand that the Company reserves the right, in its sole and exclusive discretion, to terminate my employment at any time during the Notice Period and to make a payment to me in lieu of the salary to which I would have been entitled during any remaining portion of the Notice Period.
Garden Leave: I acknowledge and agree that at the conclusion of the Notice Period, the Company shall have the right, in its sole and exclusive discretion, to require that I observe a Garden Leave period for up to 60 days. During such Garden Leave if elected by the Company, the Company will pay me my base salary and medical benefits, and I understand that during any Garden Leave I will remain an employee of the Company and bound by all of the express and implied obligations arising out of such employment, including the obligations of good faith and loyalty.(NYSCEF Doc. No. 10 §§ 3, 4, 9.)
At-Will Employment: I understand that this Agreement does not constitute a contract of employment for any specific term and that the Company or I (so long as I comply with Section 3 above) may terminate my employment at any time, for any reason or for no reason, unless a specific term of employment has been agreed to in a writing signed the Managing Director of the Human Resources department of the Company.
In addition to the foregoing hiring agreement provisions, defendant's employee handbook contains the following express and unambiguous provision:
11. Leaving the Company
(NYSCEF Doc. No. 12 § 11.)11.1 Separation
Employment with CRÉDIT AGRICOLE CIB is entered into voluntarily. You are free to resign at any time. Similarly, CRÉDIT AGRICOLE CIB may terminate the employment relationship with any employee at any time. If you resign from CRÉDIT AGRICOLE CIB, you should submit notification in writing to your Supervisor/Department Head, with a copy sent to the Human Resources Department. Your letter should contain the date on which your resignation is to take effect. In the absence of an agreement stating otherwise, all employees are expected to give two (2) weeks' notice of their intent to resign from CRÉDIT AGRICOLE CIB. Failure to do so will result in the employee not being paid for any unused accrued vacation days.
To distill the pertinent provisions quoted in full above: Any employee wishing to resign must furnish 30 days' advance notice of resignation in order to take advantage of a severance payment in lieu of salary calculable for that 30-day period, coined "the Notice Period." (NYSCEF Doc. No. 10 § 3.) To be clear, the employee can resign without furnishing the 30-day notice (see, id. § 9); but if she does, she forfeits any entitlement to a Notice Period salary (see, id. § 3). With regard to what is coined a 60-day "Garden Leave period" (id., § 4), which entails certain additional payments and benefits; that, too, depends on the employee's prerequisite invocation of a Notice Period which, as noted, only occurs upon 30-days' notice of resignation (see, id.). Lastly, any entitlement to unused vacation pay is dependent upon two weeks' notice of resignation (see, NYSCEF Doc. No. 12 § 11). And, importantly, all employees are required to furnish "the date on which your resignation is to take effect" (id.). Only in the absence of such a date will the employer assume an automatic two-week notice underlying the resignation (see, id.).
On December 16, 2019, plaintiff sent an email communication to defendant, titled "Formal Resignation," stating, emphatically and unambiguously, as follows:
Please accept this email as my formal resignation from Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank effective today, December 16, 2019. I have decided to pursue another career opportunity at this time. Thank you for the experience and support over the past 7+years.(NYSCEF Doc. No. 11.) Plain application of the Notice Period, Garden Leave, and Separation provisions to plaintiff's unequivocal resignation notice, expressly choosing an immediate effective date, and affirmatively foregoing 30-day and two-week advance notice options, leads this court to only one possible conclusion. Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the payments or benefits otherwise attainable in the event of furnishing 30-day or two-week notice. It is as simple as that for the following reason:
Sincerely, Greta Villarosa
We have long adhered to the "sound rule in the construction of contracts, that where the language is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous, the contract is to be interpreted by its own language" ( Springsteen v. Samson, 32 N.Y. 703, 706 [1865] [citing Rogers v. Kneeland, 10 Wend. 218 (1833)]). We recently reaffirmed this principle, noting that "'when parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to its terms'" ( Reiss v. Financial Performance Corp., 97 N.Y.2d 195, 198, 738 N.Y.S.2d 658, 764 N.E.2d 958 [2001] [quoting W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 565 N.Y.S.2d 440, 566 N.E.2d 639 (1990)]).(R/S Assocs. v New York Job Dev. Auth., 98 NY2d 29, 32, rearg denied 98 NY2d 693 [2002].)
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent the foregoing reality by submitting complaint allegations to the proximate effect that she didn't mean what she wrote in her resignation letter, emphatic and unambiguous as it is. The court notes that plaintiff has neither verified the complaint or submitted her own affidavit, or any other affidavit by a person possessing personal knowledge in corroboration of the bare allegations of the complaint. But more to the point: "the court is not required to accept factual allegations that are plainly contradicted by the documentary evidence or legal conclusions that are unsupportable based upon the undisputed facts" (Robinson v Robinson, 303 AD2d 234, 235 [1st Dept 2003]). And equally germane: "A party who enters into a written contract is bound by its stipulations and conditions whether or not he or she reads the contract" (Worcester Ins. Co. v Hempstead Farms Fruit Corp., 220 AD2d 659, 660 [2d Dept 1995]; see also, e.g., Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 NY2d 1 [1988]; Pimpinello v Swift & Co., 253 NY 159 [1930]).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted and, therefore, the complaint is dismissed.
This will constitute the decision and order of the court. 3/4/2021
DATE
ENTER:
/s/ _________
LOUIS L. NOCK, J.S.C.