Opinion
01 Civ. 0190 (JSM)
May 8, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leonardo Villar brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion. Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(c), or in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that on the morning of September 3, 2000, while incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center at Riker's Island, he awoke and went to take a shower at approximately 4:40 a.m. He states that this was necessary because he had experienced a nocturnal emission, and was required, as a Muslim, to perform a ritual bathing known as Al-Ghusl. While he was in the shower, a female correction officer, Kali Birdsall (sued herein as Off. Birsol # 9836), came in and told him to get out. Plaintiff refused, saying that he could not make his prayers until he had properly bathed, that he wanted to see a Captain, and that he would not get out of the shower until she left the area because it was contrary to his religious beliefs for a woman to see him naked. Officer Birdsall remained outside the shower for approximately 5 minutes until a male Captain arrived, who also told him to get out of the shower. When Plaintiff tried to explain why he was in the shower, the Captain said that he did not want to hear it, and that Plaintiff had been in the shower long enough. (Complaint at 3-5.)
Defendants contend that, on its face, the Complaint fails to set forth a Constitutional violation. They also contend that Officer Birdsall is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim, and that the claims against Warden Thompson and Deputy Warden Pagan must be dismissed because they are not alleged to have had any personal involvement in this incident.
Defendants have stated that the actions alleged in the Complaint were taken pursuant to "Lock-In/Lock-Out Schedule" Order Number 48/97, which provides that between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m., only inmates who are scheduled for Court appearances that day are permitted to be out of their cells. (Defendants' Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement, ¶ 15; Seligman Dec., Ex. C.) That Order states that, "[t]he policy of this facility is to provide maximum Lock-out time for its inmates and will lock them in only when necessary to accomplish necessary institutional business and during sleeping hours." (Seligman Dec., Ex. C.)
State prisoners' claims, brought to vindicate First Amendment rights, are reviewed under a reasonableness standard. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2259, 2260-61 (1987) Because the Court finds that Defendants' actions were taken pursuant to a prison regulation that is "reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives," id., and that Plaintiff had alternative means of exercising his rights, id. at 2262, Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim and will be dismissed.
As the Supreme Court stated in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987), "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049 (1948)). Moreover, it is not the job of the federal courts to engage in detailed supervision of the prisons, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081 (1972), and "prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878 (1979). The question, therefore, when a state prison regulation burdens the free exercise of religious practices, is whether the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penoogical objectives, or whether it represents an exaggerated response to those concerns. Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. at 2260-61. The factors relevant to this determination with respect to reasonableness are: (1) whether there is a "valid, rational connection" between the regulation and the legitimate, neutral government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether prisoners have alternative means of exercising their rights; (3) the impact that accomodation of the asserted constitutional right would have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there exist obvious, easy, less burdensome alternatives to the regulation. Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. Finally, "[w]here `other avenues' remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious of the `measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation.'" Id.
Application of these criteria to the Defendants' actions in this case demonstrates that the policy that requires prisoners to remain in their cells until 5:00 a.m. on a day when they are not scheduled for a court appearance is "reasonably related" to legitimate penological objectives — maintaining order and security while ensuring that the prisoners who have to be transported to court will be processed and ready to go in an efficient and timely manner. Giving priority in the showers and other common areas to prisoners scheduled for court appearances and allowing corrections officers to focus on supervising those prisoners without the distraction of dealing with others for the short period of time involved certainly is a reasonable method of dealing with the various demands that are made upon personnel in a facility like Riker's Island.
Second, it is obvious that prisoners, like Plaintiff, who are required to remain in their cells until 5:00 a.m. on a day when they are not scheduled for a court appearance have alternative means of exercising their rights. First, under the existing Order, Plaintiff would have been free to take a shower 20 minutes later. Second, even if it is assumed that waiting 20 minutes to shower was not an acceptable alternative because the time for prayers would arrive before 5:00 a.m., the attachment provided by Plaintiff as part of his Complaint shows on its face that Plaintiff had other alternatives to taking a shower before 5:00 a.m. That document states, "On certain occasions, it may become . . . impossible (e.g. when water cannot be found or just enough for drinking is available) . . . to use water for Wudu or Ghusl. In such situations, Tayammum (dry ablution) is performed." (Complaint at 8.) Presumably, Plaintiff could have followed this procedure if water was unavailable to him. Furthermore, the Al-Ghusl procedure does not require that the bathing take place in a shower. (Complaint at 8-9.) Plaintiff could perhaps have performed this procedure at a sink in his cell.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in this case, Plainfiff actually spent more than 5 minutes in the shower despite the proscription of Order Number 48/97. He was in the shower for some period before Officer Birdsall ordered him to get out, and then for approximately 5 minutes while they waited for the male Captain to arrive. The Captain ordered Plaintiff to get out, saying that Plaintiff "had been in there long enough so get out." Complaint at 5. Thus, by Plaintiff's own admission, he actually had the opportunity to take a shower, the alleged denial of which is the basis for his First Amendment claim.
Accomodation of the claim that inmates should have access to the showers at all hours to perform Al-Ghusl would have an impact on guards, other inmates and the allocation of prison resources. It would require more personnel from an already strained budget. See Howard v. Wallace, Civ. Action 93-0510-AH-M, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18915, at 15 (S.D. Ala. October 31, 1994), adopted and case dism., 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18900 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 1994) (finding a similar regulation closing the showers during a four hour period each night reasonable in light of the plaintiff's failure to advance a readily available alternative to the rule, and the fact that plaintiff had many other avenues by which to practice his religion). Providing unrestricted access to the showers also could impact the prison's ability to see that prisoners with court dates are processed and sent out to court in a timely fashion. Finally, Plaintiff has not suggested an obvious, easy, less burdensome alternative to the regulation.
Since a review of all of the criteria set out in Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. at 2260-61, demonstrates that the regulation at issue is reasonably related to a legitimate, neutral governmental interest, and it is clear that Plaintiff had other avenues for exercising his religion, his Complaint fails to state a cause of action for violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Therefore, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.