Opinion
CIVIL NO. 2:07cv187.
March 12, 2008
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration denying plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) as provided for in the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 416(I); 42 U.S.C. § 423; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1382c(a)(3). Section 205(g) of the Act provides, inter alia, "[a]s part of his answer, the [Commissioner] shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." It also provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The law provides that an applicant for disability insurance benefits must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). It is not enough for plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude the plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D.Ill. 1979). It is well established that the burden of proving entitlement to disability insurance benefits is on the plaintiff. See Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971); Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970).
Given the foregoing framework, "[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner's] findings." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence is defined as `more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984) quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1427 (1971); see Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1977). "If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), unless there has been an error of law." Garfield, supra at 607; see also Schnoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).
In the present matter, after consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2006.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2003, the alleged onset date ( 20 CFR 404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: hypertension, minor degenerative changes of the right knee, obesity, early chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and diabetes mellitus ( 20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404. Subpart P, Appendix 1 ( 20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk about 2 hours in an 8 hour workday; sit for about 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; no limitations in pushing and/or pulling with either the upper or lower extremities; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, crouching, crawling, kneeling and stooping; no work around unprotected heights or operation of hazardous moving machinery; and no concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work ( 20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant was born on October 8, 1957 and was 45 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 45-49, on the alleged disability onset date ( 20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English ( 20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. The claimant has acquired work skills from past relevant work ( 20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968.
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the claimant has acquired work skills from past relevant work that are transferable to other occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy ( 20 CFR 404.1566, 404.1568(d), 416.960(c), 416.966, and 416.968(d)).
11. The claimant has not been under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 1, 2003 through the date of this decision ( 20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
(Tr. 15-19).
Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined that Villano was not entitled to disability insurance benefits. The ALJ's decision became the final agency decision when the Appeals Council denied review. This appeal followed.
Villano filed her opening brief on October 24, 2007. On December 11, 2007, the defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Commissioner's decision, and on December 20, 2007, Villano filed her reply. Upon full review of the record in this cause, this court is of the view that the ALJ's decision should be affirmed.
A five step test has been established to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1988); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290-91 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summarized that test as follows:
The following steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"? (3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not disabled.Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 504 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1988); Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984). From the nature of the ALJ's decision to deny benefits, it is clear that step five was the determinative inquiry.
On May 6, 2004, Plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) disability benefits alleging that she became unable to work on September 1, 2003. Plaintiff's claims were denied administratively, she requested a hearing and Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Steven J. Neary conducted a hearing on August 24, 2006. Id. On January 18, 2007, ALJ Neary issued a decision denying Plaintiff's disability claims. (AR. 13-19), leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of defendant's denial of her disability claims.
Plaintiff was born on October 8, 1957. (AR. 108). She worked as a bell ringer for the Salvation Army, a van driver and a stocker. (AR. 215, 233). She experienced physical impairments that restricted her ability to work such as: hypertension, degenerative changes of the right knee, morbid obesity, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes mellitus, anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, sleep apnea, chronic fatigue, mood swings and dizziness. (AR. 15, 47-68, 124-139, 167-170). Plaintiff had an extremely difficult childhood. (AR. 136-139). She was abused physically and sexually as a young girl. (AR. 136).
Ms. Villano worked most recently as a bell ringer for the Salvation Army, but stopped working in 2003 because she started "getting pain in [her] knees" that "shoots up to [her] hips and . . . [her] feet hurt like they're numb." (AR. 217). She complains that she could not work any of her past jobs due to pain that prevents her from walking or standing for continuous periods of time. Id.
Plaintiff was treated by several doctors for her impairments. (AR. 218). In July 2004, she was examined by Dr. Ralph Inabit who found that Plaintiff's blood pressure was "out of control." (AR. 133). Plaintiff complained of bilateral knee pain, difficulty with ambulating for long distances and "difficulty rising from a sitting position and . . . difficulty with flexing, bending, stooping, pushing or pulling." (AR. 133). Dr. Inabit interpreted an x-ray which revealed evidence of osteoarthritis of the right knee, and "valgus knees." Id. After performing a physical exam, Dr. Inabit noted that Plaintiff was morbidly obese. (AR. 134). After performing a motor exam, Dr. Inabit noted that Plaintiff's motor function was 4/5 in the lower extremities and 4/5 in the upper extremities and that her reflexes indicate hyporeflexia in all four extremities. Id. Dr. Inabit concluded that Plaintiff suffered from: morbid obesity, hypertension, degenerative osteoarthritis of the right knee, insomnia, sleep apnea, chronic fatigue and dizziness. (AR. 135).
On July 14, 2004, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Joyce Scully, psychologist. (AR. 136). Plaintiff recounted her difficult upbringing to Dr. Scully. (AR. 135-136). Dr. Scully performed a mental status exam and "Plaintiff cried through most of the session." (AR. 137). Plaintiff reported that she "gets into angry fits over the slightest little thing . . . has trouble sleeping . . . has nightmares regularly . . . and feels safe inside but not outside the house." (AR. 137-38). Dr. Scully diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder, obesity, knee problems, and stressors that are moderate to severe; recommending that Plaintiff attend counseling and perhaps an eating disorder clinic. (AR. 139). On July 28, 2004, Dr. Ganges prepared a Psychiatric Review Technique From which was affirmed by Dr. Unversaw, PhD, finding Plaintiff's anxiety related disorders were not severe. (AR. 140-155).
On February 9, 2004, Plaintiff was admitted to La Porte Hospital and treated by Dr. Melvin Richardson. (AR. 98-110). Dr. Richardson performed numerous tests and ultimately diagnosed: osteoarthritis of the knee, hypertension, including hot flashes and blood pressure disorders, mood swings, and anxiety. (AR. 108). Dr. Richardson ordered x-rays of Plaintiff's knee which demonstrated "significant narrowing of the patellofemoral joint space as well as the femoral tibial joint space" and degenerative arthritis with joint space narrowing of the right knee. (AR. 109). Dr. Richardson noted that Plaintiff weighed 312 pounds at 5'4", and described her as morbidly obese. (AR. 110).
Dr. Serwatk, Plaintiff's treating physician, completed a Diabetes Mellitus Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire on May 16, 2006. (AR. 167-170). Dr. Serwatk noted that Plaintiff's symptoms included extreme pain and numbness and difficulty with walking. (AR. 167). The doctor opined that emotional factors contribute to the severity of Plaintiff's symptoms. Id. Plaintiff reported that she can walk one block without rest and can not stand or sit more than two hours per day in a normal eighthour working day. (AR. 169). Plaintiff further reported that she would need to take unscheduled breaks during an eight-hour work day "continuously." Id. She can lift less than 10 pounds frequently and can only bend 10% and twist 20% of an eight-hour workday. Id. Plaintiff's condition is likely to cause "good days" and "bad days" and she should avoid concentrated exposure to cold, heat, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, solvents, chemicals and other allergens. (AR. 170).
ALJ Neary conducted a hearing on January 18, 2007. (AR. 169-208). At the hearing, Villano testified as follows: she has problems walking due to pain in her knees that shoots up to her hips, and that "when [she is] done walking for the day [she] will sit down . . . and [her] feet hurt like they're numb." (AR. 217). She can walk two-three blocks before the pain becomes extreme, and cannot sit or stand for continuous periods of time because "I hurt through my hips and my knees" and she feels stiffness throughout her body. (AR. 219). In a typical day "I get up between 6:00 and 8:00, and I take my pills, and I take my daughter's dogs for a walk. Then I come back and I rest, I sit down. Then I sit there for a while and I get up and go fix my room up. . . . make my bed . . . throw a load of laundry in, and then I sit down again. And then after a little while I'll go in and clean the dishes up. Then I'll sit down again." (AR. 220). Plaintiff further testified that she cannot sit for more than one hour and can only stand on her feet continuously in fifteen minute increments. (AR. 219).
Plaintiff still drives, but not very far because she is unable to fully depress the clutch. (AR. 221). She sometimes goes out to dinner with her kids, but not often. Id. She has sleep apnea, and frequently falls asleep for up to two hours each day due to fatigue. (AR. 222-223). She was previously treated for anxiety and depression but not currently because she could not afford treatment. (AR. 223-224). She was hospitalized because of depression and anxiety when she was younger due to her extremely difficult childhood. (AR. 224).
Villano testified that she is depressed and does not trust men, and cries up to three days per week for a few hours at a time. (AR. 225). She has uncontrollable high blood pressure which makes her dizzy and occasionally causes blurred vision. (AR. 226). She had bilateral carpal tunnel surgery and still has trouble performing repetitive motions with her hands. (AR. 227). Plaintiff has neuropathy which causes her feet to tingle, however she is unable to afford treatment. (AR. 228, 229). She has diabetes mellitus and often suffers from swelling of her legs, knees and ankles. (AR. 228, 230). She suffers from insomnia every night and she takes prescription medication to help her fall asleep. (AR. 231). She has anger problems and lashes out because she "keeps all [her] stuff bottled up and blows up all at once." (AR. 231). Plaintiff testified that she is a slow reader, she has low social functioning skills, and does not deal with people outside of her immediate family. (AR. 232).
ALJ Neary posed a hypothetical question to Ms. Whitcomb, the VE, which included someone who is 48 years old with a high school education and a past work history as a stocker and van driver (chauffeur), is limited to sedentary work, can occasionally climb, crawl, crouch, kneel, stoop, cannot work at unprotected heights or operate hazardous moving machinery, cannot be exposed to pulmonary irritants. (AR. 234). The VE stated that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers such a person could perform. Out of a total workforce, the VE testified that Plaintiff could perform sedentary jobs such as: production worker which number approximately 992, interviewer which number 132, receptionist and information clerk which number 425. The VE opined however, that Villano would not be capable of performing any of her past employment. (AR. 235-236).
ALJ Neary found that Ms. Villano's history of hypertension, minor degenerative changes of the right knee, obesity, early chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and diabetes mellitus were "severe" impairments, (AR. 15), that did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments. (AR. 16). The ALJ summarized the medical evidence and opinions and found that Plaintiff's impairments could produce the alleged symptoms, however, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects entirely credible. (AR. 17).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk about 2 hours in an 8 hour workday; sit for about 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, and she could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, crouch, crawl, kneel and stoop, but could not work around unprotected heights or operate hazardous moving machinery and could not be exposed to concentrated pulmonary irritants. (AR 16-17).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments were severe but did not meet Listing 1.02, (AR. 13-19), and that "there is no medical evidence to support any limitation in the claimant's ability to sit for about 6 hours in an 8 hour workday." (AR. 17). Additionally, the ALJ found Villano had acquired the transferable skill of "sound judgment" from her past relevant work. (AR. 18).
The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The agency has promulgated regulations that set forth a five-step sequential process for analyzing disability claims. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. A claimant has the joint burdens of production and persuasion through at least step four, where the individual's residual functional capacity (RFC) is determined. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945. At step five the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that there are jobs in the national economy that the Villano can perform. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 n. 18 (7th Cir. 1994). In the present case, the ALJ found that the Villano retained the ability to perform other work within the national economy.
The agency's final decision is subject to review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that the agency findings "as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." "Substantial evidence is . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Furthermore, "[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or on the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)." Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). This court must accept the ALJ's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986).
In support of reversal, Villano first argues that the ALJ erred by finding that her physical impairments did not meet or equal Listing 1.02. However, in her reply brief she "concedes to the Commissioner that she does not meet the Listing in all of its parts." (Reply Brief, p. 1). Yet she continues to argue that "given Plaintiff's extreme obesity, the ALJ was under a duty at the time of the hearing, to at a minimum, consider whether Plaintiff's impairments met Listing 1.02." Id.
While it is true that the ALJ failed to mention Listing 1.02 in his opinion, it is obvious from the record (and Villano's concession) that her impairments do not meet or equal this Listing, and thus the ALJ did not commit reversible error.
Villano next argues that the ALJ's credibility determination is contrary to SSR 96-7p. Villano points out that the ALJ failed to even mention Villano's credibility except in the formal findings of his decision where he states: "After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but that claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible." (AR. 17). While the ALJ stated "[i]n making this finding, the undersigned considered all symptoms" (Id.) as SSR 96-7p explains: "[i]n determining the credibility of an individual's statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case record. . . ." "The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the reasons for that weight." SSR 96-7p, see also, Steele, 290 F.3d at 941-42.
The ALJ must consider the following factors when assessing credibility: an individual's daily activities; location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the individual takes to alleviate symptoms; treatment received; any measures other than treatment the individual used to relieve pain/symptoms; any other factors concerning the individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain/other symptoms. SSR 96-7p, Westlaw *3; 20 C.F.R. 416.929(c); see Zurawaski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887-88 (7th Cir. 2001).
Villano argues that contrary to the weight of the medical evidence, ALJ Neary determined that Plaintiff was not credible in her testimony regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms from hypertension, degenerative changes of the right knee, morbid obesity, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and diabetes mellitus, anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, sleep apnea, chronic fatigue, mood swings and dizziness. (AR. 15, 17, 47-68, 124-139, 167-170). Villano states that all of her treating physicians noted her impairments in their medical reports (Id.) and she testified to their limiting effects on her ability to function: "I start getting pain in my knees, and it shoots up to my hips and then it hurts very badly. Now when I'm done walking for the day I will sit down, and or try to go to bed and, my feet hurt like they're numb." (AR. 217). Only Dr. Ganges, the non-examining physician from the DHS found that Plaintiff did not suffer from obesity or early chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. (AR. 140-165). Villano further testified that she takes medications to help her impairments and that "[her] feet feel numb, almost like when [she] had carpal tunnel syndrome in [her] hands," and that she can only stand and sit for short periods of time because she gets stiff. (AR. 219). She testified that she cannot sit for more than one hour and can only stand on her feet continuously for fifteen minute increments. Id.
In Steele, the Seventh Circuit held that "according to Social Security Regulation 96-7p, which applies to the ALJs evaluations of an applicant's description of symptoms, the evaluation must contain `specific reasons' for a credibility finding; the ALJ may not simply `recite the factors that are described in the regulations.'" Steele, 290 F. 3d at 941-42. Thus Villano concludes that the ALJ failed to give specific reasons for his credibility finding and did not appropriately analyze Ms. Villano's testimony regarding her ability to sit for extended periods of time due to the pain and stiffness she feels. (AR. 17).
In response, the defendant notes that the fact that a doctor mentions a diagnosis or mentions the existence of a condition does not establish that the condition produces disabling symptoms. The defendant claims that the only other evidence Villano relies on to establish her credibility is her subjective testimony. The defendant argues that testimony regarding subjective symptoms must be evaluated in conjunction with other factors to determine whether the testimony is credible. The defendant correctly notes that in the present case, the ALJ evaluated Villano's testimony and determined that it was credible to a certain extent, but not to the extent that it established Villano was disabled.
With respect to Villano's argument that "the ALJ failed to consider all of Ms. Villano's impairments in combination and how the cumulative effect of her impairments limits her ability to sit for 6 to 8 hours per day", the defendant contends that the ALJ correctly noted that there is no medical evidence that shows Villano cannot sit (Tr. 17). Rather, Villano's knee condition limits her ability to stand and walk, but there is no evidence that it limits her ability to sit and Villano cites no medical evidence and no condition that prevents her from sitting. In fact, Villano never complained to her doctors that she had any trouble sitting. Rather, Villano relies on a doctor's report that refers to her difficulty standing up and the fact that she waddled. Yet, the waddling and standing difficulty was accommodated by the ALJ. The ALJ found that Ms. Villano could not stand or walk more than a cumulative total of two hours in an eight-hour day.
With respect to Villano's arguement that the ALJ did not sufficiently articulate his credibility finding and "did not explain how he formed his conclusions" or why he rejected Villano's above-mentioned subjective complaints, the defendant maintains that the ALJ explained his reasoning, explicitly noting the evidence that he relied upon (Tr. 17). The defendant further notes that there is no value in sending this case back to an ALJ to simply flesh out the current decision. See Fisher, 869 F.2d at 1057 ("no principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result.").
Villano continues to argue that there is medical evidence in the record that she "suffers from impairments that could cause her to be unable to sit for 6 to 8 hours per day." (emphasis added). Villano also points out that the report from Dr. Serwatk noted that she could sit only 2 hours total in an 8 hour working day with normal breaks. (Tr. 169). However, the ALJ did not give weight to this evidence because Dr. Serwatk noted that he was merely reporting what was told to him "according to patient". (Tr. 169). Thus, this court agrees that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination.
Villano next argues that the ALJ failed to analyze the impact of her obesity alone or in combination with her other impairments in violation of Social Security Ruling 02-1p. Villano notes that she has been consistently diagnosed as morbidly obese, and that her weight ranges from 290 pounds to 350 pounds. Villano complains that the ALJ never addressed the fact that her fatigue, hypertension, and sleep apnea could have been caused or exacerbated by her obesity alone. Villano also claims that the ALJ was required to recognize that her obesity could have reduced her residual functional capacity to a disabling level.
The defendant, however, notes that the ALJ explicitly considered Ms. Villano's obesity. The ALJ stated that the "[t]reating and examining state agency physicians all noted the claimant's obesity, diabetes mellitus, osteoarthritis of the knees and pain in her feet" (Tr. 17) (emphasis added). The ALJ further stated that Villano's "ability to stand and/or walk is limited. She is obese, has ongoing complaints of feet problems, has diabetes mellitus and osteoarthritis in her knees" (Tr. 17). Clearly, the ALJ explicitly considered Villano's obesity in combination with her other impairments and found that together Villano's impairments (including her obesity) resulted in a limited ability to stand and/or walk.
Next, Villano argues that the ALJ erred in holding that she had transferable skills of "sound judgment". Villano points out that in Key v. Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit held that an ALJ is required to "identify the acquired work skills, and specific occupations to which the acquired work skills are transferable." 925 F.2d 1056, 1062 (7th Cir. 1991). Villano claims that the VE never testified that she had acquired the "skill" of "sound judgment," nor did she testify that this skill was transferable to any jobs, let alone the specific jobs she stated Villano could perform.
However, as the defendant notes, Villano's argument is moot. Villano was only 49 years old at the time of the ALJ's decision, which is defined as a "younger individual". Transferability of skills is immaterial where the claimant is a younger individual who can perform sedentary work and is at least literate in English. 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, Rules 201.18 through 201.22.
Accordingly, as the ALJ's decision is sufficiently supported by the record, the decision to deny benefits will be affirmed.
Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is hereby AFFIRMED.