One or two uses of the term "bitch" in the same moment is not sufficient to create a jury question on these claims. E.g., Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., Inc., No. CV 12-00850 MV/LAM, 2015 WL 13665443, at *25 (D.N.M. Mar. 26, 2015) (citing cases); Villalva v. Dillon Cos, Inc., No. 12-cv-02005-PAB, 2013 WL 6804585, at *8 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2013). The term is offensive, but in the context of the facts described above, indicates that its use was not motivated by gender, but by a heated workplace argument during which Plaintiff admits that she lost her temper as well.

Plaintiff can satisfy the light burden of pleading facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination by "present[ing] evidence of preferential treatment given to employees outside the protected class, actions or remarks made by a decision maker, or circumstances related to the timing or sequence of events leading to plaintiff's termination." Villalva v. Dillon Companies, Inc., No. 12-cv-02005-PAB-CBS, 2013 WL 6804585 at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2013) (citing Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1100-01) (internal quotations and alteration marks omitted). Plaintiff has not done any of these things.

"To determine whether a plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies, courts identify the scope of the allegations raised in a plaintiff's charge of discrimination because a 'plaintiff's claim in federal court is generally limited by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.'" Villalva v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 2013 WL 6804585, *10 (D.Colo. Dec. 23, 2013)(quoting Jones, 502 F.3d at 1186). Plaintiff merely checked the box indicating race discrimination, she did not, however, include any facts to support her allegation.