Opinion
No. 7828
Decided July 17, 1969.
Appeal — From Mayor's Court — Court of Common Pleas without appellate jurisdiction — Section 2953.02, Revised Code, unconstitutional — Section 4, Article IV, Constitution, as amended May 7, 1968.
As a result of the amendment of Article IV, Section 4 of the Chio Constitution, effective May 7, 1968, Section 2953.02, Revised Code, is unconstitutional and the Court of Common Pleas has no jurisdiction of an appeal from a Mayor's Court.
Mr. David L. Kraft, for plaintiff.
Mr. Richard L. Gerhardt, for defendant.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Mayor's Court of the village of Commercial Point filed in that court on February 14, 1969.
In that decision the Mayor entered a finding to the effect that the defendant was guilty of violation of an ordinance of the village relating to house trailers and imposed a penalty of a fine plus costs.
This appeal was taken by the defendant under the provisions of Section 2953.02, Revised Code. In this appeal the defendant raises questions relative to the enactment and constitutionality of the ordinance.
Briefs in support of and contra such appeal have been filed and oral arguments had thereon. This appeal raises the question of the jurisdiction of this court, which will be reviewed sua sponte. Section 1905.22, Revised Code, reads as follows:
"A conviction under an ordinance of any municipal corporation may be reviewed on appeal in the same manner as appeals on questions of law from a county court, and the judgment of affirmance or reversal may be reviewed in the same manner, and for this purpose a bill of exceptions may be taken, or a statement of facts embodied in the record on the application of any party."
Section 1921.01, Revised Code, reads as follows:
"Either party may appeal from the final judgment of a judge of a county court, to the court of common pleas of the county in which the judgment was rendered."
Section 2953.02, Revised Code, reads in part as follows:
"In a criminal case, including a conviction for the violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporation, the judgment or final order of a court or magistrate inferior to the court of common pleas, may be reviewed in the court of common pleas, and a judgment or final order of a court of record or officer inferior to the court of appeals may be reviewed in the court of appeals."
It now becomes necessary for the court to determine whether the appeal from the Mayor's Court to the Court of Common Pleas is authorized by Article IV, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution, as amended on May 7, 1968. Prior to the May 7, 1968 amendment, Article IV, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution provided as follows:
"The jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Pleas, and of the judges thereof shall be fixed by law."
Under this provision the General Assembly had authority to confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of Common Pleas to hear appeals from a Mayor's Court. The Judicial Article of the Constitution above referred to, was amended by a vote of the electorate on May 7, 1968.
The jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Pleas is set forth in paragraph (B) of said section, which reads as follows:
"The courts of common pleas shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law."
This amended section of the Ohio Constitution relating to jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Pleas was in effect upon the dates that the decision was rendered in Mayor's Court and at the time that this appeal was filed in this court. See City of Euclid v. Heaton, 15 Ohio St.2d 65.
The effect of this constitutional article upon the jurisdiction of appeals from Municipal Courts to the Courts of Common Pleas was considered in the case of Stone v. Goolsby, 18 Ohio Misc. 105, in which the first paragraph of the syllabus reads as follows:
"Since the amendment of Division (B) of Article IV, Section 4, Ohio Constitution, effective May 7, 1968, the General Assembly is not authorized to confer jurisdiction upon Courts of Common Pleas to review proceedings of municipal courts."
The court has reviewed that opinion, rendered by Whiteside, J., of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, and concurs in the opinion as rendered by the court. It is true that in that case the appeal was one relative to a civil matter, whereas the appeal in this case relates to a criminal ordinance. However, the constitutional provision is applicable equally to civil as well as criminal cases. Article IV, Section 3, Subsection 2 sets forth the jurisdiction of Courts of Appeals as follows:
"Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse final orders or actions of administrative officers or agencies."
It is clear from a reading of the constitutional judicial article that it was the intent of the framers of the amendment to confer jurisdiction for a review of judgments of courts of record inferior to the Courts of Appeals in the Courts of Appeals and not in the Courts of Common Pleas. This court is of the opinion that the provisions for review as to the Courts of Appeal and the Courts of Common Pleas exclude by constitutional mandate the conferring of any additional appellate jurisdiction upon the Courts of Common Pleas. The General Assembly is without power to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Pleas beyond that provided for by Article IV, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution.
This court is, therefore, of the opinion that Section 2953.02, Revised Code, relating to appeals in criminal cases from the Mayor's Courts to the Courts of Common Pleas, is unconstitutional and is of no force or effect in view of the provisions of Article IV, Sections 3 and 4 of the Ohio Constitution as amended on May 7, 1968.
This court is, therefore, without jurisdiction to determine this appeal. It would also appear to the court that the General Assembly would be without authority to provide for any appeal from the Mayor's Court to the Court of Appeals since appeals to the Court of Appeals can be only from orders of courts of record. See Article IV, Section 3, Subsection 2. In a decision of the Court of Appeals for Paulding County, dated July 17, 1968 in the case of Town Country Food, Inc., v. Phillips, the court by syllabus stated the following:
"Since the enactment of Section 1907.012, Revised Code, County Courts are courts of record for all purposes of law and, as such, appeal on questions of law may be taken from the judgment or final order of a County Court to the Court of Appeals in whose district such County Court is located pursuant to the procedures set forth in Sections 2505.04 to 2505.45, Revised Code, as an alternative to the appeal on questions of law to the Court of Common Pleas provided for in Section 1921.01, Revised Code."
There are also statutory provisions for appeals from Municipal Court to the Court of Appeals.
The question may be raised as to the effect of the holding of this court relative to the continuance of Mayor's Courts, since there is no provision for any appeal.
The purposes of a review by a higher court is set forth in Skeel, Ohio Appellate Law, P. 7 as follows:
"There is no such thing as an unimportant judicial determination of a disputed question of fact and law. The faith of the people in courts depends on the average result, squaring with what is generally considered just and circumscribed by a sense of fair play. Courts cannot attain the exactitude of the provable sciences; an honest judgment, fairly and impartially pronounced after an adequate investigation of the facts in a tribunal presided over by one trained in the law with adequate provision for a review to see to it that the accepted law of the nation has been afforded the parties, is the means by which justice is made to serve the best interests of the people.
"A reviewing court is also important to coordinate divergent legal contentions and to establish principles and precedents to guide the course of future cases dealing with like subjects.
"An appeal then becomes desirable for two reasons, first to test the correctness of the proceeding when a litigant feels that he has not been afforded justice under the law and, second, to record and give sanction to correct rules of law as it conforms to changing conditions. `Without some central review, the divergent opinions of numerous trial courts would become confusion compounded.'"
It is beyond the jurisdiction of the court to provide for any review which is not set forth in the Constitution or by statute. Perhaps the framers of the "Modern Courts Amendment" may not have intended the results indicated by this court; however, this court is bound by the specific provisions of the constitutional amendment which limits the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court as to appeals to administrative bodies.
The court, therefore, is of the opinion that in view of Article IV, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution that the provisions of Section 2953.02, Revised Code, as to appeals from Mayor's Courts to the Common Pleas Courts, is unconstitutional, and that therefore the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal in this case from the Mayor's Court of Commercial Point, Ohio.
Judgment accordingly.