Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook

18 Citing cases

  1. Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co.

    189 Ill. App. 3d 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 53 times
    Applying a five-year limitation period for tortious interference with contract

    It has often been stated that a cause of action consists of a right belonging to the plaintiff and a violation of that right by a wrongful act or omission by the defendant for which the law gives a remedy. ( Benton v. Smith (1987), 157 Ill. App.3d 847, 854, 510 N.E.2d 952, 956; Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co. (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 320, 322, 484 N.E.2d 1187, 1189; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929.) To determine whether causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes, two tests have been employed.

  2. Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co.

    139 Ill. App. 3d 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 24 times

    A cause of action consists of a right belonging to the plaintiff and a violation of that right by a wrongful act or omission by the defendant for which the law gives a remedy. ( City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis (1945), 392 Ill. 195, 205-06, 64 N.E.2d 450; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750, 410 N.E.2d 925, appeal denied (1981), 82 Ill.2d 585.) Mere similarity in pleadings is not determinative of the issue of res judicata. Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 976, 289 N.E.2d 27.

  3. Durhan v. Neopolitan

    875 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1989)   Cited 23 times
    Applying Illinois res judicata law and determining that the plaintiff's federal due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were barred because the previous state court replevin action also challenged the "lawfulness" of the defendants' conduct "to determine whether plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of his property interests"

    As discussed earlier, under the proof approach, the court must examine the evidence or proof necessary to establish each cause of action. If the elements of proof are identical, the state court action precludes this suit. Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1st Dist. 1980). In the state court, plaintiff sought replevin of his vehicles and waivers of any storage fees which would have been assessed by the defendants. A replevin action establishes the rights of ownership to a specific piece of property, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the property was seized without lawful process.

  4. LaSalle Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Cty. of DuPage

    856 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1988)   Cited 44 times
    In LaSalle, after reviewing both the "proof" and "transactional" approach to identifying the same cause of action, this court concluded that the "collective wisdom" of our cases on this issue suggested that we should focus on "a comparison of the factual undergirding of the two cases at issue," 856 F.2d at 933, to determine whether there is one cause of action.

    Cranwill v. Donahue, 99 Ill. App.3d 968, 971, 55 Ill.Dec. 362, 364, 426 N.E.2d 337, 339 (1981). Most of the remaining cases in this group state not one test for determining what is a cause of action, but two. See, e.g., Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1980) (test is "whether the evidence needed to sustain the second would have sustained the first or whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases"); Palya v. Palya, 87 Ill. App.3d 472, 475, 42 Ill.Dec. 638, 641, 409 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1980) (test is "whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases or whether the same evidence would sustain both actions").Hagee, 729 F.2d at 513 n. 4. With respect to the "transactional" approach, he wrote:

  5. Hagee v. City of Evanston

    729 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1984)   Cited 68 times
    In Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.1984), the Seventh Circuit, in a case similar to this one, held that res judicata barred a federal suit alleging, inter alia, a takings claim due to the revocation of a building permit because of a prior state lawsuit seeking to enjoin the revocation of that same permit.

    Most of the remaining cases in this group state not one test for determining what is a cause of action, but two. See, e.g., Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill. Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1980) (test is "whether the evidence needed to sustain the second would have sustained the first or whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases"); Palya v. Palya, 87 Ill.App.3d 472, 475, 42 Ill.Dec. 638, 641, 409 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1980) (test is "whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases or whether the same evidence would sustain both actions"). In the other group of Illinois cases dealing with the res judicata doctrine, the courts have taken a "transactional" approach to identifying a cause of action.

  6. Marrese v. Am. Academy Ortho. Surgeons

    726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984)   Cited 95 times
    Noting that there are different ways for district courts to protect non-privileged documents

    Plaintiffs argue that an Illinois court would not bar a second suit based on the Illinois antitrust laws because Illinois courts employ a different test (based on similarity of evidence) to determine identity of causes of action. See Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1980); Olson v. Olson, 114 Ill.App.3d 28, 69 Ill.Dec. 769, 772, 448 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1983); Hilti, Inc. v. Griffith, 68 Ill. App.3d 528, 532-33, 24 Ill.Dec. 859, 861, 386 N.E.2d 63, 65 (1978); Rotogravure Serv. v. R.W. Borrowdale Co., 77 Ill.App.3d 518, 525, 32 Ill.Dec. 762, 767, 395 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (1978); Treister Supplemental Brief at 10-18. I do not believe it is necessary here to consider the outcome under this similarity of evidence theory of such a suit in state court because this determination is not necessary to the conclusion that plaintiffs' federal antitrust claim should not be barred in federal court.

  7. Marrese v. Am. Academy of Orthopaedic S.

    628 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1986)   Cited 10 times

    Thus, the causes of action were the same. See also Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 410 N.E.2d 925 (1st Dist. 1980); Baird Warner, Inc. v. Addison Industrial Park, 70 Ill. App.3d 59, 64, 26 Ill.Dec. 1, 8, 387 N.E.2d 831, 838 (1st Dist. 1979). On the other hand, where the plaintiff brings a suit against the defendant and claims that he is entitled to recover for a wrong committed by the defendant in a separate and distinct act or transaction from the wrong complained of in the first suit, the Illinois courts do not let the first suit operate as a bar to the second suit.

  8. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hospital

    149 Ill. 2d 302 (Ill. 1992)   Cited 117 times
    Concluding that private cause of action existed in Illinois for spoliation under statute requiring preservation of x-rays when hospital was notified of relevant pending litigation

    ( Hagee v. City of Evanston (7th Cir. 1984), 729 F.2d 510 (applying Illinois law); Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co. (1989), 189 Ill. App.3d 638.) The first is called the "same evidence" test. Under that test, res judicata bars a second suit if the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both actions. ( Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co. (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 320, 322; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750; Palya v. Palya (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 472, 475.) The second test is the "transactional" approach, which considers whether both suits arise from the same transaction, incident, or factual situation.

  9. Levaccare v. Levaccare

    376 Ill. App. 3d 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 25 times
    Stating the reviewing court will only reverse a trial court's determination on a motion for substitution of judge for cause if the finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence

    "The doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment provides that a former adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes an absolute bar to a second adjudication where there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action." VillageofNorthbrookv.CountyofCook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 749, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 410 N.E.2d 925 (1980). The record indicates that Ralph filed a notice of appeal on April 19, 2005, purporting to appeal the order that pertained to the arguments listed above.

  10. Wiencek v. Woodfield Ford Sales, Inc.

    597 N.E.2d 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 2 times

    ( Radosta v. Chrysler Corp. (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 1066, 443 N.E.2d 670; Morris v. Union Oil Co. (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 148, 421 N.E.2d 278; Baird Warner, Inc. v. Addison Industrial Park, Inc. (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 59, 387 N.E.2d 831.) Another branch of cases examines whether the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases. Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 410 N.E.2d 925; Palya v. Palya (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 472, 409 N.E.2d 133. • 2 In the present case, both cause No. 90-CH-00128 and the Attorney General's suit involved the same set of operative facts as does plaintiff's case.