It has often been stated that a cause of action consists of a right belonging to the plaintiff and a violation of that right by a wrongful act or omission by the defendant for which the law gives a remedy. ( Benton v. Smith (1987), 157 Ill. App.3d 847, 854, 510 N.E.2d 952, 956; Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co. (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 320, 322, 484 N.E.2d 1187, 1189; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929.) To determine whether causes of action are the same for res judicata purposes, two tests have been employed.
A cause of action consists of a right belonging to the plaintiff and a violation of that right by a wrongful act or omission by the defendant for which the law gives a remedy. ( City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis (1945), 392 Ill. 195, 205-06, 64 N.E.2d 450; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750, 410 N.E.2d 925, appeal denied (1981), 82 Ill.2d 585.) Mere similarity in pleadings is not determinative of the issue of res judicata. Andre v. Blackwell Electronics Industrial Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 970, 976, 289 N.E.2d 27.
As discussed earlier, under the proof approach, the court must examine the evidence or proof necessary to establish each cause of action. If the elements of proof are identical, the state court action precludes this suit. Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1st Dist. 1980). In the state court, plaintiff sought replevin of his vehicles and waivers of any storage fees which would have been assessed by the defendants. A replevin action establishes the rights of ownership to a specific piece of property, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that the property was seized without lawful process.
Cranwill v. Donahue, 99 Ill. App.3d 968, 971, 55 Ill.Dec. 362, 364, 426 N.E.2d 337, 339 (1981). Most of the remaining cases in this group state not one test for determining what is a cause of action, but two. See, e.g., Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1980) (test is "whether the evidence needed to sustain the second would have sustained the first or whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases"); Palya v. Palya, 87 Ill. App.3d 472, 475, 42 Ill.Dec. 638, 641, 409 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1980) (test is "whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases or whether the same evidence would sustain both actions").Hagee, 729 F.2d at 513 n. 4. With respect to the "transactional" approach, he wrote:
Most of the remaining cases in this group state not one test for determining what is a cause of action, but two. See, e.g., Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill. Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1980) (test is "whether the evidence needed to sustain the second would have sustained the first or whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases"); Palya v. Palya, 87 Ill.App.3d 472, 475, 42 Ill.Dec. 638, 641, 409 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1980) (test is "whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases or whether the same evidence would sustain both actions"). In the other group of Illinois cases dealing with the res judicata doctrine, the courts have taken a "transactional" approach to identifying a cause of action.
Plaintiffs argue that an Illinois court would not bar a second suit based on the Illinois antitrust laws because Illinois courts employ a different test (based on similarity of evidence) to determine identity of causes of action. See Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 750, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 796, 410 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1980); Olson v. Olson, 114 Ill.App.3d 28, 69 Ill.Dec. 769, 772, 448 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1983); Hilti, Inc. v. Griffith, 68 Ill. App.3d 528, 532-33, 24 Ill.Dec. 859, 861, 386 N.E.2d 63, 65 (1978); Rotogravure Serv. v. R.W. Borrowdale Co., 77 Ill.App.3d 518, 525, 32 Ill.Dec. 762, 767, 395 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (1978); Treister Supplemental Brief at 10-18. I do not believe it is necessary here to consider the outcome under this similarity of evidence theory of such a suit in state court because this determination is not necessary to the conclusion that plaintiffs' federal antitrust claim should not be barred in federal court.
Thus, the causes of action were the same. See also Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook, 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 410 N.E.2d 925 (1st Dist. 1980); Baird Warner, Inc. v. Addison Industrial Park, 70 Ill. App.3d 59, 64, 26 Ill.Dec. 1, 8, 387 N.E.2d 831, 838 (1st Dist. 1979). On the other hand, where the plaintiff brings a suit against the defendant and claims that he is entitled to recover for a wrong committed by the defendant in a separate and distinct act or transaction from the wrong complained of in the first suit, the Illinois courts do not let the first suit operate as a bar to the second suit.
( Hagee v. City of Evanston (7th Cir. 1984), 729 F.2d 510 (applying Illinois law); Best Coin-Op, Inc. v. Paul F. Ilg Supply Co. (1989), 189 Ill. App.3d 638.) The first is called the "same evidence" test. Under that test, res judicata bars a second suit if the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both actions. ( Pfeiffer v. William Wrigley Jr. Co. (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 320, 322; Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 750; Palya v. Palya (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 472, 475.) The second test is the "transactional" approach, which considers whether both suits arise from the same transaction, incident, or factual situation.
"The doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment provides that a former adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes an absolute bar to a second adjudication where there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action." VillageofNorthbrookv.CountyofCook, 88 Ill.App.3d 745, 749, 43 Ill.Dec. 792, 410 N.E.2d 925 (1980). The record indicates that Ralph filed a notice of appeal on April 19, 2005, purporting to appeal the order that pertained to the arguments listed above.
( Radosta v. Chrysler Corp. (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 1066, 443 N.E.2d 670; Morris v. Union Oil Co. (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 148, 421 N.E.2d 278; Baird Warner, Inc. v. Addison Industrial Park, Inc. (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 59, 387 N.E.2d 831.) Another branch of cases examines whether the evidence needed to sustain the second suit would have sustained the first, or whether there is identity of facts essential to the maintenance of both cases. Village of Northbrook v. County of Cook (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 745, 410 N.E.2d 925; Palya v. Palya (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 472, 409 N.E.2d 133. • 2 In the present case, both cause No. 90-CH-00128 and the Attorney General's suit involved the same set of operative facts as does plaintiff's case.