Village of Depue, Illinois v. Viacom International

7 Citing cases

  1. City of Chicago v. Door Dash, Inc.

    21 CV 5162 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 20, 2024)

    Three factors must be addressed: (1) the effect of the interest on the public, (2) the obligation of the governmental unit to act on behalf of the public, and (3) the extent to which the expenditure of public revenues is necessitated. Vill. of DePue, Ill. v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 713 F.Supp.2d 774, 781 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Champaign Cnty. Forest Pres. Dist. v. King, 683 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ill.App.Ct. 1997)).

  2. Lajim, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co.

    No. 13 CV 50348 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2015)   Cited 3 times

    In Soo Line R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc., 998 F. Supp. 889, 897 (N.D. Ill. 1998), the court held that Illinois' continuing tort doctrine did not apply because the last possible tortious conduct occurred in 1982 when the defendant vacated its scrap yard operation, even though the site of the former scrap yard remained contaminated: "although the effects from Tang's violations may be persisting, any tortious activities by Tang ended in 1982." Likewise, in Village of DePue v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010), the court held that Illinois' continuing tort doctrine did not apply because the last possible tortious conduct occurred in 1989, after the defendant had stopped operating its zinc smelting facility. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the continuing flow of contaminated water from the site of the former plant onto the plaintiff's property was a continuing tort: "Plaintiff alleges that it is continually re-injured by water flowing from the Site onto its property.

  3. Lajim, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co.

    917 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2019)   Cited 45 times
    In LAJIM, LLC v. General Electric Co., 917 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. docketed, (U.S. June 21, 2019) (No. 18-1564), plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction to order General Electric to investigate and remediate groundwater contamination emanating from its plant even though General Electric had entered into a consent order with the state agency (IEPA).

    However, "[a] continuing violation or tort is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts and conduct, not by continual ill effects from an initial violation." Feltmeier v. Feltmeier , 207 Ill.2d 263, 278 Ill.Dec. 228, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003) ; see Village of DePue v. Viacom Int’l, Inc. , 713 F.Supp.2d 774, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (continuing tort doctrine did not apply where plaintiff’s allegations were limited to injury from water flowing from contaminated site because tortious conduct had ceased when manufacturing at site ended years prior); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Tang Indus., Inc. , 998 F.Supp. 889, 896–97 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (continuing tort doctrine did not apply where defendant stopped dumping contaminants years prior, "although the effects from [defendant]’s violations may be persisting"). The continuing migration plaintiffs allege is merely an ill effect from the original violation, not a continuing unlawful act.

  4. Saccameno v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

    372 F. Supp. 3d 609 (N.D. Ill. 2019)   Cited 15 times
    Upholding jury finding of "substantial injury" for purposes of the ICFA where loan servicer's conduct caused plaintiff significant emotional distress and "had the potential to injure a large number of other consumers"

    Nothing in the opinion suggests that judicial and administrative decisions are the only documents of which courts may take judicial notice, or that judicial notice of consent orders is verboten. On the contrary, that courts may take judicial notice of consent orders and similar agreements is settled beyond peradventure. See, e.g. , Vill. of DePue, Ill. v. Viacom Int'l, Inc. , 713 F.Supp.2d 774, 776 n.3 (C.D. Ill. 2010) ("Judicial notice of the Consent Order is appropriate here, as its terms are not subject to reasonable dispute.") (citing GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp. , 128 F.3d 1074, 1081–82 (7th Cir. 1997) ); see alsoCommodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co. Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc. , 680 F.2d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1982) (taking judicial notice of consent judgments entered against defendant because "evidence was relevant to show Goldstein's familiarity with commodities laws and was admissible to rebut Goldstein's contention that Co. Petro's actions were, at worst, innocent, technical violations"); Shadow v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc. , No. 3:17-CV-02277-L-BLM, 2018 WL 4357980, at *3 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2018) (consent decree between CFPB and Midland Credit Management); Spence v. Basic Research , No. 2:16-CV-925-CW, 2018 WL 1997310, at *6 (D. Utah Apr. 27, 2018) (taking judicial notice of consent order between defendants and the Federal Trade Commission); In re Deutsche Bank Aktiengesells

  5. Wilmot Mountain, Inc. v. Lake Cnty. Forest Pres. Dist.

    Case No. 11 C 7088 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2012)

    Chicago Steel, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 711, 558 N.E.2d at 348. By contrast, in Village of DePue v. Viacom International, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782-84 (C.D. Ill. 2010), the court found that a village's efforts to clear a contaminated site were not efforts to act on behalf of the public, because the village was seeking to maximize its own tax and business revenues and clean its own land. It is clear that efforts by a forest preserve district to maintain its land are efforts on behalf of the public.

  6. Wilmot Mountain, Inc. v. Lake Cnty. Forest Pres. Dist.

    859 F. Supp. 2d 932 (N.D. Ill. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Chicago Steel, 200 Ill.App.3d at 711, 146 Ill.Dec. 378, 558 N.E.2d at 348. By contrast, in Village of DePue v. Viacom International, Inc., 713 F.Supp.2d 774, 782–84 (C.D.Ill.2010), the court found that a village's efforts to clear a contaminated site were not efforts to act on behalf of the public, because the village was seeking to maximize its own tax and business revenues and clean its own land. It is clear that efforts by a forest preserve district to maintain its land are efforts on behalf of the public.

  7. Peoria Ice Cream Co. v. Zosky

    2022 Ill. App. 3d 210152 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)

    Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 278-79 (2003); Hyon Waste Management Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 214 Ill.App.3d 757, 763 (1991). "[M]erely owning a piece of contaminated land is not alone enough, since such 'conduct' does not cause the nuisance or trespass-the alleged injuries would occur whether or not [defendants owned the [s]ite." Village of DePue v. Viacom International, Inc., 713 F.Supp.2d 774, 778 (CD. Ill. 2010). Moreover, simply pointing to the migration of hazardous substances is not enough.