Villa v. State

2 Citing cases

  1. State v. Carney

    584 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1998)   Cited 45 times
    Finding that license revocation is not an effect on the range of punishment, even though carrying the sting of punishment, as its purpose is protection of the public

    Other jurisdictions have similarly determined that license revocation is a collateral rather than direct consequence of a guilty plea. Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (license suspension imposed following plea of guilty to OWI was not punishment but collateral consequence of conviction); Villa v. State, 456 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del. 1983) (license revocation is not a criminal penalty or punishment); Stoltz v. State, 657 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (even though suspension of license was automatic upon plea of guilty to operating while intoxicated, it was a collateral consequence); Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. 1994) (license revocation was collateral consequence to pleading guilty to underage drinking); State v. Madison, 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835, 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (no due process right to be informed of collateral consequence of license revocation upon pleading guilty to underlying offense). Because we find license revocation is a collateral and not a direct consequence of a guilty plea, the district court had no duty to inform the defendant of it.

  2. Stoltz v. State

    657 N.E.2d 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 4 times
    In Stoltz, 657 N.E.2d at 92, we held that the defendant's plea of guilty to operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol level greater than.10% was not rendered involuntary by the trial court's failure to inform the defendant that the conviction would result in an automatic ten-year license suspension because a license suspension was a collateral consequence of the guilty plea.

    Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit stated, "[w]e need not resolve this ambiguity, however, since our conclusion would be identical in either case."Id. n. 1. Several of our sister states have also held that license revocation is a collateral consequence to a guilty plea. See, e.g., Villa v. State (1983), Del., 456 A.2d 1229, and cases cited therein; State v. Madison (1984), Wis. Ct. App., 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835, and cases cited therein. Here, the suspension of Stoltz's driver's license was a matter exclusively in the hands of the commissioner of the BMV. Furthermore, the automatic nature of his license suspension is of no moment.