Other jurisdictions have similarly determined that license revocation is a collateral rather than direct consequence of a guilty plea. Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (license suspension imposed following plea of guilty to OWI was not punishment but collateral consequence of conviction); Villa v. State, 456 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del. 1983) (license revocation is not a criminal penalty or punishment); Stoltz v. State, 657 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (even though suspension of license was automatic upon plea of guilty to operating while intoxicated, it was a collateral consequence); Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. 1994) (license revocation was collateral consequence to pleading guilty to underage drinking); State v. Madison, 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835, 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (no due process right to be informed of collateral consequence of license revocation upon pleading guilty to underlying offense). Because we find license revocation is a collateral and not a direct consequence of a guilty plea, the district court had no duty to inform the defendant of it.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit stated, "[w]e need not resolve this ambiguity, however, since our conclusion would be identical in either case."Id. n. 1. Several of our sister states have also held that license revocation is a collateral consequence to a guilty plea. See, e.g., Villa v. State (1983), Del., 456 A.2d 1229, and cases cited therein; State v. Madison (1984), Wis. Ct. App., 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835, and cases cited therein. Here, the suspension of Stoltz's driver's license was a matter exclusively in the hands of the commissioner of the BMV. Furthermore, the automatic nature of his license suspension is of no moment.