Villa v. State

11 Citing cases

  1. State v. Anderson

    C.A. No. N10A-04-004 PLA (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010)   Cited 9 times

    In essence, Anderson's case raises the question of what role the judicial branch may take in shaping that enforcement policy. Villa v. State, 456 A.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Del. 1983).

  2. State v. Wilhere

    653 A.2d 282 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994)   Cited 1 times
    Interpreting 21 Del. C. ยง 2802, which defines an habitual motor vehicle offender, to all allow a motorist to be adjudicated as an habitual offender when he has accumulated three convictions for specific driving offenses, even though the third offense takes place prior to a conviction for the second offense

    Proceedings and penalties under the habitual offender statute are deemed civil in nature. Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1983); State v. James J. Fox, Jr., Del.Super., Cr.A. No. 85-11-0082M, Gebelein, J. (August 30, 1988) (Mem.Op.); Harrington v. State, Del.Supr. No. 96, 1991, 1991 WL 247795, Holland, J. (November 19, 1991) (ORDER). A civil statute, such as ยง 2802, in which the statutory language is clear and consistent with legislative intent is properly interpreted on its plain meaning.

  3. State v. Carney

    584 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1998)   Cited 45 times
    Finding that license revocation is not an effect on the range of punishment, even though carrying the sting of punishment, as its purpose is protection of the public

    Other jurisdictions have similarly determined that license revocation is a collateral rather than direct consequence of a guilty plea. Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (license suspension imposed following plea of guilty to OWI was not punishment but collateral consequence of conviction); Villa v. State, 456 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del. 1983) (license revocation is not a criminal penalty or punishment); Stoltz v. State, 657 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (even though suspension of license was automatic upon plea of guilty to operating while intoxicated, it was a collateral consequence); Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. 1994) (license revocation was collateral consequence to pleading guilty to underage drinking); State v. Madison, 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835, 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (no due process right to be informed of collateral consequence of license revocation upon pleading guilty to underlying offense). Because we find license revocation is a collateral and not a direct consequence of a guilty plea, the district court had no duty to inform the defendant of it.

  4. Barkley v. State

    724 A.2d 558 (Del. 1999)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that a revocation of driver's license based on a conviction for cocaine possession was โ€œan immediate, automatic and mandatory penaltyโ€ that must be disclosed to the defendant before the defendant pleads guilty

    Although this Court has not directly ruled upon the question of whether loss of driving privileges is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, we did note, in a different context, that license revocation "proceedings initiated under habitual offender statutes are considered civil administrative actions." Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, 1231 (1983). Because the revocation proceedings were civil, we ruled in Villa that a defendant pleading to a traffic offense need not be advised of the consequences of a future revocation proceeding.

  5. Kipp v. State

    704 A.2d 839 (Del. 1998)   Cited 12 times
    Discussing prohibition of deadly weapon possession

    "Without a doubt, the defendant must understand the consequences of pleading guilty, but this does not include informing him of collateral civil or criminal consequences of the plea." Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1983); State v. Carr, Del.Supr., 641 A.2d 833 (1994). Cf. Krewson v. State, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 840, 842 (1988).

  6. Valerius v. State

    574 A.2d 855 (Del. 1990)   Cited 5 times

    The Legislature has thus stated that the primary purpose of the statute is to foster public safety by denying driving privileges to those whose repeated conduct evidences indifference to the safety of others. Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1983); State v. Kamalski, Del.Supr., 429 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1981). Specifically, the language of paragraph (3) of section 2801 pointedly focuses our attention upon the intent of the Legislature to impose "increased and added deprivation" of driving privileges to repeat offenders.

  7. TARR v. STATE

    486 A.2d 672 (Del. 1984)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that " defendant's election to participate in a first offender's program to avoid prosecution for the charge of driving under the influence . . . does not fit within any of these typical situations where jeopardy usually attaches[]" because of "the administrative nature of the first offender's program"

    Id. at 1318. See also Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, 1231-1232 (1983) (construing the motor vehicle Habitual Offender Act as civil in nature, rather than criminal, and providing that its sanctions may be imposed concurrent with or subsequent to criminal penalties). 21 Del. C. ยง 2802(1).

  8. Stoltz v. State

    657 N.E.2d 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 4 times
    In Stoltz, 657 N.E.2d at 92, we held that the defendant's plea of guilty to operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol level greater than.10% was not rendered involuntary by the trial court's failure to inform the defendant that the conviction would result in an automatic ten-year license suspension because a license suspension was a collateral consequence of the guilty plea.

    Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit stated, "[w]e need not resolve this ambiguity, however, since our conclusion would be identical in either case."Id. n. 1. Several of our sister states have also held that license revocation is a collateral consequence to a guilty plea. See, e.g., Villa v. State (1983), Del., 456 A.2d 1229, and cases cited therein; State v. Madison (1984), Wis. Ct. App., 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835, and cases cited therein. Here, the suspension of Stoltz's driver's license was a matter exclusively in the hands of the commissioner of the BMV. Furthermore, the automatic nature of his license suspension is of no moment.

  9. State v. Madison

    120 Wis. 2d 150 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 29 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In State v. Madison, 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835 (Ct.App. 1984), the court of appeals quoted Plutshack but then applied the Burgett rule.

    State v. Fournier, 385 A.2d 223, 224 (N.H. 1978). Accord, Villa v. State, 456 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 1983). The Colorado Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in rejecting a contention that the state had a duty to inform regarding demerit points which would be assessed against a driver's record as result of a traffic conviction:

  10. Cook v. Oberly

    459 A.2d 535 (Del. Ch. 1983)   Cited 14 times

    The three month suspension is the penalty for the first time offender and is clearly a civil penalty. See Villa v. State, Del.Supr., 456 A.2d 1229, Moore, J. (1983). Plaintiff seeks an order restraining the Department of Public Safety, the Division of Motor Vehicles and the Attorney General's Office from revoking her license.