Vigil v. People

8 Citing cases

  1. Russell v. State

    583 P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1978)   Cited 47 times
    Evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Saldana's "intent to deliver"

    State v. Broadhurst, 1948, 184 Or. 178, 196 P.2d 407, cert. den. 337 U.S. 906, 69 S.Ct. 1046, 93 L.Ed. 1718. Chewing and swallowing a check by a defendant taken during a robbery was evidence explaining its absence. Vigil v. People, 1971, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983. Evidence that defendant, being transported to scene of burglary, removed nylon stocking from his head there at time of arrest and threw it out the window of patrol car is evidence of guilt. Poindexter v. State, 1970, 255 Ind. 406, 264 N.E.2d 605. Swallowing slip of paper in course of a raid on a gambling establishment is evidence of guilt.

  2. People v. Steele

    193 Colo. 87 (Colo. 1977)   Cited 27 times
    In People v. Steele, 193 Colo. 87, 563 P.2d 6 (1977), we held that in the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecution, the defendant could not complain that the late endorsement of a witness caused her to forfeit her right to a speedy trial.

    We do not agree with the defendant's conclusions. While this court has held that it is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the principal as a prerequisite to convicting the accessory, Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971), we have also held that an accessory may be convicted of murder even if the principal is found not guilty by reason of insanity where it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the principal committed the act which resulted in the homicide.People v. Jones, supra.

  3. People v. Strohm

    185 Colo. 260 (Colo. 1974)   Cited 7 times

    In addition to the basic inference of death by felonious means, the evidence must have been sufficient to support a second inference, that either the appellant was the felonious actor, or that he was an accessory. If he was an accessory, the proof had to show that he was present and aware that his wife, Antonia, intended to commit the crime, and that he aided, abetted, assisted, advised or encouraged her in committing it. People v. Marques 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 113; Dressel v. People, 178 Colo. 115, 495 P.2d 544; Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983. The latter inference might have been warranted under the totality of the circumstances of the case, as urged by the People, were it not for the invalidity of the underlying inference — that the death was not occasioned by an accident, but rather was caused by a felonious act (which we heretofore have found to be unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Tate v. People, supra; Elliott v. People, 115 Colo. 382, 174 P.2d 500.

  4. People v. Wilkie

    522 P.2d 727 (Colo. 1974)   Cited 3 times
    In People v. Wilkie, 185 Colo. 149, 522 P.2d 727 (1975), we held that sole and exclusive possession is not required. The key requisites are dominion and control of the premises or location where the stolen property is found.

    [2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the People's case — as we must — — we find the jury's verdict of guilt to be amply sustained. Southard v. People, 174 Colo. 324, 483 P.2d 962; Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983. Without reviewing in detail the evidence, it is sufficient to note that the jury could reasonably conclude, in view of appellant's incriminating admissions, that he knowingly purchased the LSD as a "good investment," with intent to unlawfully dispense it by sale for a substantial profit, and that he was therefore guilty as charged. [3,4] Appellant's principal argument is that inasmuch as there were other persons who lived in the apartment, and, additionally, many others had ready access to the premises, appellant did not have the requisite dominion and control of the premises to attribute to him the exclusive possession of the drugs which were found in the kitchen refrigerator.

  5. People v. Marques

    184 Colo. 262 (Colo. 1974)   Cited 53 times
    Stating that when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the question is whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant's guilt of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial

    [13] Under its theory of the case, the prosecution must prove that (1) the principal committed the crime of felony theft, (2) the accessories had knowledge that the principal intended to commit the crime, and (3) having this knowledge, the accessories did in fact aid or encourage, with the specific intent to so aid or encourage, the principal in the commission of the crime. Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983; Medina v. People, 168 Colo. 255, 450 P.2d 662; Stewart v. People, 161 Colo. 1, 419 P.2d 650; McKenna v. People, 124 Colo. 112, 235 P.2d 351; Bacino v. People, 104 Colo. 229, 90 P.2d 5; Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17, 189 P. 5. [14] In the instant case, if the jury had chosen to believe the defendants' account of the episode, then they would not be guilty as principals.

  6. People v. Jones

    184 Colo. 96 (Colo. 1974)   Cited 26 times

    [3] It must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that, except for the insanity, the principal (Mike) committed a murder. Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971). The evidence in this case is without conflict that Mike committed the homicide in connection with a robbery.

  7. People v. Knapp

    180 Colo. 280 (Colo. 1973)   Cited 41 times

    [1,2] It is settled that an admission by the alleged principal may be introduced as evidence of the principal's guilt so long as all references to the defendant-accessory are effectively deleted. Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43, 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971); Stewart v. People, 161 Colo. 1, 419 P.2d 650 (1966). The issue in this case is whether the defendant was afforded the protection dictated by Bruton v. United States, supra, when Scheidt's admissions were admitted into evidence indicating that another person was present.

  8. People v. Rosenthal

    670 P.2d 1254 (Colo. App. 1983)   Cited 7 times

    Wilbourn then read the redacted confession to the jury. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court relied upon the following decisions of our Supreme Court: People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 513 P.2d 446 (1973); People v. Knapp, 180 Colo. 280, 505 P.2d 7 (1973); Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971); Stewart v. People, 161 Colo. 1, 419 P.2d 650 (1966) and Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17, 189 P. 5 (1919). These decisions establish the principle that otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence of the confession of a principal participant in a criminal offense is admissible against one charged as an accessory in the commission of that offense.