State v. Broadhurst, 1948, 184 Or. 178, 196 P.2d 407, cert. den. 337 U.S. 906, 69 S.Ct. 1046, 93 L.Ed. 1718. Chewing and swallowing a check by a defendant taken during a robbery was evidence explaining its absence. Vigil v. People, 1971, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983. Evidence that defendant, being transported to scene of burglary, removed nylon stocking from his head there at time of arrest and threw it out the window of patrol car is evidence of guilt. Poindexter v. State, 1970, 255 Ind. 406, 264 N.E.2d 605. Swallowing slip of paper in course of a raid on a gambling establishment is evidence of guilt.
We do not agree with the defendant's conclusions. While this court has held that it is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the principal as a prerequisite to convicting the accessory, Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971), we have also held that an accessory may be convicted of murder even if the principal is found not guilty by reason of insanity where it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the principal committed the act which resulted in the homicide.People v. Jones, supra.
In addition to the basic inference of death by felonious means, the evidence must have been sufficient to support a second inference, that either the appellant was the felonious actor, or that he was an accessory. If he was an accessory, the proof had to show that he was present and aware that his wife, Antonia, intended to commit the crime, and that he aided, abetted, assisted, advised or encouraged her in committing it. People v. Marques 184 Colo. 262, 520 P.2d 113; Dressel v. People, 178 Colo. 115, 495 P.2d 544; Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983. The latter inference might have been warranted under the totality of the circumstances of the case, as urged by the People, were it not for the invalidity of the underlying inference — that the death was not occasioned by an accident, but rather was caused by a felonious act (which we heretofore have found to be unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Tate v. People, supra; Elliott v. People, 115 Colo. 382, 174 P.2d 500.
[2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the People's case — as we must — — we find the jury's verdict of guilt to be amply sustained. Southard v. People, 174 Colo. 324, 483 P.2d 962; Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983. Without reviewing in detail the evidence, it is sufficient to note that the jury could reasonably conclude, in view of appellant's incriminating admissions, that he knowingly purchased the LSD as a "good investment," with intent to unlawfully dispense it by sale for a substantial profit, and that he was therefore guilty as charged. [3,4] Appellant's principal argument is that inasmuch as there were other persons who lived in the apartment, and, additionally, many others had ready access to the premises, appellant did not have the requisite dominion and control of the premises to attribute to him the exclusive possession of the drugs which were found in the kitchen refrigerator.
[13] Under its theory of the case, the prosecution must prove that (1) the principal committed the crime of felony theft, (2) the accessories had knowledge that the principal intended to commit the crime, and (3) having this knowledge, the accessories did in fact aid or encourage, with the specific intent to so aid or encourage, the principal in the commission of the crime. Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983; Medina v. People, 168 Colo. 255, 450 P.2d 662; Stewart v. People, 161 Colo. 1, 419 P.2d 650; McKenna v. People, 124 Colo. 112, 235 P.2d 351; Bacino v. People, 104 Colo. 229, 90 P.2d 5; Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17, 189 P. 5. [14] In the instant case, if the jury had chosen to believe the defendants' account of the episode, then they would not be guilty as principals.
[3] It must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that, except for the insanity, the principal (Mike) committed a murder. Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971). The evidence in this case is without conflict that Mike committed the homicide in connection with a robbery.
[1,2] It is settled that an admission by the alleged principal may be introduced as evidence of the principal's guilt so long as all references to the defendant-accessory are effectively deleted. Reed v. People, 174 Colo. 43, 482 P.2d 110 (1971); Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971); Stewart v. People, 161 Colo. 1, 419 P.2d 650 (1966). The issue in this case is whether the defendant was afforded the protection dictated by Bruton v. United States, supra, when Scheidt's admissions were admitted into evidence indicating that another person was present.
Wilbourn then read the redacted confession to the jury. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court relied upon the following decisions of our Supreme Court: People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 513 P.2d 446 (1973); People v. Knapp, 180 Colo. 280, 505 P.2d 7 (1973); Vigil v. People, 174 Colo. 164, 482 P.2d 983 (1971); Stewart v. People, 161 Colo. 1, 419 P.2d 650 (1966) and Mulligan v. People, 68 Colo. 17, 189 P. 5 (1919). These decisions establish the principle that otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence of the confession of a principal participant in a criminal offense is admissible against one charged as an accessory in the commission of that offense.