It is well established that the mere occurrence of a rear-end collision may be some evidence of negligence, but it does not prove negligence as a matter of law. See, e.g., Vigil v. Kirkland, No. 02-16-00147-CV, 2017 WL 2471091, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.);

As factfinder, the jury was free to resolve any conflict regarding these deeds' filing dates in favor of the POA. See Vigil v. Kirkland, No. 02-16-00147-CV, 2017 WL 2471091, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(mem. op.); Vigil v. Kirkland, No. 02-16-00147-CV, 2017 WL 2471091, at *2 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Consequently, Stovall's admission of fault and the description of how the accident occurred "may be some evidence that what she did do constituted negligence, [but] it [did] not establish negligence as a matter of law" in light of her testimony. Vigil v. Kirkland, No. 02-16-00147-CV, 2017 WL 2471091, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Campbell, 2015 WL 1020842, at *2).

Here, Staples's admission of fault, descriptions of how the accident occurred, and testimony about what he could have done differently, including putting the car in park after he came to a full stop, "may be some evidence that what [ ]he did do constituted negligence, [but] it does not establish negligence as a matter of law" in light of his testimony that he hit the accelerator by accident. Vigil v. Kirkland , No. 02-16-00147-CV, 2017 WL 2471091, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Campbell , 2015 WL 1020842, at *2 ); seeBibai , 2007 WL 4099526, at *3 (negligence was not established as a matter of law where driver testified he rear-ended a vehicle when his "foot slipped off of the brake and touched the accelerator"). Staples's testimony established fact questions that were " ‘particularly within the province of the jury’ and [can] be disregarded only in exceptional circumstances" not found here.

To the contrary, plenty of courts have upheld a jury's "no" answer on this issue, even in rear-end collision cases when the defendants made quasi-admissions of fault. See Lee, 2018 WL 1192240, at *3-4 (factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's "no" answer regarding negligence of a driver who rear-ended the plaintiff while the driver was reaching for his glasses; noting that the driver made numerous quasi-admissions, like telling a police officer that the accident was his fault, testifying that he was responsible for causing the accident, and that "in retrospect, instead of continuing to drive while reaching for his glasses, it would have been more reasonable to pull over and activate his hazards lights, to pull into a driveway, or to 'just suck it up' and keep driving"); Vigil v. Kirkland, No. 02-16-00147-CV, 2017 WL 2471091, at *1, *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's "no" answer regarding negligence of a driver who rear-ended a stopped car although the defendant admitted that she took her eyes off the road to check on her sleeping baby and that the accident could have been prevented if she had "kept [her] eyes on the road"); Benavente v. Granger, 312 S.W.3d 745, 747, 749-50 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's "no" answer regarding negligence of a driver who rear-ended a stopped car although the driver admitted to being distracted by looking at a yellow Lamborghini); Hernandez, 2003 WL 1090671, at *3-4 (factually sufficient evidence to support the jury's "no" answer regarding negligence of a defendant who rear-ended the plaintiff's vehicle although there was evidence that the driver was traveling at a sufficient speed to hydroplane and did not apply the brakes early enough). Considering the totality of the evidence and the

Lee had the burden to prove that Carmona was negligent and that his negligence proximately caused the accident. See Vigil v. Kirkland, No. 02-16-00147-CV, 2017 WL 2471091, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 8, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Neese v. Dietz, 845 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)). Jury question one asked: "Did the negligence, if any, of Josue Carmona proximately cause the occurrence in question?"