Our Previous Ruling Involved Some Of The Same Parties, The Same Bankruptcy Proceeding, And The Same Trustee As This Cause. ¶12 In 1963, the Court, in Viersen v. Boettcher, 1963 OK 262, 387 P.2d 133, reviewed a similar cause involving the same Cal-Cul bankruptcy proceeding and, consequently, the same bankruptcy trustee as this cause. Viersen also concerned a quiet title action between the plaintiffs Boettchers, and the defendants Sam K. Viersen and Central National Bank of Okmulgee. [The same bank and Viersen found in this chain of title are the same parties in the Viersen Chain of title.]

This rule has been recognized and consistently applied by this Court. Deruy v. Noah, 199 Okla. 230, 185 P.2d 189; Noble v. Kahn, 206 Okla. 13, 240 P.2d 757, 35 A.L.R.2d 124; Viersen v. Boettcher, Okla., 387 P.2d 133. We are of the opinion the conclusion in Viersen, supra, resolved the issues therein raised contrary to plaintiffs' arguments.

¶24 We see no error by the trial court in quieting title to the property in favor of Mingo Energy. The trial court correctly concluded that the 20-acre tract became property of the bankruptcy estate after Satterfield filed bankruptcy and that ownership rights to the property became vested in Malloy as the trustee after his appointment. In Viersen v. Boettcher , 1963 OK 262, ¶ 0, 387 P.2d 133 (syl. no. 2 by the Court), the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained:In federal court bankruptcy proceedings, title to the assets of the bankrupt vests in the trustee in bankruptcy on the filing of a petition under the bankruptcy law, and that title is not subject to divestiture by judgment in an action against the bankrupt, commenced after bankruptcy, to which the trustee is not a party.

The trial court correctly concluded that the 20-acre tract became property of the bankruptcy estate after Satterfield filed bankruptcy and that ownership rights to the property became vested in Malloy as the trustee after his appointment. In Viersen v. Boettcher, 1963 OK 262, ¶ 0, 387 P.2d 133 (syl. no. 2 by the Court), the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained: In federal court bankruptcy proceedings, title to the assets of the bankrupt vests in the trustee in bankruptcy on the filing of a petition under the bankruptcy law, and that title is not subject to divestiture by judgment in an action against the bankrupt, commenced after bankruptcy, to which the trustee is not a party.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that Oklahoma's notice statutes, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 262-63, implemented the latter section of 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) by "authoriz[ing] the filing of such instruments" in the office of the county clerk. See Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla. 1963). Kaiser's complaint does not allege that the CLO is a post-petition, bona fide purchaser of property of the bankruptcy estate.

f ownership for delay in resorting to a court of equity to establish his rights."); Dotson v. Aldridge, 246 Ark. 456, 438 S.W.2d 464, 466 (1969) (noting rule that "there is no necessity for resorting to legal remedies until there is an interference with possession"); Withroder v. Wiederoder, 156 Kan. 570, 134 P.2d 381, 385 (1943) (holding that the statute of limitations did not bar a quiet title action commenced eight years after execution of contract for exchange of interests because the plaintiff was in possession and could bring the action at any time at his convenience); Martinez v. Archuleta–Padia, 143 P.3d 1112, 1115 (Colo.App.2006) (noting that "the general rule is that those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seeking to quiet their title"); Clary v. Stack Steel & Supply Co., 611 P.2d 80, 83 (Alaska 1980) ("Normally no statute of limitations applies to a quiet title action brought by a person in possession of real property."); Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla.1963) (recognizing that "an action to quiet title, where the plaintiff has been in continuous possession of the property, claiming ownership therein, can be maintained at any time, and no statute of limitation bars his right to the relief sought"). We find these authorities persuasive and therefore conclude that the statute of limitations does not bar a claimant who has purchased real property and is in possession of that property from asserting a claim for specific performance.

For example, in Viersen v. Boettcher, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held "that an action to quiet title, where the plaintiff has been in continuous possession of the property, claiming ownership therein, can be maintained at any time, and no statute of limitation bars [the claimant's] right to the relief sought." 387 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla. 1963). Similarly, in Muktarian v. Barmby, the California Supreme Court held that while "it is ordinarily necessary to refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine which [limitation] statute applies," it was unnecessary in that case because "no statute of limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet title when he is in possession of the property" and claims ownership thereof.

1968).Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 137 (Okla. 1963).Culie v. Arnett, 765 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Okla.

We disagree. As stated in Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133 (Okla. 1963): "The trustee has no superior rights or greater interest in the property and occupies no greater position with respect thereto than the bankrupt . . . . The trustee takes the property, not as an innocent purchaser for value, without notice, but as the debtor had it at the time of bankruptcy, subject to all valid claims, liens, and equities."

Therefore, plaintiffs' notice of claim was not filed more than one year after their cause of action had arisen, within the provisions of 63-30-12. See Viersen v. Boettcher, Okla., 387 P.2d 133, 138 (1963); 65 Am.Jur.2d, Quieting Title, Sec. 55, p. 185: ". . . He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right." ELLETT, C.J., and CROCKETT and WILKINS, JJ., concur.