Opinion
2:19-cv-1334-JAD-BNW
01-28-2022
Francisco Vidal, Plaintiff v. J Lindsey, et al., Defendants
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT & RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING ACTION [ECF NO. 49]
Jennifer A. Dorsey U.S. District Judge
When Plaintiff Francisco Vidal's mail from this court started getting returned to sender, the court ordered him to file a notice of change of address by January 10, 2022, or risk having his case dismissed. Plaintiff did not update his address, so the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to dismiss this case without prejudice. The deadline for the plaintiff to object to that recommendation was January 25, 2022, and the plaintiff neither filed objections nor moved to extend the deadline to do so. “[N]o review is required of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation unless objections are filed.” Having reviewed the R&R, I find good cause to adopt it, and I do.
ECF Nos. 46, 47.
ECF No. 49.
United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).
District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. A court may dismiss an action based on a party's failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. In determining whether to dismiss an action on this ground, the court must consider: (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.
Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).
In re Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)).
The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation and the court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of the plaintiff's claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. The fourth factor-the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits-is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.
See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976).
The fifth factor requires the court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the court's need to consider dismissal. Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Because this action cannot realistically proceed without the ability for the court and the defendants to send plaintiff case-related documents, filings, and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach the plaintiff is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further squander the court's finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal.
Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that “implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court's order as satisfying this element[, ]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[, ]” have been “eroded” by Yourish).
Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986).
Having thoroughly weighed these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of dismissal. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation [ECF No. 49] is ADOPTED in full;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT this case is dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT ACCORDINGLY and CLOSE THIS CASE.