Opinion
E033683.
7-7-2003
VICTORIA S. et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Respondent; RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Real Party in Interest.
Elizabeth Wingate, for Petitioner Victoria S. Charles Casey, for Petitioner Alejandro C. No appearance, for Respondent. William C. Katzenstein, County Counsel, and Julie A. Koons, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioners Victoria S. and Alejandro C. are the parents of Alejandro S. The parents separately filed their writ petitions pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 39.1B challenging an order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing as to the child. Both Mother and Father contend the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to provide reasonable reunification services to them, and therefore the juvenile court erred in setting a section 366.26 hearing. For the reasons provided below, we reject Mothers and Fathers challenges and deny their petitions.
All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 22, 2002, the child, who was 21 months old, was detained, and a section 300 petition was filed. The petition alleged that Mother abandoned the child; her whereabouts were unknown; she failed to provide support for the child; she had mental issues as well as gestational diabetes, which she was unwilling to treat; and she failed to participate in the family maintenance voluntary (FMV) services. Regarding Father, the petition alleged that Fathers current whereabouts were unknown and that he failed to provide for the care and support of the child.
At the August 27, 2002, detention hearing, neither Mother nor Father was present. The court found a prima facie case for detention out of the home. The court also found that the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g) and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the removal of the child.
By September 2002, the social worker had located both Mother and Father, who were residing together in Texas. On September 3, 2002, the social worker interviewed Mother by telephone and read and explained each of the allegations in the petition to her. On the same day, the social worker interviewed Father in Spanish by telephone and read and explained each of the allegations in the petition to him. Mother had been diagnosed as bipolar or schizophrenic, with obsessive-compulsive disorder, and/or major depression and had a problem complying with her medication. Father was married to another woman and had children from that union as well. Both parents indicated to the social worker that they wanted reunification services. Mother had been offered FMV services on August 7, 2002, that included counseling, case management, parent training, and teaching/demonstrating homemaker services. Furthermore, after Mother and Father had been referred to Child Protective Services (CPS) pertaining to the child while they lived in Texas, Mother also received services through Texas CPS that included parenting classes, case management counseling, and mental health services, while Father participated in parenting classes.
The social worker opined that Father had been involved in the childs life, that he assisted in the care and support of the child, and that there were no issues that kept him from adequately parenting and protecting the child. As to Mother, the social worker found Mother had trouble adequately caring for the child based on her ongoing mental health problems. The social worker recommended Father be given full physical custody and joint legal custody of the child and that its jurisdiction be terminated upon the filing of the Family Law Orders pursuant to section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1).
At the scheduled jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on September 25, 2002, neither Mother nor Father was present, and the matter was set for contest. The hearing was then continued to October 21, 2002.
In an addendum report dated October 21, 2002, the social worker reported that Mother was advised against travel due to her pregnancy being considered high risk. Mother reported that Father had left their home in Texas without her knowledge and that he had another girlfriend he was planning on marrying. Mother was unable to provide the social worker with Fathers telephone number and address. Mother also stated that Father had a history of domestic violence and alcohol abuse.
At the October, 21, 2002, hearing, Father attended and had the proceedings translated to him. At that time, Father informed the social worker that he had moved to Los Angeles and was working as a laborer and that he was living with his cousin and her family. When the social worker asked Father for his address and telephone number, he gave the social worker the street name, but did not remember the exact address and telephone number. Father failed to call the social worker with his exact home address and telephone number and his employers name and telephone number, even after requested by the social worker. The social worker attempted to call the telephone number Father gave at least four times, but there was no answer and no answering machine on which to leave a message. Later, the social worker received information from the relative caretaker, the childs maternal great-grandmother, that Father was "not really working . . . ."
At an October 23, 2002, hearing, where Father was present but Mother was not, the court granted Fathers request for extended day visits with his child but denied his request for overnight visits with the child.
On November 12, 2002, an amended section 300 petition was filed, which contained the same allegations as the first petition, except that it deleted references to Mothers and Fathers current whereabouts as being unknown.
In an addendum report filed on November 15, 2002, the social worker reported that Fathers whereabouts once again became unknown and that he failed to call the social worker with his current address. Social workers tried to call Father on October 21, 22, 24, 28, 29, and 31, 2002, without any luck. On October 22 and 28, 2002, Fathers cousin verified that Father lived with her family; however, the social worker was unable to get the street address and find out more about Fathers living situation. When the social worker called Fathers cousin again on November 1, 2002, Fathers cousin reported that, although Father had been living with her family, he was no longer living there and would not be coming back. The cousin also reported that she knew about Fathers child; that Father was working as a gardener in Los Angeles, but she did not know where exactly; that she knew nothing of Fathers girlfriend; and that she was unwilling to disclose her address. The social worker noted that Father had made many inconsistent statements regarding his past and present residences.
As of November 2002, Mother had still not seen a therapist or psychiatrist and had not been on any medication to treat her on-going mental health issues. Father, although he had indicated that he wanted the child, had not followed through with informing DPSS of his current address and telephone number.
The November 21, 2002, contested jurisdictional hearing, where Mother and Father were present in court, was continued. On December 18, 2002, that hearing, at which Mother and Father were present, was once again continued. On December 19, 2002, that hearing, at which Mother and Father failed to appear, was once again continued to January 14, 2003. On January 14, 2003, the contested jurisdictional hearing was once again continued.
The contested jurisdictional hearing, at which Mother and Father were present, was eventually held on January 15, 2003. The court found Father to be the presumed father of the child. After reading and considering the social workers reports and hearing arguments from the parties, the court found the allegations in the amended petition to be true. The court then ordered family reunification services to the parents, and the parents were ordered to participate in the approved case plan. The parents were advised that family reunification services would not exceed the statutory time of six months. The court ordered the case plan and services to Father be provided in Spanish. Mother and Father were ordered to maintain a suitable and stable residence, maintain a legitimate means of support, maintain a relationship with the child by adhering to the visitation plan, comply with all court orders, notify the social worker of any changes in address, participate in general counseling, and complete a parenting education class. Mother was ordered to obtain a psychiatric evaluation and follow the recommendations made in the evaluation. Father was ordered to participate in alcohol treatment and testing and participate in a domestic violence program. DPSS was responsible for ensuring the childs medical and dental needs were cared for; referring the parents to the appropriate counseling, educational, and rehabilitation programs; contacting persons involved with the family to assess progress; and arranging transportation for the child. On that same day, Father filed a notification of his mailing address, which indicated his street address and purported city but failed to include a zip code or telephone number.
In a status review report filed on March 27, 2003, the social worker recommended that the family reunification services be terminated as to both parents for their failure to comply and that a section 366.26 hearing be set to determine permanent plans of adoption for the child. The social worker noted that Mother did not have a stable place to live. As of March 27, she was living with her mother in a the home that did not have electricity or working plumbing. Mother informed the social worker that she was planning to go to Catholic Charities to see if they would place her in a motel. Mother had previously resided at two residential homes but had not stayed long at either. Mother also had stayed with a man named "Raymond" but would not give the social worker this mans last name or the address where they had lived. Mother was aware she was not working on providing a home for her son. Mother did not have employment but informed the social worker she was looking for a job and was trying to get her "SSI moved from Texas to California." Although Mother had been referred to parenting and life skill classes and individual and group therapy and had been given bus passes, she failed to complete her classes and counseling.
On December 6, 2002, Father called DPSS and stated that he wanted to visit with his son, but he would not leave a telephone number or an address. As of February 4, Father had not been referred to any services because he had not given DPSS a full address or telephone number at which the social worker had been able to contact him. On February 24, 2003, the social worker obtained four telephone numbers from Mother where Father might be reached. On that same day, the social worker unsuccessfully tried to find Father by calling the telephone numbers. On March 23, 2003, the social worker met with Father at a McDonalds restaurant in Riverside. The social worker, through a Spanish-speaking interpreter, spoke with Father. Father was living with a lady in Los Angeles; he declined to give the social worker her name. Father said that he was working in construction on Pico and La Brea, but he did not know the name of the company. Upon the social workers request, Father gave the social worker his cell phone number. The interpreter read Father his reunification case plan to him in Spanish, and Father stated that he understood it. After Father asked the social worker where he could get the services, the social worker informed Father that when he called with his address the social worker would arrange classes for him in Los Angeles. The following day, Father called the social worker and informed her of his exact address.
Regarding visitation, the social worker noted that Mother had visited the child on a regular basis; she usually visited her child on the weekends. Father had visited the child at least five times since January 15, 2003, but he failed to show up for a couple of visits for which he had called and made appointments.
On April 21, 2003, a review hearing was held at which both parents were present. The matter was set for a contested hearing at Fathers counsels request, and the court ordered Father to file a "JV140" form of Fathers address. On that same day, Father filed a notification of mailing address (the JV140 form).
On May 12, 2003, the contested six-month review hearing was held, at which both parents were present. After reading and considering the reports filed and hearing arguments from counsel, the court found that return of the child to the custody of Father and Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or emotional or physical well-being of the child. The court also found that notice had been given as required by law; that DPSS had complied with the case plan; that reasonable services had been offered to the parents; that the progress the parents made at alleviating/ mitigating the causes necessitating placement had been "minimal to none"; and that the parents had failed to make substantive progress in their court-ordered case plan. The court thereafter terminated reunification services to Father and Mother and set the matter for a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
On May 13, 2003, Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 39.1B. On May 15, 2003, Father filed his notice of intent to file a writ petition pursuant to rule 39.1B.
II
DISCUSSION
In their separate writ petitions, the parents contend the juvenile court erred in terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. Specifically, they argue the court erred in finding that reasonable reunification services had been provided to them. As discussed below, we disagree.
With regard to the parents contentions, our sole task is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that reasonable services were provided or offered. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762; see also Robert L. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 619, 625.) Substantial evidence is evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75; In re Solomon L. (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 1106, 1110, 236 Cal. Rptr. 2; In re Lynna B. (1979) 92 Cal. App. 3d 682, 695, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256.) We "must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent." (In re Ronell A. (1995) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361.) In addition, "all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and the reviewing court must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court." (In re Albert B. (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 361, 375, 263 Cal. Rptr. 694.) Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court. (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
Furthermore, in reviewing the reasonableness of reunification services, we must recognize that "in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services which are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.]" (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969; see also In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) In other words, the "adequacy of the reunification plan and of the departments efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case." (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011.)
Initially, we note that while the parents had reserved the right to address their reunification plan, they never indicated they had a problem with the plan. By consenting and failing to object to the reunification plan ordered by the juvenile court and implemented by the social workers, the parents waived appellate review of the adequacy of their plan. (In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476.) "If Mother [and Father] felt during the reunification period that the services offered [to them] were inadequate, [they] had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a better plan: "The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his [or her] legal rights and of calling the judges attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his [or her] objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal." [Citation.] [Citation.]" (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)
Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence in the record to show that the services provided to the parents were reasonable.
Father argues "there was no good faith effort by the department in providing services to [him] and that the court could not have found by clear and convincing evidence . . . that reasonable services were provided."
In the instant case, throughout the dependency proceedings, providing Father with services was problematic because his whereabouts were often unknown. The social worker was unable to provide Father with services because the only time she saw him was in court, and he would not provide a full address or telephone number. Repeatedly, the social workers involved in this case asked Father for his exact address and telephone number, and consistently Father failed to provide this information. The social worker tried to contact Father at telephone numbers provided by Mother but was unable to reach him. Although on January 15, 2003, Father filed a notification of his mailing address, this notification failed to give the zip code of his address. Furthermore, Father failed to give the social worker his exact address as recently as March 23, 2003, when the social worker asked Father for his address so that she could provide him with referrals for classes. Father eventually provided the social worker with his exact address on March 24, 2003, only two days prior to her writing the review report and three days prior to filing it. Father failed to meet his obligation to remain in contact with DPSS during the reunification period and failed to inform the social worker within 72 hours of any changes to his address as required by his case plan. It was Fathers obligation to communicate with the social worker and participate in reunification services. (See, e.g., In re Raymond R. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 436, 441.)
Father also argues that the social worker was unaware of the components of his case plan for alcohol treatment and domestic violence program. We reject this contention because there is no evidence in the record to support it. Reunification services are not inadequate simply because the parent is unwilling or indifferent. (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1220, 259 Cal. Rptr. 863.)
Father further argues that the social worker provided nothing to him in Spanish and did not file a Spanish case plan as required by the courts January 15, 2003, order. Father did not raise these contentions in the trial court. Hence, Father waived these issues by failing to object below. "Many dependency cases have held that a parents failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court. [Citations.] As some of these courts have noted, any other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts. The party could deliberately stand by in silence and thereby permit the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. [Citation.]" (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339, and cases cited therein; see also In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355.) This policy applies full force to the instant case, as neither the court nor DPSS was put on notice that DPSS failed to file Fathers case plan in Spanish or failed to provide him with services in Spanish. Thus, Fathers attempt to challenge these issues is an attempt to raise new issues which were not presented to the juvenile court. We find these issues waived, and we need not consider them further. (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [" . . . [a] party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the [juvenile] court"].)
Even assuming Father preserved these issues for appeal, we note that Fathers case plan was read to him in Spanish, and Father stated that he understood the case plan.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find substantial evidence to support the trial courts finding that services were reasonable to Father.
We also find that substantial evidence in the record shows that Mother was provided with reasonable services. Mother was referred to the Jefferson Wellness Center (JWC) with the Riverside County Department of Mental Health. She was supposed to go to JWC on a daily basis, but she minimally participated in the program and made very little progress. Mother, who was also referred to a parenting class, failed to finish the parenting class. She complains in her writ petition that the social worker did not refer her to a new class. However, according to the record, it was Mother who failed to enroll in the new class. Mother wanted to start the class over and take the parenting class offered at the Perris Resource Center, yet she never enrolled. Mother was provided with referrals to a transitional housing program, and she was given bus passes. The social worker discussed with Mother her various living options. Two social workers discussed and reviewed the case plan with Mother. Nevertheless, Mother failed to comply with her case plan. Mothers "real problem was not a lack of services available but a lack of initiative to consistently take advantage of the services that were offered." (Angela S. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763.)
Under the circumstances of this case, substantial evidence supports the trial courts finding that reasonable services were provided to Mother.
Moreover, we find neither exceptional circumstances nor any substantial evidence in the present case which support continuation of reunification services. (Cf. In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1777-1778; In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1209; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768.) Indeed, no evidence was presented that an additional six months of reunification services would benefit the child. An additional six months for Father and Mother to complete their reunification plan will mean the childs life is still not permanently settled. The juvenile court thus did not abuse its discretion by terminating reunification services even though few services had been provided.
III
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is DENIED.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, Acting P.J., and WARD, J.