Opinion
Civil 1:20-CV-425
11-29-2021
WILLIAM VICTOR, Plaintiff, v. LT. MOSS, et al., Defendants.
Mannion, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Statement of Facts and of the Case
It is said that doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is the height of folly. We are reminded of this truism as we turn to the instant case, where the prisoner-plaintiff has filed yet another motion seeking emergency injunctive relief against non-parties, even after we have previously found that he is not entitled to such relief from this court.
This is a civil rights action brought by William Victor, a state inmate. In his complaint Victor, who is proceeding pro se, named multiple individual defendants at two facilities, SCI Dallas and SCI Frackville. According to Victor, on September 17, 2019, staff at SCI Frackville violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they used excessive force and engaged in an “unprovoked attack” upon him. (Doc. 1). Victor then alleges that he was transferred to a nearby prison, SCI Frackville, for medical treatment following his injuries but suffered another violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when medical staff were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
Victor is no longer housed in either of these facilities. Instead, he is incarcerated at SCI Phoenix. However, in the course of this litigation, Victor has filed numerous motions for preliminary injunctions, seeking the court's intervention in a series of matters which were not legally, logically, temporally, or topically related to the claims in this lawsuit. (Docs. 36, 40, 58, and 60). We have consistently denied these requests and declined to allow this lawsuit to become the forum for litigation of unrelated claims by the plaintiff.
Undeterred by these prior rulings, Victor has filed another motion seeking preliminary, emergency injunctive relief against non-parties arising out of matters that are unrelated to the claims in this case. Specifically, Victor reports that he is temporarily housed in the Luzerne County Prison “to answer criminal charges filed against me almost two years ago.” (Doc. 99). Victor's motion complains about the conditions of his confinement at this county prison and the medical care he has received at the county jail, as well as protesting the county prison's COVID protocols. On the basis of these allegations, which are far afield from the claims in the instant lawsuit, Victor invites us once again to enjoin a series of non-party prison officials in this county jail.
Because we continue to believe that these factually unrelated matters, which involve individuals who are not parties to this lawsuit, are not properly brought before us, it is recommended that this motion be denied.
II. Discussion
A. Preliminary Injunction Rule 65b The Legal Standard.
This court has an on-going obligation to carefully screen inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary, or emergency relief, in the form of preliminary injunctions. Longo v. SCI Camp Hill, No. 3:17-CV-2104, 2019 WL 1141085, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-2104, 2019 WL 1139490 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2019); Stanley v. Luzerne Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 3:11-CV-1699, 2011 WL 5520426, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2011), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Stanley v. Luzerne Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 3:11-CV-1699, 2011 WL 5520403 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2011). As part of this legally mandated screening process, we determine whether these pro se pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.
As we have previously explained to the plaintiff, inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary or emergency relief in the form of preliminary injunctions, are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained,
Four factors govern a district court's decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985)). See also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001); Emile v. SCI-Pittsburgh, No. 04-974, 2006 WL 2773261, *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2006) (denying inmate preliminary injunction).
A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction seeking greater access to legal materials). It is an extraordinary remedy. Given the extraordinary nature of this form of relief, a motion for preliminary injunction places precise burdens on the moving party. As a threshold matter, “it is a movant's burden to show that the ‘preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.' ” Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at * 6 (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F .2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)). Thus, when considering such requests, courts are cautioned that:
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis deleted). Furthermore, the Court must recognize that an “[i]njunction is an equitable remedy which should not be lightly indulged in, but used sparingly and only in a clear and plain case.” Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union # 53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1230 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1977). As a corollary to the principle that preliminary injunctions should issue only in a clear and plain case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed that “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937).Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at *6.
Accordingly, for an inmate to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Rule 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, and that he will be irreparably harmed if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). If the movant fails to carry this burden on either of these elements, the motion should be denied since a party seeking such relief must “demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1987)).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.§ 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are further instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity . . . in tailoring any preliminary relief.§ 3626(a)(2).
Furthermore, several other basic legal tenets guide our discretion in this particular case, where Victor: (1) requests injunctive relief of a presumably permanent nature; (2) requests relief that goes beyond merely preserving the status quo in this litigation, but seeks to impose new, mandatory conditions on other prison officials; and (3) seeks relief from non-parties. Each of these aspects of Victor's prayer for injunctive relief presents separate problems and concerns.
At the outset, a request for some form of mandatory proactive injunctive relief in the prison context “must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995). Moreover, it is well-settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, where the requested preliminary injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but ... at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir.1980). Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir.1982). Thus, a request for some form of mandatory proactive injunctive relief in the prison context “must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Goff, 60 F.3d 518.
Further, to the extent that Victor seeks to enjoin nonparties in this litigation, he must make a particularly exacting showing. It is clear that “[a] non-party cannot be bound by the terms of an injunction unless the non-party is found to be acting ‘in active concert or participation' with the party against whom injunctive relief is sought.” Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47, 56 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)); Robertson v. Samuels, No. 3:13-CV-2500, 2014 WL 347007, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2014), affd, 593 Fed.Appx. 91 (3d Cir. 2014).
Finally, in assessing a motion for preliminary injunction, the court must also consider two other factors: (1) the possible harm to other interested parties if the relief is granted, Kershner, 670 F.2d at 443; and (2) whether the issuance of the injunctive relief would not be adverse to the public interest. Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at * 6 (citing Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001)).
B. Victor's Latest Request for Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied.
Judged against these exacting standards, Victor's latest motion for preliminary injunctive relief fails for a single, simple reason: Victor has filed this motion for preliminary relief against individuals who are not named as defendants in the instant action seeking relief which is unrelated to the claims in this case. Thus, Victor's latest motion for preliminary injunction runs afoul of the:
“[G]eneral rule that a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.” Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117, 17 S.Ct. 262, 41 L.Ed. 648 (1897) (“The decree is also objectionable because it enjoins persons not parties to the suit.”)). Indeed, courts have refused to issue injunctions against non-parties. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, 523 F.Supp.2d 328, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (the court denied the defendant's motion for a
preliminary injunction against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission because it was not a party to the suit and it was not an “officer, agent, servant, employee, or attorney” of any party); Williams v. Platt, Civ. No. 03-281-C, 2006 WL 149024 at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan.18, 2006) (unpublished) (the court denied the plaintiff's motion for an injunction noting that he had “not established a relationship between the preliminary injunction and the underlying civil rights claim, and he seeks to bind non-parties without any suggestion of active concert or participation by the named defendants”). Moreover, once a court has issued an injunction against a party, that injunction may only be enforced against non-parties that are officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys of a party, or ones that are in active concert or participation with such non-parties or the party itself. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2). To be bound by an injunction, a “non-party must have constructively had his day in court.” Harris County, Tex. v. CarMax Auto Superstores Inc., 177 F.3d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (“the relevant inquiry is ... whether [the non-party] had such a key role in the corporation's participation in the injunction proceedings that it can be fairly said that he has had his day in court in relation to the validity of the injunction.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).Banks v. Good, 2011 WL 2437061 (W.D. Pa. Apr.20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2418699 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2011). Given the fact that the issues raised in this motion involve persons who are not before this court and entail matters which bear no legal, logical, topical, or temporal relationship to the claims in this case, Victor's latest motion for preliminary injunction should be denied.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of the plaintiff's motion for preliminary, emergency injunctive relief (Doc. 99), IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion be DENIED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.