Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-01874-DCC-JDA
05-09-2023
Russell Gordon Vickery, Plaintiff, v. Chad McBride, Sheriff; Joshua D. Black, Deputy Sheriff; D. Simmone, Deputy Sheriff; C. Reena Thomason, Anderson County Clerk of Court, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Russell Gordon Vickery (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Anderson County Detention Center (“ACDC”). [Doc. 1 at 4-5.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the pleadings filed in this matter and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following pertinent allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 5.] On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff was subject to a traffic stop by police and arrested. [Id. at 10.] On February 18, 2023, Plaintiff appeared before a magistrate judge and was denied bond. [Id. at 11.] Plaintiff asserts he is being held against his will at ACDC in violation of his rights. [ Id. at 11-13.]
The Court provides only a summary of the many allegations contained in Plaintiff's twenty-four page Complaint. The undersigned has carefully reviewed all of the allegations from the Complaint and will refer to additional allegations, when pertinent, in the analysis below.
As to his injuries, Plaintiff contends that he suffered the loss of his freedom, liberty, house, belongings, and property and was denied medical care. [Id. at 17.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $1,000 per day for the loss of his liberty as well as compensation for the loss of his property. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Anderson County Court of General Sessions with the following crimes: drugs/trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2021A0410101393; traffic/failure to stop for a blue light at case number 2021A0410200770; drugs/possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2021A0410200771; traffic/failure to stop for a blue light at case number 2023A0410100268; and drugs/trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base at case number 2023A0410100269. See Anderson County Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Anderson/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by the case numbers listed above) (last visited May 9, 2023). Those charges all remain pending against Plaintiff at this time.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, for the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Frivolous Allegations
To begin, Plaintiff's Complaint as a whole is substantively without merit because he is asserting his claims as a sovereign citizen. As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous or malicious.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).
In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004). Although the Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional,” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity and that his conclusory assertions fail to state a cognizable claim for relief, particularly to the extent Plaintiff bases his claims on the sovereign citizen theory. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997). Although Plaintiff has not specifically identified himself as a sovereign citizen, his Complaint bears all of the hallmarks of the sovereign citizen theory. For example, Plaintiff signed the Complaint with his name and as “sui juris, Agent, Attorney-In-Fact WITHOUT PREJUDICE Record Owner and Holder in due course.” [Doc. 1 at 24.] Likewise, Plaintiff asserts the he invokes “jurisdiction under Article 3 of the United States Constitution under
Admiral[]ty Maritime, commerce and diversity of jurisdiction for lack of subject matter of the person, (personal jurisdiction).” [Id. at 5.] Further, Plaintiff notes as follows with regard to his identity:
“RUSSELL GORDON VICKERY”, spelled in all capit[a]l letters as displayed in the caption on the face of this suit is a “legal person” or a “legal fiction,” a statutory interface to the commercial world known as the “Debtor.” The body and holder of all the rights of the people.
“Russell Gordon Vickery,” sui juris, spelled properly in capit[a]l and lowercase letters is a sentient, living, breathing, flesh and blood man. Ths subject of all the rights of the people.
“RUSSELL GORDON VICKER,” the “Debtor,” is a fictitious corporate entity “ENS LEGIS” and a creation of law, a vessel in commerce and a transmitting utility to which all commercial presentments are passed. It, “the Debtor,” is not a natural person but for/by legal reasoning it is legally treated as a natural person for purposes of commercial activity for the benefit of creditors.
(All capit[a]l letter names and titles is an intentional, internal style employed by the U.S. Government and the States for purposes of a predetermined usage and connection to living people and through their consent, unintelligently and unkowingly, they enter an unknown jurisdiction void of all human rights.)
“Russell Gordon Vickery,” sui juris, Agent and Attorney-In-Fact, spelled properly in upper and lowercase letters is a “traveller” and a “freeman,” and is NOT the all capit[a]l letter name “Debtor” and NOT under any circumstances to be considered a surety or an accommodation party for ANY juristic person, corporation or the like. By definition, Vickery is an “Alien” and is not a member of the foreign corporation “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (28 USC 3002(15)),” which laid down their sovereignty . . .[ Id. at 6-7.] Plaintiff's filings are replete with other similar allegations. Indeed, the crux of Plaintiff's argument that he was falsely arrested, charged, and incarcerated is premised on his belief that he is a sovereign citizen. Plaintiff alleges that when he was pulled over, he “expla[i]ned to [the] officers that he was not contractually obligated to them for he did not have a license or identification reg[i]stered with the highway dept. that he was simply travelling in his private property” and that he “did not have a ‘Government Name' to give them.” [Id. at 10.]
Each of these allegations are couched in terms of the sovereign citizen argument, which “has been rejected repeatedly by the courts.” Smith v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00900, 2013 WL 5464723, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 2013) (citation omitted). Adherents to the sovereign citizen theory “believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 Fed.Appx. 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Presley v. Prodan, No. 3:12-cv-3511-CMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1342465, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2013) (collecting cases describing the sovereign citizen movement and its common features), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1342539 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2013).
Federal courts have repeatedly rejected the sovereign citizen theory as baseless. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual's claimed status . . . as a ‘sovereign citizen' . . . that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing the “sovereign citizen” theory as having “no conceivable validity in American law”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant claimed he was “outside” the jurisdiction of the United States; however, the court found this argument to be “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous” and rejected it “without expending any more of this Court's resources on discussion”); Glover v. South Carolina, No. 5:16-cv-00969-JMC, 2017 WL 1836982, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 8, 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-6846, 2017 WL 5197454 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017). Thus, because Plaintiff is asserting claims in this case based on the sovereign citizen theory, his claims are subject to summary dismissal as frivolous. In sum, “Plaintiff's filings are so outlandish and unmoored from reality that the Court finds this entire action to be frivolous.” Anderson v. Dye, No. 5:21-cv-00168-MR, 2022 WL 1213619, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2022).
Abstention under Younger
Additionally, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims related to his pending state court criminal charges. Plaintiff makes various frivolous and cursory allegations regarding the underlying incidents and investigations related to the criminal charges pending against him. Indeed, the crux of this action appears to be a challenge to the charges pending against Plaintiff in the Anderson County Court of General Sessions as well as his current detention at ACDC.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charges, including dismissal of those charges, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper and violate his constitutional rights, and he appears to seek dismissal of those pending charges. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court criminal proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims related to the pending criminal charges against him and the legality of his present detention at the ACDC.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
Next, each of the named Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal as explained below. And because Plaintiff has failed to name any Defendant that is a proper party to this action, the Complaint is subject to dismissal on that basis.
Defendant Thomason
Plaintiff purports to sue the Anderson County Clerk of Court, C. Reena Thomason. [Doc. 1 at 4.] However, she is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they have acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Further, clerks of court and other court support personnel are entitled to immunity similar to judges when performing their quasi-judicial duties. See Jarvis v. Chasanow, 448 Fed.Appx. 406 (4th Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Williamsburg Cnty. Sheriff's Office, No. 1:15-cv-1074-PMD-BM, 2016 WL 1427316, at *6 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2016). “Absolute immunity ‘applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel that are basic and integral part[s] of the judicial function.'” Jackson v. Houck, 181 Fed.Appx. 372, 373 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Absolute immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Here, the alleged wrongful act, or failure to act, of Defendant Thomason was part of her judicial or quasi-judicial function and she has immunity from this lawsuit. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim against this Defendant should be dismissed, with prejudice, as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) because it is barred by absolute immunity. See Mills v. Marchant, No. 8:19-cv-1512-TMC-JDA, 2019 WL 2647600, at *3 (D.S.C. June 4, 2019) (collecting cases), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 2644216 (D.S.C. June 27, 2019).
Defendants McBride and Simmone
Defendants McBride and Simmone are also entitled to dismissal. Defendant McBride is identified as the Anderson County Sheriff and Defendant Simmone is identified as a Deputy Sheriff. [Doc. 1 at 3-4.] These Defendants appear to be named because of their involvement in the investigations related to Plaintiff's pending state court criminal charges or their oversight of ACDC. [Id. at 12 (alleging that Plaintiff “has filed 5 grievances [concerning his claims], all which have been unanswered, to D. Simmone and Sher[]iff Chad McBride”).]
However, to the extent these Defendants are named in their supervisory roles over ACDC or over the officers involved in the incidents described in the Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support a claim for supervisory liability. The doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994).
Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against any Defendant to make such a showing.
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim against these two Defendants for their failure to respond to his grievances, such a claim is without merit. “[I]t is well settled that inmates have no federal constitutional right to have any inmate grievance system in operation at the place where they are incarcerated.” Rivera v. Leonard, No. 5:15-cv-01191-DCN, 2016 WL 3364905, at *4 (D.S.C. June 17, 2016), aff'd, 672 Fed.Appx. 262 (4th Cir. 2016). “Because inmate grievance procedures are not constitutionally required in state prison systems, the failure to follow grievance procedures does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Doans v. Rice, 831 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision).
Defendant Black
Next, the Complaint fails to state any claim for relief against Defendant Black or any other police officer. Plaintiff identifies Defendant Black as a deputy sheriff that initiated the traffic stop and arrested him. [Doc. 1 at 3-4, 10.] Plaintiff's contentions that this Defendant engaged in any unlawful and unconstitutional conduct related to his arrest, charges, and detention are without merit because he has not alleged facts to support cognizable claims. Plaintiff's cursory allegations simply do not satisfy the pleading requirements to state a plausible claim for relief.
As to any claims that this Defendant or any other police officer violated the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff cannot pursue any such claims. Significantly, Plaintiff has attached to his Complaint copies of two arrest warrants related to the charges of drugs/trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base and traffic/failure to stop for a blue light, which both remain pending against him. [Doc. 1-2.] In light of these facially valid arrest warrants, Plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1983 claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[A] claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained.”); Howell v. Taylor, No. 3:13-cv-2111-JFA-PJG, 2013 WL 6240518, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2013).
Further, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution as a matter of law. “An indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim for malicious prosecution against Defendant Black, any such claim fails because he has not alleged the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor and because the prosecution is supported by probable cause as conclusively established by the numerous indictments for the many charges pending against him in the Anderson County Court of General Sessions. Id.
Failure to State a Claim
Finally, in addition to each of the reasons for dismissal already noted, this action is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. It is unclear to the Court what causes of action Plaintiff intends to state in his Complaint. Plaintiff has cited many constitutional amendments as the basis for his claims. However, he fails to provide allegations to support a claim for relief that is plausible as to those constitutional provisions.
Fourth Amendment, False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
First, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or malicious prosecution, his claims are without merit as a matter of law. The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 1983 actions premised on claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead the minimum facts necessary to state a cognizable claim for a Fourth Amendment violation. Additionally, under § 1983, a public official cannot be charged with unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, or malicious prosecution when the search and arrest are based on probable cause. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.”). Moreover, “an indictment, ‘fair upon its face,' returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. S.C., No. 6:07-cv-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (explaining § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded based on the filing of an indictment). Here, the grand jury has filed indictments for certain charges pending against Plaintiff. The indictments act as a bar to Plaintiff's claims for money damages as to those charges and his present incarceration in the ACDC. Therefore, any claims related to those charges and his incarceration are subject to summary dismissal.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Due Process
Likewise, Plaintiff's due process claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments fail because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing he was subjected to any deprivation of due process to support such a claim. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a procedural due process violation with regard to the charges pending against him, the investigation into the crimes he is charged with, or his purportedly unlawful incarceration, he has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible. Additionally, such claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons already stated. First, the Court should abstain from deciding such claims under Younger. Further, at this stage, the valid indictments against him act as a bar to any such claims.
To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a substantive due process claim with regard to the conditions of his confinement, he has failed to allege facts to state a plausible claim. “To prevail on a substantive due process claim, a pretrial detainee must show unconstitutional punishment by proving that the challenged conditions were either (1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation omitted). However, “Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to state a claim of a constitutional magnitude.” Brown v. Polk, No.4:21-cv-1229-TMC-TER, 2021 WL 3080966, at *2 (D.S.C. June 28, 2021) (discussing the requirements for a pretrial detainee to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3080157 (D.S.C. July 21, 2021). Plaintiff makes no allegations concerning the circumstances of the conditions of his confinement or the individuals responsible. As such, his claim is without merit.
Sixth Amendment, Speedy Trial
Next, Plaintiff cites the Sixth Amendment and thus he appears to allege that Defendants have violated his right to a speedy trial. [Doc. 1 at 5.] “The Sixth Amendment provides that an ‘accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,' and this right has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Vaughn v. Greenwood Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 8:07-cv-2022-TLW-BHH, 2008 WL 5378265, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 24, 2008).
To the extent Plaintiff contends he has been denied the right to a speedy trial, he does not allege the violation of any federal statute. Even if he had, the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3116, et seq., applies only to criminal prosecutions brought by the United States and not to those brought by state or local governments. See United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 451 (4th Cir. 2012). Further, this “federal court should abstain from considering a speedy-trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal.” Julius v. Dickers, No. 4:18-cv-105-HMH-TER, 2018 WL 1545698, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1536572 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2018). As previously discussed, this Court should abstain under Younger from hearing Plaintiff's claims because he has available state court remedies. See, e.g., Tyler v. South Carolina, No. 9:12-cv-260-RMG-BM, 2012 WL 988601, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988596 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012). As such, any speedy-trial claim under the Sixth Amendment should be dismissed.
Eighth/ Fourteenth Amendment, Deliberate Indifference
Further, the Complaint might be asserting a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs. Specifically, the Complaint contains a single conclusory allegation that he was denied “medical care (knee surgery).” [Doc. 1 at 17.] However, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim related to any deliberate indifference as to his medical treatment, he has failed to state a claim for relief because he provides no allegations regarding the personal involvement of any individual who is responsible for his medical treatment or how any such treatment or lack of treatment rises to the level of deliberate indifference.
A pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference claim arises under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment; however, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments provides the framework for analyzing such a claim. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988).
To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he was deprived of an objectively serious medical need by a state actor and (2) the state actor knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference “is a higher standard for culpability than mere negligence or even civil recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. Absent exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable deliberate indifference claim when there exists a mere disagreement between the plaintiff and the state official over the proper medical care. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any Defendant knew of and disregarded a serious medical need and its associated risks. Simply put, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support a deliberate indifference claim and he fails to identify any defendant responsible for his injury or his medical care.
As the Fourth Circuit has noted:
To state a claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them.Depaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
Other Claims
Finally, as to any other claim brought under any other federal law or constitutional provision not addressed herein, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief as a matter of law or because he has failed to allege facts to support a cognizable claim. Therefore, because Plaintiff has “not nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the Complaint is subject to dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
For example, Plaintiff cites the Thirteenth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 5.] Although it is unclear what conduct or events this claim is based upon, it is well settled that “[b]y its plain language, the Thirteenth Amendment does not apply to a convicted criminal.” Moore v. Solomon, No. 1:16-cv-238-FDW, 2016 WL 6272406, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 25, 2016), aff'd, 688 Fed.Appx. 196 (4th Cir. 2017). Courts have routinely dismissed Thirteenth Amendment claims by prisoners as frivolous. See, e.g., Cox v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-50-TMC-JRM, 2012 WL 1158864, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 1158861 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2012). Similarly, Plaintiff has also cited the First Amendment [Doc. 1 at 5], but he provides no facts to support any such claim and the Court is unable to determine what cause of action might arise under that amendment.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned recommends dismissal of this case without leave to amend given the patently frivolous nature of Plaintiff's allegations.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).