That portion of the bond which is pertinent to the determination of this case reads: "Now in order to guarantee his compliance with the order of the court to make said payments the defendant brings P. O. McClung and Marlin Lamar and Joe T. Wheeler as security, and they jointly and severally bind themselves to comply with the order of the court up to the amount of said bond, and this bond is made in the principal sum of $1,000 in order to secure the compliance with the order of this court." These defendants signed the bond for the simple purpose of guaranteeing this alimony money due by Hugh D. McClung. U.S. Fidelity c. Co. v. Tucker, 165 Ga. 283 ( 140 S.E. 866), and Vickers v. Jones, 200 Ga. 338 ( 37 S.E.2d 205), cited by the defendants, stated correct principles of law, but on the contrary support the conclusions we reach, and are not cause for reversal of the instant case under the facts. It is contended by counsel for the defendants that a summary judgment could not be entered on the bond in the instant case and that a new and independent suit would be required.

In the absence of a cause of action for abusive litigation, a party is not liable in tort for seeking injunctive relief. OCGA § 51-7-85; Mason v. Port Wentworth Corp., 75 Ga. App. 844 ( 44 S.E.2d 808) (1947). See Short Co. v. Spragins, Buck Co., 104 Ga. 628 ( 30 S.E. 810) (1898); Vickers v. Jones, 200 Ga. 338, 349 (3) ( 37 S.E.2d 205) (1946). Appellants have neither alleged nor proved the elements of abusive litigation.

We have not overlooked the cases where bonds were held not eventual condemnation money bonds because they were conditioned "to respond to the liability for damages that could not be recovered in the cases in which they were made." See Vickers v. Jones, 200 Ga. 338, 348 ( 37 S.E.2d 205). The plaintiffs in error insist that the rules pronounced in those, and similar cases, are applicable here because, as they contend, the foreclosure of the conditional-sale contract, as a mortgage, was a proceeding in rem and in a case of that nature no recovery of money can be had. The position, for the reasons discussed in the first divisions of the opinion, is not sound. It must be remembered that when the injunction was granted restraining the prosecution of the foreclosure proceedings in order to afford Altman the opportunity to plead the setoff to which he contended he was entitled, the foreclosure lost its separate identity and became merged into the equity case. In the case of Kidd v. Finch, 188 Ga. 492, 495-496 ( 4 S.E.2d 187), it is held: "The plaintiff also invoked the equitable jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of obtaining an injunction to restrain further prosecution of the suit in the municipal court. Since the municipal court did not have juris

G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellant. I. The trial court erred in its ruling that persons other than the owner, fishing in privately owned land-locked lakes at the invitation of the owner, were not required to first obtain the fishing license required by the Game and Fish laws of Mississippi, and in reversing the Justice of the Peace Court conviction of appellee and discharging him. Commonwealth v. Gilbert (Mass.), 35 N.E. 454; Dargan v. Richardson (S.C.) 92 S.E.2d 167; Draffen v. Black (Ky.), 196 S.W.2d 362; Ex Parte Louis Fritz, 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722, 109 Am. St. Rep. 700; Holland v. Flora (Ky.), 284 S.W.2d 824; State Game Fish Comm. v. Fritz, 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9; State v. Buckingham, 93 Miss. 846, 47 So. 501; State v. Hill, 98 Miss. 142, 53 So. 411; State v. Nelson (Wash.), 261 P. 796; State v. Taylor (Mo.), 214 S.W.2d 34; Territory v. Hoy Chong, 21 Haw. 39; Vickers v. Jones (Ga.), 37 S.E.2d 205; H.B. 791, Regular Sess. 1960; H.B. Nos. 192, 346, 949, Regular Sess. 1962; 36A C.J.S., Fish, Secs. 26, 29, 30. William Joel Blass, Wiggins, for appellee.

T.C. Callison, Attorney General, James S. Verner,Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel R. McLeod,Assistant Attorney General, of Columbia, and J. ReubenLong, Solicitor, of Conway, for Appellant, cite: As to privateponds being included in the Statutory phrase "any watersof this state": 214 S.W.2d 34; (Ga.) 37 S.E.2d 205; 187 A. 199; 16 A.L.R. 684. As to the statutesbeing constitutional as applied to private ponds: 214 S.W.2d 34; 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132; 1915A Am. Jur. Cas. 1155; 25 Am. Jur., Fish, Sec. 48; 36 C. J.S. 863, Fish, Par. 29, n. 54; 22 L.R.A. 429. As toright of State to regulate fishing by non-residents, regardlessof location of waters: 96 L.Ed. 458; 24 L.Ed. 248; 43 L.Ed. 432; 209 S.W.2d 588; 93 L.Ed. 389. As toCourt of Equity having no power to restrain Criminal proceedings: 181 S.C. 379, 187 S.E. 821; 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813; 143 S.C. 283, 141 S.E. 454; 143 S.C. 347, 141 S.E. 610; 28 A.J., Injunctions, par. 235; 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, par. 159. As to the right of one toquestion the constitutionality of a statute only being assertedwhen some right of such person is directly affectedby the questioned act: 136 S.C. 345, 134 S.E. 380; 46 F.2d 671; 115 F.2d 627; 96 F.2d 620.

"A general demurrer goes to the whole pleading which it attacks and should be overruled if any part of such pleading is good in substance." Vickers v. Jones, 200 Ga. 338, 347 ( 37 S.E.2d 205). 6. "There is no provision of law for reviewing by writ of error an interlocutory order merely dissolving a temporary restraining order."