For a detinue action to lie under Virginia law, a plaintiff must establish (1) a property interest in the thing sought to be recovered, (2) the right to immediate possession of the property, (3) that the property is capable of identification, (4) that the property is of some value, and (5) that the defendant had possession at some time before the institution of the action. Vicars v. Atl. Disc. Co., 205 Va. 934, 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1965); see also York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 427 (E.D.Va.1989). Although it is not clear if Fuqua contests multiple individual elements, she definitely contests the first one. Accordingly, the dispositive question in this context is whether BMA can prove that it was “unlawfully divested” of possession of the Painting sometime before Fuqua acquired it.

In Virginia, to maintain an action for detinue: "(1) The plaintiff must have property in the thing sought to be recovered; (2) he must have the right to its immediate possession; (3) it must be capable of identification; (4) the property must be of some value, and (5) the defendant must have had possession at some time prior to the institution of the action." Vicars v. Atl. Disc. Co., 205 Va. 934, 938,140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1965); see also York v.Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 427 (E.D. Va. 1989). Brown and Tharpe have stipulated to facts establishing four of the five elements of detinue. As a result, there is no dispute that Brown once owned the Tiffany Sword, that it is capable of identification, and is, in fact, the same sword purchased by Tharpe in 1992.

A. To recover in detinue under Virginia law, the plaintiff must establish (1) that plaintiff has a property interest in the thing sought to be recovered, (2) that plaintiff has the right to immediate possession of the property, (3) that the property is capable of identification, (4) that the property is of some value, and (5) that defendant had possession at some time prior to the institution of the detinue action. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 427 (E.D.Va. 1989); Vicars v. Atlantic Discount Co., 205 Va. 934, 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1965). The first, second, and fifth of these elements are in dispute here. In particular, the question is when these requirements must be met. Must the government establish that it had a property interest in and right to immediate possession of the $103,800 in August 1991, when the Law Firm accepted Covington's money, or in October 1994, when the government filed its detinue complaint? Similarly, while it is beyond question that the Law Firm once possessed the $103,800, must the government also prove that the Law Firm still possessed the money in October 1994 when the instant suit was filed? Answers to these questions follow logically from the nature of a detinue action.

To establish a claim for detinue in Virginia, a “plaintiff must have (1) a property interest in the thing sought to be recovered; (2) the right to immediate possession; (3) the property is capable of identification; (4) the property must be of some value; and (5) defendant must have had possession at some time prior to the institution of the act.” York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421,427 (E.D. Va. 1989) (citing D.T. Vicars v. Atlantic Discount Co., 205 Va. 934,140 (1965)). “The remedy for a detinue claim is recovery of the item being withheld and any damages for its detention.”

To recover in detinue the following elements must be established: (1) the plaintiff must have a property interest in the thing sought to be recovered; (2) the plaintiff must have the right to immediate possession of the property; (3) the property must be identifiable; (4) the property must have some value; and (5) the defendant must have had possession of the property before the institution of the action. Vicars v. Atlantic Discount Co., 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1965). When successful in detinue, plaintiffs can recover both the property and resulting damages.

Indiana law controls substantive matters in this contract dispute; however, “the law of Virginia must control all questions of procedure, burden of proof and sufficiency of evidence.” Vicars v. Atl. Disc. Co., 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1965) (applying Virginia law to an action in detinue where Georgia law controlled the case's substantive questions); see also U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. 3D Facility Servs., Inc., No. 120CV1575LOTCB, 2021 WL 5234884, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 19, 2021) (applying Virginia law to an action in detinue where Minnesota law controlled the case's substantive questions).

A counterplaintiff must establish (1) a property interest in the thing sought to be recovered, (2) the right to immediate possession of the property, (3) that the property is capable of identification, (4) that the property is of some value, and (5) that the counter-defendant had possession at some time before the institution of the action. Vicars v. Atl. Disc. Co., 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1965). Defendants hypothesize, with no citation to supporting authority, that they are entitled to immediate possession by virtue of their alleged combined majority interest in the Illustrations.

Minnesota law controls substantive matters in this contract dispute; however, “the law of Virginia must control all questions of procedure, burden of proof and sufficiency of evidence.” Vicars v. Ail. Disc. Co., 295 Va. 934, 938, 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1965) (applying Virginia law to an action in detinue where Georgia law controlled the case's substantive questions). Therefore, finding that Virginia law applies, the undersigned will evaluate whether the Plaintiff sufficiently alleged claim for detinue under Virginia Code section 8.01-114. Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-114.

To prevail in such action, the following elements must be established: (1) the plaintiff has a property interest in the item sought to be recovered; (2) the plaintiff has the right to its immediate possession: (3) the property is capable of identification; (4) the property has some value; and (5) the defendant had possession of the property at some time prior to the institution of the action. D.T. Vicars v. Atl. Disc. Co., 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1965). Similarly, Washington's replevin statute permits a plaintiff to recover possession of personal property after establishing "ownership of the property, a right to its possession, a demand on the respondents for its surrender, their refusal to surrender it, and their consequent wrongful detention of same."

In order to maintain an action in detinue, the plaintiff must show: (1) a right of property in the personal property to be recovered; (2) a right of immediate possession; (3) that the property is capable of identification and immediate possession; (4) the property has some value; and (5) that the defendant had possession at some time prior to the commencement of the action. See Vicars v. Atl. Disc. Co., 140 S.E.2d 667, 670 (Va. 1965). The court concludes that this claim fails because Lokey and Leatherwood are entitled to sovereign immunity, and so Shabazz cannot obtain the relief he seeks from them.