Summary
In Meck, we analyzed the language of the motor-driven vehicle exception, concluding the exception "waives immunity for personal injuries proximately caused by an employee's negligent operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle if the employee would be personally liable to the claimant under Texas law."
Summary of this case from Via Metro. Transit Auth. v. ReynoldsOpinion
No. 04-17-00108-CV
04-18-2018
VIA METROPOLITAN TRANSIT, Appellant v. Curtis MECK, Appellee
Wallace Jefferson, Alexandra W. Albright, Amy Warr, Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP, 515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350, Austin, TX 78701, Ricardo R. Reyna, Rodney Eugene Cox, Joshua Nicholls, Brock Person Guerra Reyna, P.C., San Antonio, TX 78247, for Appellant. Charles A. Riley, Darby Riley, Riley & Riley, 320 Lexington Avenue, San Antonio, TX 78215, for Appellee.
Wallace Jefferson, Alexandra W. Albright, Amy Warr, Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP, 515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350, Austin, TX 78701, Ricardo R. Reyna, Rodney Eugene Cox, Joshua Nicholls, Brock Person Guerra Reyna, P.C., San Antonio, TX 78247, for Appellant.
Charles A. Riley, Darby Riley, Riley & Riley, 320 Lexington Avenue, San Antonio, TX 78215, for Appellee.
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice, Marialyn Barnard, Justice, Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Appellee Curtis Meck was injured while riding a bus operated by appellant VIA Metropolitan Transit ("VIA"). Meck sued VIA, alleging his neck, back, and wrist injuries were caused by the bus driver's negligent operation of the bus. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Meck based on the jury's verdict. In two issues on appeal, VIA argues: (1) the trial court erred by including in the jury charge a "high degree of care" standard applicable to common carriers; and (2) there is no evidence VIA breached the applicable ordinary care standard. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
Meck was riding a VIA bus when he reached up to grab the bus strap located above him to signal the bus to stop. Meck had just boarded the bus when he pulled the strap; however, by the time he pulled the strap, the bus had started to accelerate. As the bus began to move, another passenger exclaimed, "Back door!" — a common call on buses — to alert the bus driver that Meck wished to stop. The bus driver had recently completed VIA's classroom training program, and at the time of the incident, he was participating in on-the-road training. Wanda Scott, another VIA operator, was also riding the bus as a "line instructor" to observe and evaluate the bus driver.
What happened next is disputed. According to Meck, the bus driver abruptly stopped when he heard the passenger exclaim, "Back door!" Meck claimed the bus driver over-reacted and slammed on his brakes, causing him to lurch forward and injure himself. Meck further claimed that later that day he felt stiff, and as a result, he went to the hospital where he learned he sustained injuries to his neck, back, and wrist. VIA, on the other hand, claimed the bus driver slowly came to a stop after he heard someone exclaim, "Back door!" According to VIA, the bus had been in motion for no more than 5 seconds and was going less than 5 miles per hour when the bus driver stopped the bus.
Meck sued VIA alleging negligence. At trial, the jury heard testimony from Meck, who testified about the foregoing events. During his testimony, Meck explained that because he had just boarded the bus, he was not situated to brace for a sudden stop. The jury also heard testimony from Scott, who testified the correct way for a bus driver to stop when asked to make an undesignated stop was to continue driving and make a courtesy stop on the other side of the intersection so that he could smoothly slow the bus and bring it to a stop. In addition to Meck's and Scott's testimony, the jury heard testimony from VIA's vice president for safety support regarding VIA's bus safety standards. The jury also reviewed a video of the incident.
In the jury charge, negligence was defined as "failure to use a high degree of care, that is, failing to do that which a very cautious, competent, and prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a very cautious, competent, and prudent person would not have done under the same or similar circumstances." The jury ultimately determined the negligence of VIA, acting through its bus driver, proximately caused Meck's injuries. The jury awarded Meck $30,000 for past pain and mental anguish, $15,000 for future pain and mental anguish, $15,000 for past physical impairment, $15,000 for future physical impairment, $40,000 for past medical expenses, and $60,000 for future medical expenses. The trial court rendered judgment for Meck based on the jury's verdict and reduced Meck's actual damages to $100,000 pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.023(b) (West 2011) (limiting liability of unit of local government to money damages in maximum amount of $100,000). This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, VIA raises two issues challenging the jury charge and sufficiency of the evidence. In its first issue, VIA argues the trial court erred by defining the duty element of negligence in the jury charge as requiring adherence to a "high degree of care" standard, and as a result, it was prejudiced by the inclusion. In its second issue on appeal, VIA asserts there is no evidence it breached an ordinary standard of care.
Jury Charge
As indicated above, VIA challenges the jury charge by arguing the charge defines the duty element of negligence as imposing a "high degree of care" standard, and it is not subject to such a standard as a matter of law. VIA further argues it was therefore prejudiced by the instruction.
To support its argument, VIA asserts the following two subpoints: (1) the "high degree of care" standard applies only to common carriers and it is not a common carrier because it is not "in business;" and (2) it is immune from suit because it is a governmental unit, and its immunity is not waived under the motor-driven vehicle exception of the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA"). With regard to its second subpoint, VIA argues waiver under the motor-driven vehicle exception applies only to tort claims that allege a governmental entity failed to use ordinary care as opposed to a "high degree of care" as set out in the jury charge.
In response, Meck asserts VIA is a common carrier subject to the "high degree of care" standard. According to Meck, VIA is a common carrier because its primary function is public transportation. Meck asserts VIA meets the traditional definitions of common carrier, citing both the former Texas Transportation Code and Black's Law Dictionary. In response to VIA's immunity argument, Meck contends the degree of care required under the motor-driven vehicle exception is not limited to ordinary negligence, but rather is based on the potential liability of the employee. Meck claims the exception incorporates the common law of Texas, which, in this case, is the "high degree of care" standard owed by a bus driver of a common carrier.
In Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. v. Elmer , the Texas Supreme Court explained that although the Texas Transportation Code does not define "common carrier," a predecessor statute defined the duties and liabilities of a common carrier to include "railroad companies, and other carriers of passengers, foods, wares, merchandise for hire, within this state, on land, or in boats or vessels on the waters entirely within this state." 124 S.W.3d 210, 212 (Tex. 2003).
In his brief, Meck cites Black's Law Dictionary, stating it defines common carrier as "any carrier required by law to convey passengers or freight without refusal if the approved fare or charge is paid in contrast to a private or contract carrier."
Standard of Review
"We review a trial court's decision to submit or refuse a particular instruction in its charge for an abuse of discretion." Thota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012) ; Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Morris , 434 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) ; VIA Metro. Transit Auth. v. Barraza , No. 04-13-00035-CV, 2013 WL 6255761, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 4, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. , 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex. 2002) ; Barraza , 2013 WL 6255761, at *9. "Submission of the charge is the trial court's responsibility, and the trial court is given wide latitude to determine the propriety of explanatory instructions and definitions." Morris , 434 S.W.3d at 758. "An instruction is proper if it (1) assists the jury, (2) accurately states the law, and (3) finds support in the pleadings and evidence." Thota , 366 S.W.3d at 687 (quoting Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley , 284 S.W.3d 851, 855–56 (Tex. 2009) ); Barraza , 2013 WL 6255761, at *9 ; see Morris , 434 S.W.3d at 758.
We will not reverse a trial court's judgment for a charge error unless that error was harmful. Thota , 366 S.W.3d at 687 ; Barraza , 2013 WL 6255761, at *9. Error is considered harmful if it "probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment" or "probably prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case to the appellate courts." Thota , 366 S.W.3d at 687 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 61.1) ; Barraza , 2013 WL 6255761, at *9 (same); see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a).
1. Whether VIA is Immune from Suit
Because immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction absent a valid statutory or constitutional waiver of immunity, we will first address VIA's contention that it is immune from suit and the TTCA does not waive its immunity from suit. Suarez v. City of Tex. City , 465 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Tex. 2015). "Without jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed at all in any cause; it may not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits of the case." Zachry Constr. Corp. v. Port of Houston Auth. of Harris Cnty. , 449 S.W.3d 98, 108 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Rusk State Hosp. v. Black , 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) ; Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood , 418 S.W.3d 566, 578 (Tex. 2013) ). In analyzing VIA's contention, we must determine whether: (1) VIA is a governmental entity immune from suit, and (2) if VIA is immune from suit, whether the TTCA waives VIA's immunity from suit. See Suarez , 465 S.W.3d at 632 ; Zachry Constr. Corp. , 449 S.W.3d at 108.
Applicable Law
Absent an express waiver of governmental immunity, a local governmental entity is generally immune from lawsuits for money damages. State v. Holland , 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007) ; City of Houston v. Nicolai , 539 S.W.3d 378, 385-86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.], 2017, no pet.). "[I]t is the Legislature's sole province to waive or abrogate sovereign immunity." Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT–Davy , 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002) ; see also Tooke v. City of Mexia , 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). We interpret statutory waivers of immunity narrowly because legislative consent to sue must be expressed in clear and unambiguous language. IT–Davy , 74 S.W.3d at 854 ; MRSW Mgmt. LLC v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 403 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) ; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2013) ("In order to preserve the legislature's interest in managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language.").
"The TTCA provides for limited waivers of immunity from suit against governmental entities for claims arising from three general areas: (1) injury caused by an employee's operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment, (2) injury caused by a condition or use of tangible property, and (3) injury caused by a condition or use of real property." Nicolai , 539 S.W.3d at 386 ; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021. Pertinent to this case is the first general area: the motor-driven vehicle exception, which specifically provides that a governmental entity is liable for:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within the scope of employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law ...
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1).
Application
This court has recognized that "VIA is a governmental unit with exclusively governmental functions." Martinez v. VIA Metro. Transit Auth. , 38 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). "Accordingly, VIA is immune from suit unless its immunity has been waived." Id. We thus turn our attention to the next portion of VIA's argument — that its immunity from suit was not waived under the motor-driven vehicle exception of the TTCA because the exception waives immunity only for ordinary negligence claims as opposed to negligence claims involving a "high degree of care" standard.
As pointed out above, the motor-driven vehicle exception waives immunity for personal injuries proximately caused by an employee's negligent operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle if the employee would be personally liable to the claimant under Texas law. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1). It is undisputed that this case involves a personal injury that arose out of the bus driver's alleged negligent operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle. The parties' dispute centers on the meaning of the later part of the statute, which imposes liability on a governmental unit only if the employee would be personally liable to the claimant under Texas law. See id. (emphasis added); Ortega v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit , No. 05-96-00020-CV, 1997 WL 524155, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 1997, no pet.) (holding that under motor-driven vehicle exception, governmental entity's liability is predicated on liability of employee). Nowhere in the motor-driven vehicle exception are specific standards of care expressly mentioned as is the case with other exceptions under the TTCA. See Suarez , 465 S.W.3d at 632 ("In premises-defect cases, the governmental unit owes ‘only the duty [of care] that a private person owes to a licensee on private property.’ When property is open to the public for ‘recreation,’ however, the recreational use statute further limits the governmental unit's duty by classifying recreational users as trespassers and limiting liability for premises defects to claims involving gross negligence, malicious intent, or bad faith.") (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.002(f), 101.022(a), (b) ); see also Morris , 434 S.W.3d at 758 (stating TTCA did not provide what standards of care should apply in negligence suit). Rather, to determine whether VIA's immunity is waived by the motor-driven vehicle exception, we must determine whether the bus driver would be liable. See Ortega , 1997 WL 524155, at *4. (holding no waiver of immunity because jury had found bus driver was not negligent).
Under Texas law, in cases involving common carriers, a motor vehicle operator, like a bus driver, would be liable if he or she failed to exercise a "high degree of care." See Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg By & Through Lindburg , 766 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex. 1989) (recognizing that Texas imposes a higher standard of care on motor vehicle operators involving common carriers); Transit Mgmt. Co. of Laredo v. Sanchez , 886 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (stating bus company, as a carrier of passengers, owes high degree of foresight and prudence). Thus, contrary to VIA's assertion, the motor-driven vehicle exception is not limited to tort claims alleging only an ordinary standard of care; rather, the exception incorporates whatever standard of care, including a "high degree of care," may be applicable to the case.
We note that VIA disputes Meck's assertion that it is a common carrier, and we fully address this contention in the next portion of our opinion.
Here, at the charge conference, Meck essentially argued VIA was a common carrier and its bus driver would be personally liable under Texas law because he allegedly breached a "high degree of care" to which he is allegedly subject. We therefore conclude that for the purposes of waiver of immunity, the motor-driven vehicle exception is satisfied; accordingly, immunity is waived under the TTCA. See Williamson County v. Voss , 284 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (holding waiver of immunity under section 101.021(1)(B) is satisfied because appellant alleged employees breached duty for which they would be personally liable regardless of ultimate determination of fault by fact finder); Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Willis , 163 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (holding claim that bus driver was negligent by failing to properly stop bus close to curb was sufficient to state cause of action within the motor-driven vehicle exception to governmental immunity under TTCA).
2. Whether VIA is a Common Carrier
As stated above, VIA also challenges the jury charge by arguing the charge erroneously imposes a "high degree of care" standard because it is not a common carrier. VIA contends it is not a common carrier because it is not "in business" and its primary function is governmental.
Applicable Law
"It is well settled that common carriers are held to a higher standard of care when transporting passengers." Elmer , 124 S.W.3d at 212. According to the Texas Supreme Court, "common carriers" are "those in the business of carrying passengers and goods who hold themselves out for hire by the public." Id. The supreme court has instructed that "[w]hen determining whether someone who provides transportation is a common carrier, we look to their primary function." Id. at 213. The court has further explained, "[i]t must be determined whether the business of the entity is public transportation or whether such transportation is ‘only incidental’ to its primary business." Id. Based on this test, common carriers have included: "railroads, buses, airplanes, taxis, street cars, and other vehicles." Id. at 212–13. On the other hand, school bus drivers, tow truck drivers, and speed boat operators have been held not to be common carriers. Id.
Application
This court has not previously addressed whether VIA is a common carrier. Additionally, this court has not seen cases which have challenged the application of the "high degree of care" standard to VIA. However, under the primary function test, the "high degree of care" standard has been applied to similar transit authorities, such as the Dallas Area Rapid Transit ("DART"), which operates bus service for the Dallas area. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Jackson , 450 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tex. 1970) (stating bus company "as a carrier of passengers, is under a duty to exercise such a high degree of foresight as to possible dangers and such a high degree of prudence in guarding against them, as would be used by a very cautious, prudent and competent man under the same or similar circumstances"); Morris , 434 S.W.3d at 758 (holding DART is common carrier and subject to "high degree of care" standard); Johnson v. Metro. Transit Auth. , No. 01-99-00978-CV, 2001 WL 1243646, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 18, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (holding trial court did not err by submitting pattern jury charge on high degree of care for common carrier where passenger alleged injury on METRO bus); Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Perkins , No. 05-94-01557-CV, 1995 WL 379247, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 30, 1995, no writ) (not designated for publication) (applying "high degree of care" standard without discussing whether DART was a common carrier in passenger suit for injuries sustained on DART bus).
Most recently, in Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Morris , the Dallas Court of Appeals held Dallas Area Rapid Transit ("DART") was a common carrier subject to the "high degree of care" standard. Morris , 434 S.W.3d at 757. In that case, David Morris was injured when he fell while riding on a bus operated by DART. Id. at 755. Morris sued DART, alleging his injuries were caused by the negligent operation of the bus driver. Id. The jury charge included a definition for "high degree of care," and the jury found the bus driver to be 75 percent responsible and Morris to be 25 percent responsible. Id. Morris was awarded damages for past medical expenses, past loss of earning capacity, and past and future pain, mental anguish and physical impairment. Id. On appeal, DART argued the trial court erred in submitting the definition to the jury because the "high degree of care" standard only applied to common carriers, and DART was not a common carrier. Id.
DART advanced three reasons in support of its contention that it was not a common carrier: "(1) the TTCA limited waiver of immunity for personal injury arising from the negligent operation of a motor-driven vehicle [did] not impose common carrier status or a ‘high degree of care’ standard on the governmental entity; (2) as a ‘regional transportation authority’ under the Texas Transportation Code, DART [was] not operated for a profit; is funded in part by grants and tax dollars; and the fares charged do not equal the cost to provide the service; and (3) there [was] nothing in the record in this case to establish that DART [was] in the ‘business’ of carrying passengers for hire because there is no evidence that Morris paid a fare to ride the bus on the day in question." Id. at 758.
The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed, rejecting each of the arguments advanced by DART. Id. The court reasoned the TTCA did not provide what standards of care should apply in a negligence suit. Id. at 759. Rather, the TTCA references Texas law for standards of care, and under Texas law, a common carrier owes a "high degree of care" to its passenger. Id. Second, the court pointed out that the test for determining whether DART was a common carrier was the primary function test – not whether the carrier operated for profit or whether the carrier obtained its funding from grants and tax dollars. Id. With regard to DART's last argument, the court held the evidence established DART engaged in the transportation of people because the record reflects a number of individuals utilized DART for commuting purposes. Id.
We find Morris persuasive and applicable here. Like DART, VIA argues it is not a common carrier because it is not "in the ‘business’ of transportation" and it is not a business for profit. VIA contends that it instead furthers a governmental purpose of providing a service to the public. However, VIA's argument ignores the primary function test.
In deciding whether VIA is a common carrier, we must apply the primary function test as instructed by the Texas Supreme Court. See id. Under this test, we must decide "whether the business of [VIA] is public transportation or whether such transportation is ‘only incidental’ to [VIA's] primary business." Elmer , 124 S.W.3d at 212. It is undisputed VIA is a transit authority. And although it may not be a business for profit, VIA's primary function is public transportation as it transports people from place to place notwithstanding the source of its funding. We therefore conclude VIA is a common carrier.
VIA, however, urges this court not to follow Morris , arguing its primary function is purely governmental as opposed to proprietary. For support, it points to the proprietary-governmental dichotomy often cited in immunity cases. Most recently, the discussion of this dichotomy was explored in Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville , 489 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2016). In that case, the Texas Supreme Court defined governmental acts as those "[a]cts done as a branch of the state – such as when a city ‘exercise[s] powers conferred on [it] for purposes essentially public ... pertaining to the administration of general laws made to enforce the general policy of the state." Id. at 433. On the other hand, "[a]cts that are proprietary in nature, therefore, are not done as a branch of the state but instead ‘for the private advantage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants.’ " Id.
Although this court has recognized the governmental functions provided by VIA, the proprietary-governmental dichotomy is not applicable in determining whether a governmental entity is a common carrier. See Martinez , 38 S.W.3d at 175 ; Salvatierra v. VIA Metro. Transit Auth. , 974 S.W.2d 179, 182–84 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (classifying function of San Antonio bus transportation system as exclusively governmental for tort immunity purposes). Rather, the dichotomy is explored when determining whether governmental immunity is waived. See Salvatierra , 974 S.W.2d at 184 (pointing out matter of what is or is not governmental is for tort immunity purposes). VIA also recognizes the dichotomy has not been considered when analyzing the primary function of a transit authority; nonetheless, VIA urges this court to consider the proprietary-governmental distinction to determine if VIA is a common carrier, arguing the primary function test that is used by the Texas Supreme Court is outdated. We decline to accept VIA's invitation to abandon the primary function test and conclude the primary function test is the test we must use to determine whether an entity is a common carrier. Elmer , 124 S.W.3d at 212.
Applying that test, we hold the primary function of VIA is public transportation, and therefore, VIA is a common carrier subject to a "high degree of care" standard. See id. ; Morris , 434 S.W.3d at 757. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by including the "high degree of care" standard applicable to a common carrier in the jury charge.
Legal Sufficiency
In its second issue on appeal, VIA argues there is no evidence to support a finding that VIA's bus driver failed to exercise ordinary care, and therefore, it is entitled to a new trial using the ordinary standard of care. According to VIA, the evidence is insufficient because Meck was required to produce expert testimony to establish VIA's bus driver breached an ordinary standard of care, but Meck only produced testimony from the bus line instructor and VIA's vice president for safety support regarding VIA's bus safety standards.
In response, Meck argues there is ample evidence in the record to support the jury's finding that VIA was negligent. Meck asserts that contrary to VIA's argument, expert testimony is not required to establish VIA's negligence. Meck further contends the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that VIA breached the applicable "high degree of care" standard.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Whether expert testimony is necessary to establish the applicable standard of care is a question we review de novo. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham , 154 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2004). "Expert testimony is required when an issue involves matters beyond jurors' common understanding." Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez , 206 S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2006) ; see Fulgham , 154 S.W.3d at 90 ("Expert testimony is necessary when the alleged negligence is of such a nature as not to be within the experience of the layman.").
Application
VIA's contention that there is no evidence establishing its alleged negligence because there is no expert testimony is premised on its theory that the bus driver breached an ordinary standard of care owed to Meck. Having held above that VIA is a common carrier subject to a "high degree of care" standard, we note that VIA's complaint erroneously assumes the standard of care to be applied is ordinary. Nowhere in its brief does VIA contend expert testimony is required to establish breach of a "high degree of care" standard. To the contrary, this court has found that expert testimony is not always necessary to establish breach of a "high degree of care." See Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Covarrubias , 400 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding jury competent enough to determine whether appellant used high degree of care in handling torpedoes without benefit of expert testimony). Rather, as stated above, expert testimony is required only when an issue involves a matter beyond a lay person's common understanding. See Tamez , 206 S.W.3d at 583 ; Fulgham , 154 S.W.3d at 90.
Here, Meck based his negligence claim on the fact that the bus driver left the bus stop at a high rate of speed while the doors of the bus were open and then abruptly stopped. Understanding that it is not safe to start a vehicle with the doors open and then abruptly stop the vehicle shortly after starting it does not fall beyond a lay person's common understanding. See Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey , 151 Tex. 359, 250 S.W.2d 379, 382 (1952) (holding that the matter of safely stopping bus on highway covered in ice did not lie within filed properly subject to expert opinion testimony). VIA, however, relies on this court's opinion in Greater San Antonio Transp. Co. v. Polito , No. 04-10-00330-CV, 2011 WL 2893080 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 20, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) for the proposition that the alleged negligence flowed from the use of specialized equipment or industry standards applicable to a metropolitan bus. In that case, we held expert testimony was required; however, we were careful to point out that the negligence claims were based on the use of specialized dispatch equipment unique to taxi cabs — the use of which is unfamiliar to a lay person. See id. ; see also VIA Metro. Transit v. Garcia , 397 S.W.3d 702, 711 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 2012, pet. denied) (Barnard, J., dissenting) (referencing Polito ). Unlike Polito , Meck's claim that the bus driver was negligent was not based on his use of specialized equipment or training, but rather on commonly understood principles of driving. See Tamez , 206 S.W.3d at 583 ; see Fulgham , 154 S.W.3d at 90. Thus, we conclude expert testimony was not required to establish VIA's negligence.
Moreover, even if expert testimony was required, the jury heard evidence from both the bus driver's line instructor and VIA's vice president of safety that the bus driver should not have abruptly stopped when Meck signaled that he needed to get off the bus at an undesignated stop. Thus, such testimony constitutes some evidence from which reasonable jurors could have believed the bus driver failed to exercise a "high degree of care" owed by VIA. Accordingly, we overrule VIA's final issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment.