Summary
finding Illinois was the place of conduct in a failure-to-warn case reasoning plaintiffs first encountered and had opportunity to inspect faulty tires in Illinois
Summary of this case from Alexander v. Abbott Labs., Inc. (In re Depakote)Opinion
Case Number: 98-C-2657
February 4, 1999
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Vhora et al. ("Plaintiffs") have filed this action seeking damages for injuries sustained from the blowout of an allegedly defective tire pursuant to 740 ILCS 180 / 0.01 et seq. This Court exercises jurisdiction based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties. Plaintiffs assert several claims of liability against the movant, Defendant Michelin North America ("Defendant" or "Michelin"), including negligence claims, product liability claims, negligence spoilation claims, and failure to warn claims. Defendant has filed an unopposed motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' spoilation and failure to warn claims, and for the reasons set forth below, that motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant's motion is unopposed. Plaintiffs have failed to provide the Court with a 12(N) statement as required by local rule. Therefore, the Court assumes for the purpose of this motion that all the facts presented in Defendant's 12(M) statement are true.Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d at 1112 (7th Cir. 1994).
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This cause of action arises from a single motor vehicle accident which occurred on August 22, 1992. On August 21, 1992, the day before the accident, Plaintiff Usman Vhora executed the rental agreement for a 1989 Dodge 350 Bus. Prior to renting the vehicle, plaintiffs Yunus Vhora and Usman Vhora briefly inspected the vehicle and noticed the tires were shiny and "looked new".
On August 22, 1992, eighteen of the nineteen plaintiffs were passengers in the rented bus. Plaintiffs were traveling west outside of Sulphur Springs, Texas, when the left rear tire of the incident vehicle allegedly "blew out". The incident tire was a Michelin XCH-4 M+S All Season Radial Light Truck Tire, Model LT225/75R16 ("the tire", "the incident tire"). The bus rolled over several times causing three fatalities and allegedly causing injuries to surviving passengers.
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs originally filed this action in 1992 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiffs were domiciled in Illinois at all times relevant to this case. In the original action, Plaintiffs named as defendants the driver of the incident vehicle and Insurance Rental Car Company ("IRC"). In 1994, Plaintiffs amended their original complaint omitting the driver as a defendant, and instead naming as defendants: IRC, Tommy House Tire Company, Inc., Everybody's Oil Company, Michelin North America, Inc.("Michelin"), and Chrysler Corporation ("Chrysler"). In April 1997, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the original action. In January 1998, Plaintiffs reached a settlement with IRC.
In March of 1998, Plaintiffs filed the present action, a refiling of the 1992 action, in the Circuit Court of Cook County. In the present filing Plaintiffs named only Michelin and Chrysler as defendants. On April 30, 1998, Defendants removed the action to this Court. Defendant Michelin is domiciled in South Carolina. On May 5, 1998 Michelin filed an answer to the complaint. On October 13, 1998 Michelin moved for partial summary judgment. The Court set the date by which Plaintiffs were to respond to Michelin's motion for summary judgment as October 27, 1998. Plaintiffs failed to respond by October 27, 1998. On November 12, 1998, while the parties appeared before the Court on another matter, Plaintiffs requested in open court an opportunity to respond late to Michelin's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs asserted they were unclear as to the response deadline. The Court declined to extend Plaintiffs' time to respond noting that Plaintiffs were afforded ample opportunity to respond to Defendant's motion, or to request more time, but instead ignored the matter altogether. On December 29, 1998 the Court granted summary judgment to Chrysler, leaving Michelin as the sole defendant in this action.
II. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is to be granted when no dispute of material fact exists between the parties. The Court must view the evidence making all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no material issue exists for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Once the movant has properly supported his motion, the nonmoving party must offer specific facts demonstrating that a material dispute indeed exists. Id. "The non-moving party, however, may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial."Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1998). A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgement. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that there exists a material issue for trial with regard to either their their failure to warn claims or their negligent spoilation claims. As a result, summary judgment must be granted on these counts.
A. FAILURE TO WARN
As a preliminary matter, the Court must determines what law governs Plaintiffs' failure to warn claims. To determine what law governs, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction look to the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Under Illinois choice of law rules, this Court must apply the "Most Significant Relationship Test" from the Restatement of Conflicts (1969) to determine what law governs the instant claims. Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42 (1970). Generally in tort actions, the Court considers the following four factors: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct occurred; (3) the domicile, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; (4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42 (1970). Usually in practice, the Most Significant Relationship Test means in tort actions that the law of the place where the injury occurred will govern, unless another state has a more significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties. Fedrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 144 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1998).
In the instant case, the injury that allegedly resulted from Defendant's failure to warn took place in Texas, the scene of the accident. Nonetheless, the Court finds that Illinois has the most significant relationship to the failure to warn claims. First, Illinois is the place where the conduct, in this case an omission, allegedly causing the injury occurred. If Michelin failed to warn Plaintiffs anywhere it was in Illinois. Illinois is the location where Plaintiffs first encountered and had an opportunity to inspect the tire. Illinois is, therefore, the only location where Plaintiffs could reasonably have been warned. Further, Plaintiffs are domiciled in Illinois. Finally, the place where the parties' relationship is centered is Illinois. The commercial transaction that underpins this product liability action occurred when Plaintiffs' rented Defendant's product, via a rental car company, in Illinois. The Court therefore concludes that Illinois has the most significant relationship to this claim despite the injury occurring in Texas, and therefore Illinois law controls.
Under Illinois law, for Plaintiffs to prevail at trial on their failure to warn claims, they would bear the burden of demonstrating the following three elements: (1) Defendant knew or should have know of the dangerous propensity of its product; (2) Defendant failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs; (3) Defendant's failure to warn was the proximate cause of injury to Plaintiffs. Woodill v. Parke Davis Co., 79 Ill.2d 26 (1980).
Here, Plaintiffs fail to offer evidence sufficient to support the first or third element. There is no evidence on record that Defendant knew or should have known of the "dangerous propensity" of its product. Nor is there evidence on record that Plaintiffs would have avoided the injury but for Defendant's failure to adequately warn. In fact, the undisputed facts indicate that Plaintiffs made only a cursory inspection of the tires prior to renting the incident vehicle.
The only evidence Plaintiffs offer with regard to their failure to warn claims is the testimony of William Nonamaker. Nonamaker testified that he believes an "appropriate" warning should have been included with the tire and at all points of sale. However, Nonamaker does not specify what information Michelin ought to have provided Plaintiffs to avoid these injuries. Nor is he qualified to so opine. Nonamaker is not a warnings expert. As Nonamaker is not qualified as an expert to testify on the issue of the adequacy of the warnings on the incident tire, his testimony does very little to help Plaintiffs. Further, even if his testimony were credible with regard to the necessity of having an appropriate warning on the incident tire, it does not speak to the issue of Michelin's knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the tire, or to the issue of these particular Plaintiffs avoiding injury but for the lack of warning. Therefore, because Plaintiffs have not supported two essential elements of their failure to warn claim with evidence sufficient to support a verdict in their favor, summary judgment must be granted for Defendant on the failure to warn claims.
B. NEGLIGENT SPOILATION OF EVIDENCE
Defendant has also moved for summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' negligent spoilation of evidence claims. Plaintiffs contend that Michelin breached its duty to, "exercise due care and caution so as not to lose, misplace or destroy evidence and to affirmatively preserve evidence which a reasonable person in the defendant's position should have foreseen was material to a potential civil action." Complaint at ¶ 6. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant, "carelessly and negligently or willfully and wantonly lost or destroyed evidence which the Defendant reasonably knew or should have known or anticipated would be necessary to the Plaintiffs to prove their cause of action." Complaint at ¶ 7.
Again, the initial matter for the Court is to determine what law will govern this claim. As discussed above, the Court must use the Illinois Most Significant Relationship Test to ascertain what law controls this claim, which means considering: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct occurred; (3) the domicile, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. Ingersoll v. Klien, 46 Ill.2d 42 (1970).
At first blush, the choice of law determination for this cause of action seems similar to the failure to warn claim analysis outlined above:
(1) The alleged injury here is that Plaintiffs' ability to litigate their case has been diminished. As the case is being litigated in Illinois, Illinois is the place where that injury occurred.
(2) The place where the conduct occurred is South Carolina, where Defendant formulated and implemented its policy of destroying the information which Plaintiffs now desire.
(3) Plaintiffs are domiciled in Illinois, and Defendant is domiciled in South Carolina.
(4) The place where the parties' relationship is centered is still Illinois.
Weighing these factors with an eye to the tort choice of law paradigm that prioritizes the place of injury, it would seem that Illinois law should control this cause of action.
However, in the case of Plaintiffs' negligent spoilation of evidence claims, the choice of law analysis cannot begin and end with a mechanical tallying of the most significant relationship factors. With such a claim the Court must particularly bear in mind the meta-policy concerns which underlie choice of law principals such as, "the relevant policies of the forum and other interested states; protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;[and] certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result." In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981). To properly determine which state has the most significant relationship to the tort at hand, the Court must afford slightly different weight to these four factors than is indicated by the failure to warn analysis above. There are two reasons for this shift in the analysis: (1) the injury here is pecuniary in nature; and (2) the cause of action here centers on corporate codes of conduct.
First, the injury complained of is pecuniary in nature. Plaintiffs claim that as a result of Defendant's alleged negligence or misconduct, Plaintiffs' ability to fairly litigate this suit has been impaired. Where the injury complained of is pecuniary in nature, the place where the injury occurred becomes less important in determining which state has the most significant relationship. Stavrioh's v. Litwin, 710 F. Supp. 216 (N.D.Ill. 1988). This is true partly because it is often difficult to determine the location where one's pecuniary interests were injured. See, Restatement (second) of Conflict of laws, Sec. 148 (1971). Therefore, for purposes of choice of law analysis, the place of injury is given less weight by the Court than it ordinarily would be given in a tort action.
Secondly, the cause of action here centers on corporate codes of conduct, specifically document retention policies. Plaintiffs allege that by destroying certain documents relating to the manufacturing process used to create the incident tire, Defendant has impermissibly interfered with Plaintiffs' ability to prove their product liability case. Implicit in this claim is the allegation that Defendant was under a duty to retain such information. Such an allegation challenges the appropriateness of Defendant's corporate policy to destroy such information. Where a cause of action centers on corporate codes of conduct the choice of law analytical emphasis properly shifts to the place where the conduct occurred. Stavrioh's v. Litwin, 710 F. Supp. 216 (N.D.Ill. 1988). This is primarily because the state in which the conduct occurs has a significant interest in regulating the conduct of its corporate domiciliaries, and therefore choice of law principles are well served by honoring that state's relationship to the tort in question. Further, "holding a defendant corporation accountable to its principal place of business serves choice of law interests in certainty, predictability and expectation." In re Colorado Air Crash, 867 F. Supp. 630, 635 (N.D.Ill. 1994). Here, the conduct which created the alleged injury took place in South Carolina, where Defendant's document retention policies were established and implemented.
Therefore, in revisiting the choice of law factors relevant to determine which state has the most significant relationship to this tort, the Court finds that the most important factor in this cause of action is the place where the complained of conduct occurred, which is South Carolina. Also, while South Carolina is not the place where the pecuniary injury occurred, this factor is less important than where the conduct took place. Further, South Carolina is the domicile of one of the parties. Finally, while Illinois is the place where the parties' relationship is centered, and the place where the pecuniary injury occurred, the Court finds these contacts do not outweigh South Carolina's interest in regulating the conduct of its corporate domiciliaries. Therefore, South Carolina has the most significant relationship to this cause of action, and South Carolina law will govern it.
The interests of the place where the parties' relationship is centered is relatively low compared to a state's interest in protecting its domiciliaries. See, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981)
Applying South Carolina law to Plaintiffs' negligent spoilation of evidence claims, the Court finds that summary judgment must be granted to Defendant, as South Carolina does not recognize a negligent spoilation of evidence cause of action. Goewey v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 1268 (D.S.C. 1995). As no such claim exists under the applicable law, there can be no material fact in dispute, and summary judgment is appropriate for these claims.
In declining to recognize negligent spoilation of evidence as a cause of action, South Carolina is in the majority. Forty-two states do not recognize negligent spoilation of evidence as a cause of action. See, Margaret O'Mara Frosard Neal S. Gainsberg, Spoilation of Evidence in Illinois: The Law After Boyd v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 28 LOY. U. CHI., L.J. 685 (1997).
To conclude, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that a material fact is in dispute with regard to either their failure to warn or negligent spoilation of evidence claims. As a result, summary judgment will be entered for Defendant on these claims.
ORDERED: Defendant Michelin's motion for partial summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiffs' negligent spoilation claims (Counts XIX — XXVII), and Plaintiffs' failure to warn claims. All other counts and claims will proceed to trial.