Our court has said, on several occasions, that the determination of custody of minor children by the trial court is subject to the "clearly erroneous" provisions of Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910, 914 (N.D. 1975). See also, Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790, 792 (N.D. 1978). Although, generally, trial courts are not required to prepare findings on motions under Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, there is an exception to motions involving a modification of child custody. The fact-finding process is necessary in this situation to facilitate a proper determination concerning whether there has been a material change in circumstances to justify a change in custody.
Such a practice is frowned upon. See, Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751-752 (3rd Cir. 1965) (this practice viewed with disfavor in majority of Federal District Courts); Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790, 797 (N.D. 1978). In challenging a tax assessment ruling, Associates has two presumptions to overcome:
He argues the district court erred in adopting her proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment verbatim, rather than making its own determination and issuing its own findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (7) ; McDowell v. McDowell , 2003 ND 174, ¶ 8, 670 N.W.2d 876 (quoting Schmidkunz v. Schmidkunz , 529 N.W.2d 857, 858 (N.D. 1995) ) (" ‘When the [district] court affixes its signature to the findings, even though drafted by counsel, they become the findings of the court, and if they adequately explain the basis of the court’s decision,’ the findings will be upheld."); see also Dale Expl., LLC v. Hiepler , 2018 ND 271, ¶ 8, 920 N.W.2d 750 ; Vetter v. Vetter , 267 N.W.2d 790, 792 (N.D. 1978).[¶2] Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
Schmidkunz v. Schmidkunz, 529 N.W.2d 857, 858 (N.D. 1995); Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 553 N.W.2d 215, 218 (N.D. 1996). "When the trial judge affixes his signature to the findings of fact they become the findings of the court."Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790, 792 (N.D. 1978). [¶ 9] Before signing the findings prepared by Sharon McDowell's attorney, the district court reviewed and revised them.
When the trial judge affixes his signature to the findings of fact they become the findings of the court irrespective of whether or not they have been prepared by counsel. Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1978)."D.G. Porter, Inc. v. Fridley, 373 N.W.2d 917, 920 (N.D. 1985). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the written findings made by the trial court are supported by the evidence.
Any conduct of a parent which adversely affects the welfare of the child is regarded as a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant a change of custody. E.g., Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1978); Jordana v. Corley, 220 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1974); Goff v. Goff, 211 N.W.2d 850 (N.D. 1973). Therefore, we do not believe that every expressed condition can be condemned.
When the trial judge affixes his signature to the findings of fact they become the findings of the court irrespective of whether or not they have been prepared by counsel. Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1978). In this case, the trial judge requested proposed findings to be submitted by counsel for both parties, and the judge subsequently adopted the findings prepared by Porter's counsel.
Voskuil v. Voskuil, 256 N.W.2d 526, 530 (N.D. 1977). See also, Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1978); Matson v. Matson, 226 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1975); and Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829 (N.D. 1974). Compare, however, Struchynski v. Decker, 194 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1972) and Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960). Professor Davis in 2 Administrative Law Treatise § 16.06 (1958) describes the adequacy of administrative agency findings in relation to ". . . the need of the reviewing court for a clear view of the basis for the agency's action.
He is familiar with all of the facts involved in the dissolution of this family and in its history since that time. See Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790, 793 (N.D. 1978). During the hearing on Lynette's motion, the judge heard testimony from Lynette, her parents, Dale, his mother, his fiancee, and others. The trial judge is better able to ascertain the facts because he can listen to and observe the demeanor of the witnesses.
Nevertheless, if this court is to give trial court findings of fact the deference that Rule 52(a) contemplates, we must clearly understand how those findings support the conclusion reached. See, e.g., Vetter v. Vetter, 267 N.W.2d 790, 794-795 (N.D. 1978), and Ellendale Farmers Union Cooperative Ass'n v. Davis, 219 N.W.2d 829, 836 (N.D. 1974). We do not intend to imply that an unexplained finding that the contract "was given by mistake" or "obtained through fraud" would be alone adequate.