A party who is damaged has a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3 (1989). "Factors taken into consideration in determining if a landlord has acted reasonably include, but are not limited to: the rental rate at which the landlord attempted to re-let the premises; the marketing efforts used; and the market rental rate for similar such units."

A party who is damaged has a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3 (1989). "Factors taken into consideration in determining if a landlord has acted reasonably include, but are not limited to: the rental rate at which the landlord attempted to re-let the premises; the marketing efforts used; and the market rental rate for similar such units."

We agree with Landmark, however, that the trial court improperly raised this issue sua sponte. Although a plaintiff does have a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable effort under the circumstances of a particular case is a question of fact for the trier”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3, 560 A.2d 980 (1989); and “[t]he burden of proving that the injured party could have avoided some or all of his or her damages ... rests on the party accused of the tortious act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

We agree with Landmark, however, that the trial court improperly raised this issue sua sponte. Although a plaintiff does have a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages, “[w]hat constitutes a reasonable effort under the circumstances of a particular case is a question of fact for the trier”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3, 560 A.2d 980 (1989); and “[t]he burden of proving that the injured party could have avoided some or all of his or her damages ... rests on the party accused of the tortious act.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

We have often said in the contracts and torts contexts that the party receiving a damage award has a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. Preston v. Keith, supra, 217 Conn. 16 and n. 5; Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3, 560 A.2d 980 (1989); West Haven Sound Development Corp. v. West Haven, 201 Conn. 305, 332, 514 A.2d 734 (1986). "What constitutes a reasonable effort under the circumstances of a particular case is a question of fact for the trier."

"The general rule of damages in a breach of contract action is that the award should place the injured party in the same position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3, 560 A.2d 980 (1989); West Haven Sound Development Corporation v. West Haven, 207 Conn. 308, 317, 541 A.2d 858 (1988); Danpar Associates v. Somersville Mills Sales Room, Inc., 182 Conn. 444, 446, 438 A.2d 708 (1980); Johnson v. Healy, 176 Conn. 97, 105, 405 A.2d 54 (1978); Bachman v. Fortuna, 145 Conn. 191, 194, 141 A.2d 477 (1958); see also 3 Restatement (Second), Contracts 344(a), 347(a) and (b), and comments contained therein." Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 492-93, 572 A.2d 978 (1990). "

The general rule of damages in a breach of contract action is that the award should place the injured party in the same position as he would have been in had the contract been performed. Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3, 560 A.2d 980 (1989); West Haven Sound Development Corporation v. West Haven, 207 Conn. 308, 317, 541 A.2d 858 (1988); Danpar Associates v. Somersville Mills Sales Room, Inc., 182 Conn. 444, 446, 438 A.2d 708 (1980); Johnson v. Healy, 176 Conn. 97, 105, 405 A.2d 54 (1978); Bachman v. Fortuna, 145 Conn. 191, 194, 141 A.2d 477 (1958); see also 3 Restatement (Second), Contracts 344(a), 347(a) and (b), and comments contained therein. In this instance, had the contract been performed, the plaintiff would have received $60,000 from an insurer, to dispose of at her discretion.

The plaintiffs also correctly note that attorney's fees permitted under the provisions of a lease must be reasonable. See Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 5-6, 560 A.2d 980 (1989); Matyas v. Minck, 37 Conn. App. 321, 336, 655 A.2d 1155 (1995). The plaintiffs, however, have not brought to our attention any evidence demonstrating that the defendant was not entitled to any or all of the legal fees deducted from the security deposit because the fees were unreasonable.

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 3-4, 560 A.2d 980 (1989). We review the court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard.

The trial court relied on this provision when it allowed the evidence of the attorney's fees and the plaintiffs' recovery of those fees. "`[A] contract clause providing for reimbursement of "incurred" fees permits recovery [of such fees] upon the presentation of an attorney's bill, so long as that bill is not unreasonable upon its face and has not been shown to be unreasonable by countervailing evidence or by the exercise of the trier's own expert judgment.'" Vespoli v. Pagliarulo, 212 Conn. 1, 5-6, 560 A.2d 980 (1989), quoting Storm Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 186 Conn. 237, 246, 440 A.2d 306 (1982). The plaintiffs in this case presented their attorney's bill.