We next consider the husband's arguments concerning Supreme Court's separate property determinations and distribution of the parties' marital property. First, although the husband's Chase savings account was held in his name alone, it was opened during the marriage and, thus, it was his burden to prove that it was separate property ( see Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1004, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013];Judson v. Judson, 255 A.D.2d 656, 657, 679 N.Y.S.2d 465 [1998];Seidman v. Seidman, 226 A.D.2d 1011, 1012, 641 N.Y.S.2d 431 [1996] ). While it is undisputed that, prior to the marriage, the husband received approximately $132,000 as a personal injury award—which would constitute separate property ( seeDomestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][d] [2] )—his testimony concerning the location of these funds was not credible or consistent. As the husband failed to carry his burden to establish that the savings account was separate property, it was properly classified and equitablydistributed as marital property ( see Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d at 1004, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382;Murray v. Murray, 101 A.D.3d 1320, 1322, 956 N.Y.S.2d 252 [2012],lv. dismissed20 N.Y.3d 1085, 965 N.Y.S.2d 74, 987 N.E.2d 635 [2013];Steinberg v. Steinberg, 59 A.D.3d 702, 704, 874 N.Y.S.2d 230 [2009];compare D'Ambra v. D'Ambra, 94 A.D.3d 1532, 1535, 943 N.Y.S.2d 698 [2012] ).

We are not persuaded. A trial court has substantial discretion in fashioning an equitable distribution award, taking due account of the requisite statutory factors (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5] ; Roma v. Roma, 140 A.D.3d 1242, 1243, 32 N.Y.S.3d 703 [2016] ; Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1001, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013] ). Equitable distribution does not require a 50–50 distribution (seeVertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d at 1001, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 ).

We exercise our discretion and treat the husband's premature appeal from the decision and order as a valid appeal from the judgment (see Quarty v. Quarty, 96 A.D.3d 1274, 1275 n.1, 948 N.Y.S.2d 130 [2012]; Alessi v. Alessi, 289 A.D.2d 782, 782–783, 734 N.Y.S.2d 665 [2001] ).1 Supreme Court has “ ‘substantial discretion’ ” to fashion equitable distribution of marital property “ ‘based on the circumstances of each case, and the determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or failure to consider the requisite statutory factors' ” (Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1001, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013], quoting Williams v. Williams, 99 A.D.3d 1094, 1096, 952 N.Y.S.2d 662 [2012]; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d] ). Initially, Supreme Court's factual findings illustrate that it considered the requisite statutory factors (see Noble v. Noble, 78 A.D.3d 1386, 1387, 911 N.Y.S.2d 252 [2010]; Rosenkranse v. Rosenkranse, 290 A.D.2d 685, 686, 736 N.Y.S.2d 453 [2002] ). Turning to the record evidence relating to the husband's specific contentions, both parties testified that they shared marital assets throughout the marriage and maintained joint accounts from which they paid the mortgage payment and other household expenses. The wife testified that she primarily managed the funds for the household and deposited her monthly paycheck into either the parties' joint checking account or into the savings account from which she paid the mortgage, and that she paid all necessary expenses up until her departure from the marital home in May 2011. The husband testified that, while he wa

There is no requirement that each item of marital property be distributed equally and the trial court has discretion in fashioning a division of property ( see Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1001, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013];Quinn v. Quinn, 61 A.D.3d 1067, 1069, 876 N.Y.S.2d 720 [2009] ). However, relative parity is appropriate here in light of the 40–plus years of marriage and no factors justifying an unequal distributive award ( see Stahl v. Stahl, 80 A.D.3d 932, 933, 914 N.Y.S.2d 447 [2011];Baudisch v. Baudisch, 233 A.D.2d 834, 834, 649 N.Y.S.2d 895 [1996] ).

The husband, however, offered proof to the contrary as to the wife's direct contributions to his business. Presented with conflicting proof, the court did not credit the wife's testimony, and no basis exists to disturb its credibility determination (seeVertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1004, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013] ). As to the wife's indirect contributions, the court noted, and the evidence discloses, that the wife cared for the children and contributed to the overall household income while the husband worked.

In reaching the amount of $5,000, Supreme Court appropriately considered, among other things, the $8,000 that the husband paid to the wife in interim counsel fees, the amount of temporary maintenance and child support received by the wife, "the tremendous expenditures made by the husband to keep the family and the marital residence afloat during the pendency of [the action]" and the amount of the wife's income after the divorce, but before securing employment. As Supreme Court's award reflects a proper consideration of the parties' respective financial circumstances, as well as the circumstances of the case (see Johnson v. Chapin, 12 N.Y.3d 461, 467, 881 N.Y.S.2d 373, 909 N.E.2d 66 [2009] ; Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1004–1005, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013] ), the court did not abuse its considerable discretion in awarding the wife $5,000 in postjudgment counsel fees (see Robinson v. Robinson, 133 A.D.3d 1185, 1191, 21 N.Y.S.3d 392 [2015] ; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 91 A.D.3d 1107, 1109, 937 N.Y.S.2d 355 [2012] ). To the extent that the wife asserts that the proceedings were unfair because the husband allegedly spent more in legal fees, we note that the wife was free to use her temporary maintenance to supplement the interim and postjudgment counsel fee awards.

To the extent that the failure to include such an adjustment was an oversight, remittal is necessary to allow Supreme Court to include such a provision if that was its original intent (see Smith v. Smith, 1 A.D.3d at 873, 769 N.Y.S.2d 306 ). We also agree with the wife that the husband's child support obligation should have been made retroactive to June 19, 2012, the date the wife made such demand in her summons with notice (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][7][a] ; Smith v. Smith, 116 A.D.3d 1139, 1142, 983 N.Y.S.2d 341 [2014] ; Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1006, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013] ). Next, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to direct the husband to name the wife as sole and irrevocable beneficiary of the husband's life insurance policies in order to secure his outstanding maintenance and child support obligations (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [8][a] ; Murray v. Murray, 101 A.D.3d 1320, 1325, 956 N.Y.S.2d 252 [2012], lv. dismissed 20 N.Y.3d 1085, 965 N.Y.S.2d 74, 987 N.E.2d 635 [2013] ). Indeed, a trial court may, in its discretion, direct a spouse to purchase life insurance to secure payments for the maintenance and support of a dependent spouse or unemancipated child (see Hartog v. Hartog, 85 N.Y.2d 36, 50, 623 N.Y.S.2d 537, 647 N.E.2d 749 [1995] ; Murray v. Murray, 101 A.D.3d at 1325, 956 N.Y.S.2d 252 ).

The motion was denied and the wife now appeals from both the judgment of divorce and the order denying her motion.Whether a particular asset is marital or separate property is a question of law that a trial court must initially address to ascertain the marital estate (see Fields v. Fields, 15 N.Y.3d 158, 161, 905 N.Y.S.2d 783, 931 N.E.2d 1039 [2010] ). Property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage is presumed to be marital property, while property acquired before the marriage is presumed to be separate property (see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][1][c] ; [d][1]; Ceravolo v. DeSantis, 125 A.D.3d 113, 115, 1 N.Y.S.3d 468 [2015] ). It is well settled that Supreme Court's equitable distribution award " ‘will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or failure to consider the requisite statutory factors [under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d) ]’ " ( Robinson v. Robinson, 133 A.D.3d 1185, 1187, 21 N.Y.S.3d 392 [2015], quoting Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1001, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013] ). Notably, "equitable distribution does not require equal distribution" ( Fisher v. Fisher, 122 A.D.3d 1032, 1033, 996 N.Y.S.2d 759 [2014] ). When the record is sufficiently developed, this Court may, in the interest of judicial economy, make any adjustments necessary for the equitable distribution of the marital estate (see Mula v. Mula, 131 A.D.3d 1296, 1299, 16 N.Y.S.3d 868 [2015] ).

We note that Supreme Court's decision does not indicate whether the shared custody arrangement was considered as a specific factor, yet the court expressly found that the amount calculated was appropriate. In determining the husband's support obligation, the court properly applied the three-step method in calculating his proportional share of the basic child support obligation (see Bast v. Rossoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 726–727, 675 N.Y.S.2d 19, 697 N.E.2d 1009 [1998] ; compare Vertucci v. Vertucci, 103 A.D.3d 999, 1005, 962 N.Y.S.2d 382 [2013] ). Because the parties' combined incomes slightly exceeded the statutory cap of $141,000 (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1–b][c][3] ), the court noted that it had considered the statutory factors in utilizing the combined parental income in excess of the statutory cap (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1–b][c], [f] ).

The defendant's contention that he was entitled to a separate property credit for his contributions to the marital residence, the parcel of vacant land, the Ferrari, and the Mercedes SL550 is without merit. Although a party is generally entitled to a credit for any contribution of separate property utilized toward the purchase of a marital asset, the partial use of separate funds to acquire a marital asset does not mandate that a credit for separate funds be given (see Beardslee v Beardslee, 124 AD3d 969, 969; Vertucci v Vertucci, 103 AD3d 999, 1003; see also Fields v Fields, 15 NY3d 158, 166-168). Moreover, where separate property has been commingled with marital property, there is a presumption that the commingled funds constitute marital property (see Scher v Scher, 91 AD3d at 846; Massimi v Massimi, 35 AD3d 400, 402).