Opinion
No. NBSP-052921
February 1, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a summary process action brought by the plaintiff, Stacy Lynn Versachi, who seeks to recover possession of the residential premises known as 61 Holly Lane, Wethersfield, Connecticut (the "Premises") from the defendant, Anthony Lombardi. The plaintiff has filed a one-count complaint alleging nonpayment of rent. The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations and asserted the four following special defenses: 1. The plaintiff has no interest in the Premises; 2. The defendant has a life use in the Premises; 3. Unjust enrichment; and 4. The defendant is the beneficial owner of the Premises pursuant to a constructive trust. The plaintiff moved to strike the special defense of unjust enrichment, which motion was granted. A court trial was held on December 3 and continued on December 17, 2009. The plaintiff, a resident of Colorado, did not testify at the trial. Both parties were represented by counsel. The parties were granted until December 31, 2009 to file post-trial briefs concerning their respective legal claims.
The plaintiff's mother, Janice Versachi, brought the action and testified on the plaintiff's behalf pursuant to a power of attorney (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).
Background
The defendant purchased the lot on which he built the Premises in 1964. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) The defendant is eighty-nine years old and has lived in the Premises since 1964. Sometime in 2001, Janet Lynn moved to the Premises at the request of the defendant and the defendant transferred a one-half interest in the Premises to Lynn. No testimony was offered as to the payment of any monetary consideration for the transfer. The court heard conflicting testimony concerning the level of care that was needed by both Janet Lynn and the defendant and was actually provided to each other. In November of 2002, the defendant conveyed his remaining one-half interest in the Premises to Lynn for $50,000.00. Lynn subsequently transferred the Premises to the plaintiff by quitclaim deed dated August 12, 2003. Janet Lynn died in 2005. The defendant has continued to live in the Premises.
The deed recites the payment by the plaintiff of consideration of "$100,000.00" but Janice Versachi testified at trial that no monetary consideration was paid. Versachi also testified that Lynn wished to transfer the Premises to her but because she was "engaged in a business" and for other reasons, Janice Versachi requested that the Premises be transferred to her daughter.
The Plaintiff's Claim. CT Page 6527
The plaintiff's complaint alleges the following:"1. On or about July 1, 2009, the plaintiff, as lessor (landlord), and the defendant, as lessee (tenant), entered in to an oral month to month lease for rental of the following premises (apartment): 61 Holly Lane, Wethersfield, CT 06109.
2. The defendant agreed to pay the monthly rental of $500.00, payable on the 1st day of each month.
3. The defendant took possession of the premises pursuant to the oral month to month lease, and still occupies the premises."
The Defendant's Claims
The defendant claims that he had an agreement with Lynn that he could remain in the Premises for life. Attorney David Mester testified that he represented the defendant for many years and handled the transfer of the Premises. Mester testified that he heard Lynn agree at the closing that the defendant could remain in the Premises for life.
Legal Standard
"In a summary process action based on nonpayment of rent, the landlord must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the elements of the case. The essential elements are: (1) On or about a certain date, the landlord and the tenant entered into an oral or written, lease/rental agreement for a weekly/monthly/yearly term for use and occupancy of a certain premises; (2) The tenant agreed to pay an agreed-upon rent by a certain date; (3) The tenant took possession of the premises pursuant to the lease; (4) The tenant failed to pay the rent due under the lease by a certain date; (5) The landlord caused a proper Notice to Quit Possession to be served on the tenant to vacate the premises on or before a certain termination date; and (6) Although the time given in the Notice to Quit Possession of the premises has passed, the tenant remains in possession of the premises. See General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1)(D)." Klobocista v. Zappia, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Docket No. HDSP-141135 (Apr. 27, 2007) ( 2007 Ct.Sup. 5059).
As pointed out in Klobocista, in order for the plaintiff to prevail in this action brought for nonpayment of rent, it is necessary that the plaintiff prove the existence of a rental agreement.
Janice Versachi testified that she met with the defendant in July 2009 and told him that she needed money for real estate taxes. She testified that she told the defendant that he would have to pay her "at least $500 per month or that he would have to go." When asked by the plaintiff's attorney if the defendant "offered" to pay her any money, Versachi said "no." The defendant testified that he never made any agreement with Versachi to pay $500.00 per month nor any other sum as rent.
"[I]t is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to accept some, all or none of a witness's testimony." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hoffer v. Swan Lake Ass'n., Inc., 66 Conn.App. 858, 861, 786 A.2d 436 (2001).
"The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint." Gulycz v. Stop Shop Cos., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992). Failure of the plaintiff to establish any of the necessary elements, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, results in judgment for the defendant. Id.
The court finds that the plaintiff has not sustained her burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any agreement with the defendant which the essential element of her summary process action. Having found that the plaintiff has failed to sustain her burden of proof, it is not necessary to rule on the defendant's special defenses.
Judgment is entered in favor of the defendant.
So ordered.