Opinion
2013-01-29
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP, New York (David K. Kessler of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP, New York (David K. Kessler of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondent.
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Claire V. Merkine of counsel), attorney for the children.
Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Karen I. Lupuloff, J.), entered on or about February 27, 2012, which, following a hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1027, granted petitioner agency's application to remand the subject children to the agency pending resolution of the neglect proceeding, unanimously affirmed, without costs, and the stay of the order currently in effect continued for 60 days from the date of entry of this order.
The record supports the court's determination that the children's life or health was at imminent risk of harm (Family Court Act § 1027[b][i] ), given the strong evidence of educational neglect and the prior findings of educational and medical neglect ( see Matter of Annalize P. [Angie D.], 78 A.D.3d 413, 911 N.Y.S.2d 291 [1st Dept. 2010];see also Matter of Serenity S. [Iyesha A.], 89 A.D.3d 737, 739, 931 N.Y.S.2d 693 [2d Dept. 2011] ). The court correctly found that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the children's removal from the home, including agency referrals to various services ( see Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 378, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E.2d 840 [2004] ). Despite these efforts and prior neglect findings, the children's excessive lateness and absence from school continued. Accordingly, the court properly determined that, despite the harm of removal, it was in the children's best interests to remand them to the agency, rather than return them to respondent mother ( see id. at 366–367, 787 N.Y.S.2d 196, 820 N.E.2d 840).
However, respondent or any other interested party may move to vacate the Family Court's order ( seeFamily Court Act § 1061). At oral argument, the agency indicated that it would not oppose such a motion, given respondent's compliance *299with the terms and conditions of this Court's April 2012 order staying the Family Court's order ( see id.) The stay shall continue in effect for 60 days from the date of entry of this order.