Opinion
CV196017723
11-19-2019
VERNON HOUSING AUTHORITY v. Henry BROOKS
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Macierowski, J.
The plaintiff, Vernon Housing Authority (VHA), brings this summary process action against the defendant, Henry Brooks, seeking immediate possession of the defendant’s apartment located in the Franklin Park West housing complex in Vernon, CT.
The question before the court is whether the plaintiff may terminate the lease and evict the defendant, who is a protected tenant pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23c(a)(1)(B) due to his disability, based on his behavior, as set forth herein, toward the plaintiff’s employees and other tenants.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 4, 2018, the plaintiff caused a pretermination notice to be served on the defendant. The notice set forth specific instances between April and August 2018 when the defendant engaged in threatening, intimidating, and/or harassing conduct toward the plaintiff’s employees. The notice stated that such conduct violated the defendant’s lease agreement, violated his tenant responsibilities pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-11, and constituted a nuisance and/or a serious nuisance. The notice informed the defendant that his lease would terminate on September 17, 2018 unless he remedied his breach.
On February 28, 2019, the plaintiff caused a notice to quit to be served on the defendant with a quit date of March 21, 2019. In addition to the behavior alleged in the pretermination notice, the notice to quit cited instances of substantially similar behavior by the defendant directed at the plaintiff’s employees, as well as certain behavior directed at other Franklin Park West tenants, all of which occurred in late 2018 and early 2019, after the right to cure date and within six months of the pretermination notice.
The plaintiff filed a four-count complaint on May 20, 2019, alleging nuisance, lease violations, serious nuisance, and violations of tenant responsibilities pursuant to § 47a-11. The defendant filed an answer, denying the allegations in the complaint and raising as a special defense that he lives in a complex of five or more units and has a physical or mental disability. As additional information, the defendant wrote that he had a pending complaint against the plaintiff with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). The plaintiff replied, denying all special defenses and also stating that CHRO had dismissed the defendant’s complaint.
According to the CHRO Investigative Report, which the plaintiff attached to its Reply, the defendant filed his complaint on March 14, 2019, two weeks after he was served the Notice to Quit. The complaint was dismissed on June 17, 2019, after an investigation found no reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff discriminated against the defendant.
After a continuance at the plaintiff’s request for mediation and attempted settlement, the matter was tried before the court on August 9, 2019. The defendant represented himself at trial. In addition to the defendant, the court heard testimony from several of the plaintiff’s employees and Franklin Park West tenants. Numerous documents were submitted into evidence by both sides.
FACTS
The court has reviewed the pleadings, considered the evidence and testimony presented in light of the applicable principles of law, and weighed the credibility of the witnesses. The court finds the following facts to have been proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
The plaintiff operates the Franklin Park West housing complex where the defendant resides. The complex provides housing for qualified elderly and disabled tenants. The defendant has been a tenant pursuant to a written lease with the plaintiff for approximately two years. The defendant is thirty-two years old, on social security disability, and intellectually disabled. The plaintiff accommodated the defendant’s disability twice during his tenancy by moving him to different apartments at his request.
Betsy Soto currently serves as the plaintiff’s Executive Director. She has worked for the plaintiff for fifteen years. According to her testimony, which the court credits, soon after the defendant moved in, he began to engage in a pattern of behavior that caused her and other employees concern. During his frequent visits to the leasing office, the defendant aggressively yelled at employees and threatened to have them fired. After coming into the office for an apparent business purpose, he remained in or around the office for extended periods of time. He watched the employees and waited outside the office and in the employee parking area. This behavior occurred on a regular, if not daily, basis. Soto described the defendant’s behavior as mean, cruel, and tormenting.
At least five different employees complained to Soto about the defendant’s behavior. Three employees left the plaintiff’s employment due in part to the defendant’s behavior. While many of the plaintiff’s properties include elderly and disabled tenants, Soto testified that she has not experienced a situation with a tenant like this before.
Judy Hyde worked for the plaintiff for over five years, until August 2, 2019. During the time period at issue, she served as the property manager and had regular contact with the defendant. According to her testimony, which the court credits, the defendant repeatedly threatened to have her fired; and threatened to call the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the local health department, or other authorities. He called her names and mocked her by referring to her as a "whale." He told her that he hopes that she has a heart attack and dies.
Hyde was not the only target of the defendant’s erratic behavior. The defendant frequently called the office and left multiple messages a day, threatening to have employees fired if they did not call back right away. When he came into the office, he swore at the employees, threatened to have them fired, and made alarming and intimidating statements, such as "I know what car you drive" and "I know where you live." He also referred to the employees’ children or families. At times, the defendant stood outside the office or in the nearby parking area as if he was waiting for the employees to come out. Hyde described the defendant’s behavior as a "constant thing" that began in 2018 and continued into 2019, after the pretermination notice was filed.
Hyde was fearful of the defendant. She asked to be escorted to her vehicle whenever the defendant was in the area. On one occasion this past spring, the defendant was waiting outside the office when Hyde left for the day. As Hyde was leaving, the defendant stated: "I can go home now for dinner because she is leaving," indicating that he had been purposely waiting outside for Hyde to leave. Hyde left her job with the plaintiff due in part to the defendant’s behavior.
Hyde received complaints from other employees who were concerned about the defendant’s behavior and were fearful of him. Hyde accommodated their concerns by allowing them to leave early or work from a different area so that they could avoid being alone in the office with the defendant.
Hyde also testified as to an incident that occurred on the morning of August 22, 2018, which was the day of the plaintiff’s annual picnic. Hyde and other staff members were trying to set up for the picnic. The defendant kept interrupting. He yelled at them and told Hyde that she could be replaced with one phone call. He proceeded to call someone on the phone, and told that person that Hyde and Soto were bad people. He stated that he thought all women should be dunked in a dunk tank and that he would be the one to dunk them. Hyde asked him to leave several times. The incident went on for forty-five minutes. Hyde was upset, and the defendant’s conduct made it difficult for her and others to work.
As a result of this incident, the police were called by Soto and Hyde on a complaint of threatening. The police report was entered into evidence. The defendant told the police and testified at trial that he made the dunk tank comment because he had been to a carnival where the first selectman sat in a dunk tank. He thought that it would be a fun activity for the picnic. He stated that he did not intend to threaten Hyde or anyone else. The police gave him a verbal warning. While the court cannot conclude that the comment was intended to be threatening, it does conclude, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, that it was intended to harass and demean Hyde as well as the other female staff members present.
Hyde has worked in the housing business for sixteen years. During that time, she has worked with people with a variety of disabilities. She testified that she has never before encountered a situation like this one with a tenant.
Donna Weber is the Resident Coordinator for the plaintiff. She has worked there for twenty-five years. She testified credibly regarding an incident that occurred on April 4, 2018. The defendant was yelling and threatening to have Weber fired. He stated that he would "take care of her." Weber felt threatened. She created a record of the incident, which she gave to Soto. She testified that the defendant disrupted the office, threatened their jobs, and called Soto names. She testified that in her twenty-five years of experience, she never experienced such problems with a tenant.
Maria Patrella has been a tenant with the plaintiff for six years. She started out as friends with the defendant, but the relationship soured over time. Patrella is now afraid to sit outside her apartment because the defendant is always nearby. She hears him make statements like "I wish she would die."
However, her testimony contradicted and undermined the most serious allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint regarding the defendant’s behavior toward tenants. She testified regarding an incident, which is detailed in the complaint that occurred in early February 2019. The defendant showed her sexually explicit pictures of men, referred to her and her friend as lesbians, and made sexually inappropriate comments. The police were later called by the plaintiff’s staff as a result of this incident. While Patrella was clearly offended by this highly inappropriate conduct, she acknowledged that she and the defendant were friends at the time and socialized together. Indeed, the defendant submitted photos of the two together in Patrella’s apartment along with other tenants during social visits.
Patrella and the defendant ceased to be friends after the February 2019 incident described in the preceding paragraph. The defendant complained about residents, including Patrella, smoking on the patios just outside their apartments in violation of the plaintiff’s smoking policy. The smoke aggravated the defendant’s asthma. The defendant complained to the plaintiff about the tenants’ smoking. He pushed to have the plaintiff enforce the policy requiring residents to smoke at least twenty-five feet away from the apartments. According to Patrella, the defendant called the police six times on her to complain. These incidents appear to be the primary cause of the breakdown in the friendship between Patrella and the defendant.
With regard to the allegation in the complaint that the defendant entered apartments uninvited, Patrella stated that the defendant did enter her apartment uninvited while they were friends, but she did not mind. She acknowledged that he stopped entering her apartment after they stopped being friends. Her friend, Giselle Cormier, also denied that the defendant entered her apartment without permission. The court finds insufficient evidence to sustain this allegation.
The tenants testified that the defendant regularly walked repeatedly around the complex, talking in a loud voice, as if he wanted people to overhear. He looked at the residents and smirked at them in a manner that seemed intended to aggravate and provoke them. The defendant complained loudly about the office staff, called Hyde names, and threatened to have Hyde and other employees fired. One tenant testified that the defendant told him: "Women shouldn’t be in charge of anything."
As the defendant points out, he has never physically harmed any of the plaintiff’s employees or tenants, nor has he directly threatened physical harm. He has not damaged property. He has never been arrested for any of the alleged behavior. He believes that the plaintiff’s staff and residents are mad at him because of his persistent complaints about mold and the smoking policy. However, the court finds no evidence that the plaintiff retaliated against him because of his complaints or his disability.
Two tenants testified on the defendant’s behalf. They testified that the acrimony between some of the other residents and the defendant stems from his complaints about their smoking and his insistence on enforcing the smoking policy. They acknowledge that he can be loud and intimidating but state that they have never seen him act aggressively. One tenant testified that the defendant realized the trouble he had gotten himself into and has shown "self control" by not going into the leasing office alone since March 2019. The defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff on March 1, 2019, the day after he was served the notice to quit. In it, he promises to use phone and email to communicate with the plaintiff’s employees and to bring another person with him when he enters the office. Since that time, he has entered the plaintiff’s office just one time, accompanied by a neighbor. The defendant appeared calm, patient, and respectful throughout the hearing. The defendant testified that his voice is naturally loud due to his disability. While that may be true, several witnesses testified credibly that his voice was noticeably louder during the incidents in question than it was during the hearing and described his behavior at those times as aggressive. On the basis of his demeanor in court as well as the evidence and testimony indicating that the defendant significantly modified his behavior after the notice to quit was filed, the court finds that the defendant’s behavior prior to that and as set forth herein was both voluntary and intentional.
DISCUSSION
The Third Count- Serious Nuisance
All of the plaintiff’s claims other than serious nuisance (i.e., nuisance, violation of lease terms, and violation of tenant responsibilities) require a pretermination notice. General Statutes § 47a-15. Although the plaintiff did serve a pretermination notice on the defendant, said notice based the defendant’s breach only on his behavior toward the plaintiff’s employees. The notice contained no allegation that the defendant was threatening, harassing, or disturbing the peaceful enjoyment of fellow tenants. Thus, the defendant was given no notice that his behavior toward other tenants was a problem, or that such behavior might become the basis of his eviction. He had no opportunity to cure that behavior. Indeed, the behavior alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint involving fellow tenants occurred after the pretermination notice was served.
"The legislative purpose [of a pretermination ... notice] is to discourage summary evictions against first offenders ..." St. Paul’s Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn.App. 728, 734-35, 6 A.3d 1168 (2010). Therefore, "before a landlord may proceed with a summary process action, except in those situations specifically excluded, the landlord must first deliver a [pretermination] notice to the tenant specifying the alleged violations and offer the tenant a ... period to remedy." Id., 734. A pretermination notice "must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the information the tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction ... To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of § 47a-15 must be construed strictly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Harris, 225 Conn. 600, 605, 625 A.2d 816 (1993). For the right to cure to have meaning, (1) the pretermination notice must provide sufficient detail to apprise the tenant of the behavior constituting the breach so that he can cure such behavior, and (2) any subsequent summary process action must be based on "substantially the same act or omission" occurring within six months. Section 47a-15(2).
Here, the court finds that the defendant’s behavior toward tenants was not raised in the pretermination notice and is not substantially the same act or omission as the behavior toward the plaintiff’s employees set forth in said notice. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot rely on the defendant’s behavior toward other tenants for any claim that requires a pretermination notice. See Housing Authority v. Rivera, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session, Docket No. NHSP-113781 (March 13, 2015, Ecker, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 190) (the court can only evict based on allegations in a pretermination notice). The plaintiff may rely on said behavior for the serious nuisance claim, which does not require a pretermination notice and a right to cure.
However, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof as to the serious nuisance claim. For the purposes relevant here, serious nuisance means "inflicting bodily harm upon another tenant or the landlord or threatening to inflict such harm with the present ability to effect the harm and under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat will be carried out ... [or] conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord ..." Section 47a-15(A), (C).
Physical assaults have been found to constitute a serious nuisance. See Hamilton Park Associates, LP v. Alcena, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-19-6105245-S (September 12, 2019, Foley, J.T.R.); Housing Authority v. Morrow, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Housing Session at Norwalk, Docket No. SPNO-9406-15836 (May 16, 1995, Tierney, J.); Hartford East Apartments v. Easton, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-127220 (September 12, 2005, Dos Santos, J.) (39 Conn.L.Rptr. 910). Serious threats of imminent harm have been found to constitute a serious nuisance. See Suburban Greater Hartford Realty Management Corp. v. Edwards, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-148230 (April 24, 2009, Gilligan, J.), rev’d on other grounds, 123 Conn.App. 295, 1 A.3d 1138 (2010) (enraged tenant who threatened to "blow someone’s f ... ing head off" and tracked the landlord down at his place of business committed a serious nuisance). Setting fire to the common area of a housing complex has also been found to constitute a serious nuisance; see West Haven Housing Authority v. Salvestrini, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-18-6008676-S (December 28, 2018, Cordani, J.); as has causing a fire after disabling a smoke detector. See Woodside Village v. Gonzalez, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-18-6010483-S (May 8, 2019, Shah, J.). On the other hand, a seriously cluttered apartment with three running refrigerators was found not to constitute a serious nuisance as the condition did not create an immediate and serious risk of fire or danger to the safety of other tenants. See Cardinal Realty Investors, LLC v. Bernasconi, 287 Conn. 136, 140, 946 A.2d 1242 (2008).
In the present case, the defendant did not inflict bodily harm on another tenant or any of the plaintiff’s employees, nor did he threaten to inflict such harm. Although the defendant’s statements to the plaintiff’s employees that he hoped they would have a heart attack and die, and that he knew what car they drove and where they lived certainly could be perceived as veiled threats and reasonably cause alarm, they were not, on their face, threats to inflict bodily harm. Moreover, they were not made with a present ability to effect bodily harm or under circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a threat of bodily harm would in fact be carried out. Indeed, the evidence supports the conclusion that the plaintiff’s employees were concerned about the defendant’s behavior escalating and about the potential for future harm as opposed to being fearful of a present threat of bodily harm. As for the tenants, none testified as to any threat of bodily harm. Similarly, there was no immediate and serious danger.
This case is more akin to Bates Woods Apartments v. Whitehead-Swain, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 1023174 (July 18, 2007, Abrams, J.). There, the court found that a pattern of verbally abusive and obscene behavior by the defendant directed at other tenants, which had resulted in numerous calls to the police, did not rise to the level of serious nuisance. "While the Court feels great sympathy for the targets of [the defendant’s] wrath and the other tenants in the complex, the law provides them with avenues of relief, both criminal and civil ..." Id. See also Rose Hill Estates, LLC v. McGuinness, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Housing Session, Docket No. CV-19-6104751-S (April 10, 2019, Foley, J.T.R.) (several incidents of loud and obnoxious behavior and yelling at the property manager, which caused the manager to "feel uneasy," did not rise to the level of a serious nuisance).
For the above reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving that the defendant’s conduct constituted a serious nuisance.
The First and Fourth Counts- Nuisance and § 47a-11
In the First and Fourth Counts, the plaintiff seeks to evict the defendant on the basis of nuisance and violation of his tenant responsibilities pursuant to § 47a-11 by disturbing his neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment and/or committing a nuisance or a serious nuisance. Pursuant to § 47a-11(g), a tenant shall "conduct himself ... in a manner that will not disturb his neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of the premises or constitute a nuisance, as defined in section 47a-32 ..." Thus, a tenant’s obligation to not engage in a nuisance activity is grounded in § 47a-11(g) so that both the First Count and the Fourth Count hinge on whether the defendant violated § 47a-11(g) by committing a nuisance or otherwise. General Statutes § 47a-32 defines nuisance as including but not limited to "any conduct which interferes substantially with the comfort or safety of other tenants or occupants of the same or adjacent buildings or structures."
The defendant is a protected tenant pursuant to § 47a-23c(a)(1)(B) due to his mental disability. "General Statutes § 47a-23c is sometimes called the ‘good cause’ eviction statute and applies to evictions involving a protected class of tenants, namely those who are elderly, blind or disabled and who reside in a building [or a complex] that consists of five or more dwelling units. In enacting this good cause eviction statute, the legislature sought to protect elderly, blind and ... disabled tenants from evictions, other than those that were instituted for good cause." 41 Talcott, LLC v. Cutter, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-11-4016092-S (June 28, 2012, Baldini, J.). Section 47a-23c is a remedial statute, intended to benefit a protected class of tenants and must be construed liberally in favor of those it seeks to protect. O’Brien Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 215 Conn. 367, 373, 576 A.2d 469 (1990). The statute both limits the grounds upon which a protected tenant may be evicted and imposes a higher standard for eviction on those grounds that are allowed.
Section 47a-23c was amended in 2012 to protect tenants "with a physical or mental disability." Prior to that, it applied to the "blind" or "physically disabled." The defendant testified as to his mental disability. While the plaintiff’s reply generally denied all special defenses, the plaintiff did not contest the defendant’s disability at trial. Indeed, the plaintiff’s witnesses testified as to efforts made to accommodate the defendant’s disability and to the fact that the plaintiff’s properties, including Franklin Park West, provide housing for elderly and disabled residents. On the basis of this testimony, the court concludes that the defendant is mentally disabled for the purposes of the protected tenant statute.
Section 47a-23c(b)(1)(C) prevents a landlord from evicting a protected tenant for a violation of § 47a-11 unless such violation "materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants." Thus, conduct that constitutes an ordinary nuisance and grounds for evicting a nonprotected tenant may not support an eviction of a protected tenant. For example, nuisance behavior that substantially interferes with the comfort of other tenants, but does not materially affect their health and safety, will not support an eviction of a protected tenant. Also, behavior directed at nontenant occupants or neighbors will not support an eviction of a protected tenant based on nuisance or any other violation of § 47a-11. Only violations of tenant responsibilities under § 47a-11, including nuisance behavior, that materially affect the health and safety of other tenants will support such an eviction. The plaintiff in the present case cannot prevail on the First and Fourth Counts because (1) the pretermination notice did not include notice of violations based on behavior directed at other tenants, and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot rely on such behavior to support an eviction on these grounds; and (2) even if the plaintiff could so rely, the court finds insufficient evidence that the defendant’s behavior toward other tenants materially affected their health and safety. Although the defendant’s behavior toward the other tenants might have been annoying, disturbing, and offensive, causing them to avoid being outside when he was in the area, the court finds that it did not materially affect their health and safety. See Waterbury Housing Authority v. Lebel, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Housing Session, Docket No. SPWA-9008-08613 (July 8, 1991, Vertefeuille, J.) (noise that disturbed other tenants did not materially affect their health and safety so as to support an eviction of a protected tenant).
The Second Count- Lease Violations
Having disposed of the First, Third, and Fourth Counts of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court now turns to the Second Count, which seeks to evict the defendant for violating his lease agreement. Section 47a-23c(b)(1)(D) requires that, in order to evict a protected tenant, any noncompliance with the rental agreement must be "material." "[W]hether a tenant’s default under a lease constitutes a material breach of the lease is a question of fact ..." St. John Urban Development Corp. v. Chisholm, 111 Conn.App. 649, 653, 960 A.2d 1080 (2008).
Section 9 of the lease agreement entitled "TENANT AUTHORIZED RESIDENT (HOUSEHOLD MEMBER) OBLIGATIONS" describes the obligations and responsibilities of the defendant as a tenant of the plaintiff. Subsection (q) states that the tenant shall "[n]ot engage in any activity that threatens the health, safety or right of peaceful enjoyment of the PHA Authority property by other residents or employees of the Authority." The plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s conduct violated this provision. For the reasons previously stated, the court will consider only the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff’s employees to determine if such conduct constituted a material violation of the lease.
On the basis of the totality of the evidence and testimony presented and the facts as found by the court, the court finds that the defendant engaged in a persistent pattern of harassing, verbally abusive, intimidating, and even stalking behavior toward the plaintiff’s employees. This behavior included yelling loudly at employees; calling them demeaning and derogatory names; threatening on a regular basis to have them fired if they did not respond to his demands; making intimidating statements indicating that he knows what car they drive, where they live, and whether they have children; all while also watching and lying in wait in or around the plaintiff’s office and the parking area. Even if the professional employees of a public housing authority might rightly be expected to endure a certain amount of inconvenience or disturbance, they should not be expected to endure the behavior described herein. This behavior continued after the pretermination notice was filed and after the right to cure date. The defendant’s conduct not only substantially interfered with the peaceful enjoyment of the property by the plaintiff’s employees, but it regularly interfered with their ability to perform their jobs and caused them to reasonably fear for their safety.
Certainly, the defendant has the right to complain about conditions at the property, call public authorities, and even try to have employees fired if he chooses; however, he does not have the right to verbally abuse, harass, and stalk employees, disrupt their work on a regular basis, and cause them to fear for their safety. It is true that the defendant’s voice is naturally louder than others’, and he may become more frustrated and persistent because of his disability; however, his behavior in the present case went well beyond that. The court finds that the defendant was capable of controlling his behavior and simply chose not to until after the notice to quit was served. Thus, the court finds that he engaged in said behavior knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally.
The court finds that the defendant’s actions constitute material noncompliance with the rental agreement and good cause for his eviction pursuant to § 47a-23c.
Equitable Factors
The defendant is an intellectually disabled tenant in a public housing complex. He is on social security disability income. He testified that he has applied for housing with other municipal housing authorities in the area and is on a waiting list. There was no evidence that he has other available housing. In addition, since the notice to quit was filed, the defendant has promised to refrain from the behavior set forth herein and to limit his contacts with the plaintiff’s employees. There was no evidence that he engaged in the complained behavior in the months immediately before trial. The defendant asked not to be evicted, testified that he has remained "quiet and orderly" since March 2019, and promised to continue to do so.
Weighing the equitable factors in this case, the court finds that the harm to the defendant, a disabled and protected tenant, caused by evicting him from his publicly subsidized housing when he has no readily available alternate housing would outweigh any harm to the plaintiff by staying such eviction and giving the defendant additional time to locate other housing. Here, the harm to the defendant is great while the injury to the plaintiff is limited and curable. Indeed, it appears that the defendant cured his behavior months before trial, albeit after the right to cure date.
Therefore, having found for the plaintiff, the court will nevertheless exercise its equitable authority to stay the defendant’s eviction for six months from the date of judgment. During the stay, the defendant shall abide by the terms of his lease agreement, including that he not engage in any activity that threatens the health, safety, or right of peaceful enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property by other residents or by the plaintiff’s employees. The court also orders that, absent an emergency, the defendant shall not enter the plaintiff’s offices unless accompanied by another adult. Upon any violation of the terms of the stay, the plaintiff may file an affidavit of noncompliance. If, after a hearing, the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms of the stay, it may order an immediate execution.