Opinion
Rehearing Granted 3 Cal. 214 at 218.
Appeal from the County Court of the County of Santa Clara.
This was an action of forcible entry and detainer. The plaintiff claimed 160 acres of land near the City of San Jose under the pre-emption laws of the United States, and by virtue of an Act of the Legislature of California, entitled " An Act prescribing the mode of Maintaining and Detending Possessory Actions on Public Lands in this State," a verdict was rendered against the defendant. He moved for a new trial, and judgment being entered against him, he appealed to the County Court.
The plaintiff moved the County Court to dismiss the appeal, on the grounds stated in the appellant's first point. The Court refused to dismiss the appeal and the plaintiff excepted. The Court tried the case without a jury, by consent, and rendered a judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed. A statement of facts was duly served and filed by the plaintiff, and an amended statement was duly served and filed by the defendant. But the Court did not settle the statement.
COUNSEL
1st. The County Courterred in overruling the motion to dismiss the appeal from the Justice's Court, because there was a motion for a new trial still pending in the Justice's Court, and because the costs of the Court were not paid, as required by law, before an appeal could be taken. (See Compiled Laws, p. 632, § 627.)
2d. The County Court erred in refusing to permit plaintiff and appellant to show how the land was improved or enhanced in value by the improvements of the plaintiff and and appellant, that being a material point to be proven. (See § 4 Possessory Act, Compiled Laws, 897.)
3d. There was a forcible and unlawful entry and unlawful detainer by the defendant, in the actual possession of plaintiff, and the County Court erred in refusing to give judgment for the plaintiff and appellant.
4th. There was no finding of the facts by the Court sitting as a jury, as the law requires, upon which to base the judgment of the Court. The judgment was entered on the 11th day of May, and the finding of the Court was not made until the 12th day of May, A. D. 1854, being after the rendition and entry of judgment, and after the Court had adjourned.
Wallace & Ryland, for Appellant, made the following points:
Williams, Morse & Campbell, for Respondent.
JUDGES: Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Ch. J. Murray dissenting.
OPINION
HEYDENFELDT, Judge
In overruling a motion for rehearing, Mr. Ch. J. Murray filed the following opinion:
I am of opinion, the petition for rehearing should be overruled. The question is one of practice alone, and having been decided by a majority of the Court, I abandon my objections, and acquiesce in the judgment.
DISSENT:
MURRAY
Mr. Ch. J. Murray delivered the following dissenting opinion:
It is my misfortune to differ from a majority of the Court in this case. Although the question is one of practice, which, when settled either way, may operate justly, still it is not without importance.
Section 180, chapter5th of the Practice Act provides, " Upon the trial of an issue of fact by the Court, its decis shall be given in writing and filed with the clerk, within ten days after the trial took place. In giving the decision, the facts found, and conclusions of law, shall be separately stated. Judgment upon the decision shall be executed accordingly. In the case of Russel v. Armador , 2 Cal. 305, Court held that the finding was the basis of the judgment, in the same manner as the verdict of a jury; " and it follows," says the Court, " that without such decision the judgment cannot stand."
If the decision of the Court upon the questions of law and fact is to be regarded like the verdict of a jury, as the predicate of the judgment, it follows, that as no judgment could be rendered in anticipation of the verdict of the jury, or until the verdict was actually returned and recorded, so no judgment can be rendered until the Court has actually reduced its findings to writing.
The object of the statute in allowing ten day's time, was for the purpose of enabling the Judge to separate the questions of law and fact, and to arrive at a proper decision of the points involved, not only for the convenience of the Court, and for the purpose of securing a correct administration of justice, but also to enable the parties below who wish to appeal or move for new trial, to understand the grounds on which the Court bases its judgment.
If, however, the Court can pronounce its oral opinion from the Bench, on which judgment is entered, and afterwards file its decision in vacation, or after the lapse of months, it would be impossible for the party wishing to move for new trial, to know whether the Court had decided against him on a question of law or fact. It might very well be, that he would acquiesce in the decision, if based upon a question of fact, but in order to ascertain this, he is driven to his appeal or mandamus, to learn what it was his right to know in the first place, viz: the reason why judgment had been rendered against him.
It is said this rule will work great hardship and inconvenience to the Courts below, when deciding causes on the eve of adjournment; that, in such cases, they may not be able to give their reasons for deciding a case, but may, during vacation, reduce their opinions to writing; in other words, find reasons to bolster up or sustain a previous judgment. A judgment for which a Court is unable to give any reasons, at the time of its rendition is, in my opinion, of but little account, and if the Court requires time to reduce it to shape, it would be as well to take time to consider the questions involved, before final judgment. The Court is not compelled to find and file its conclusions within the ten days provided by statute, as we have already decided the provision as to time, is directory. The better practice, therefore, in my opinion, would be to find the conclusions, in all cases, before entering judgment. In fact, from a careful examination of the statute, as well as the previous decision of this Court, I can arrive at no other conclusion than that the finding must, in every case, precede the judgment, and that a judgment rendered before such finding is void.
For these reasons, I am of opinion that there is no finding of the Court below, as required by statute, and that the judgment ought to be reversed.